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SYNOPSIS 
This thesis proposes that all legal systems use objective standards as an integral part of their conceptual 
foundation. To demonstrate this point, this thesis will show that Jewish law, ancient Athenian law, Roman law 
and canon law use an objective standard like English common law’s ‘reasonable person’ to judge human 
behaviour. It argues that the universal use of objective standards dictates that human reason, a capability 
possessed by all mentally complete human beings, holds that objective standards are an important tool in 
judicial reasoning.  
To establish a just system of law, this thesis contends that objective standards should be used when judging 
human behaviour. This thesis, however, does not argue that purely objective standards should be used. Instead, a 
hybrid standard would suffice. In either standard, objectivity is present. This thesis therefore rejects using purely 
subjective standards to adjudicate human conduct. Whilst subjective elements are taken into account, such as 
sex, disability or other personal features of a defendant, this remains consistent with the objectivity thesis 
because subjective elements are not the basis by which fault is assessed. Fault is assessed objectively however, 
to ensure fairness, the defendant’s personal features are taken into consideration to ensure that he is not held to a 
standard no one can meet. The use of objective standards to determine accountability after individual 
idiosyncracies are factored into judgement, without those idiosyncracies determining the outcome. This is why 
the inclusion of subjective elements remains consistent with the objectivity thesis.  
The introductory chapter summarises this thesis and its methodology, and positions this thesis in its relevant 
jurisprudential context. The second chapter of this thesis identifies the use of objective standards in ‘Jewish 
law’. This term will refer to historical Jewish law in ancient times down to and including Maimonides in the 
twelfth century. After showing the use of objective standards in Jewish law, chapter three examines the use of 
objective standards in ancient Athenian law, focusing on the crime of homicide.  
With an analysis of ancient Athenian law in chapter three, this thesis proceeds to examine the use of objective 
standards in Roman law. After identifying the ancestor of common law’s ‘reasonable person’ in chapter four - 
Roman law’s homo constantissimus, chapter five continues to trace the use of objective standards in canon law 
jurisprudential thought. This chapter will focus on canon law issued before 1582 A.D. when Pope Gregory XIII 
revised and promulgated the Corpus Juris Canonici (the body of canon law).  
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Chapter six assesses the final legal system, English common law. This chapter successfully shows that this legal 
system used objective standards from as early as the sixth century A.D. Because all of the legal systems 
assessed in this thesis used objective standards in adjudication to ensure that their laws were just, we can infer 
that through reason, human beings view objective standards as a useful judicial or legislative tool. Chapter seven 
provides a defence to a potential argument against this thesis made from tradition.  
This objection argues that objective standards were only used in all these legal systems because they were 
blindly adopted through legal succession. In chapter seven, it is contended that this idea is false. Legal systems 
did not adopt prior philosophies or judicial tools blindly. Instead, these precedents had undergone a process to 
ensure they were befitting for society.  
Chapter eight explains why it is important we understand that all human judgement relies on objective elements 
like those evident in the reasonable man test of English common law. This thesis argues that the law ought not 
to apply subjective standards because in doing so it offends a principle throughout legal systems. The thesis 
traces the history of objectivity through Jewish law, ancient Athenian law, Roman law, canon law and common 
law. This chapter will assess two legal principles used in Australian law – mandatory minimum sentencing and 
strict liability. This chapter demonstrates how these contemporary laws offend the principle of objectivity – and 
argues for their revocation.  
The final chapter provides the conclusion that because objective standards are universally used to evaluate 
human behaviour; objective standards therefore play an important role to perpetuate a moral judgement.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
I OVERVIEW 
English jurors are familiar with objective standards, like the reasonable person, that are used to determine 
responsibilities of the defendant in many areas of the law. However, the pervasive existence of objective 
standards used to assess responsibility is not fully comprehended by jurisprudential thinkers. In the words of 
Liza H. Gold, the ‘reasonable person standard represents the law’s attempt to devise an ‘objective’ standard 
against which to measure reasonable behaviour.’1  
 
This thesis will show that the pervasive presence of a reasonable person standard within a diverse variety of 
historical legal systems will suggest that objective standards play an important role in adjudication. As Nicole 
A. Vincent noted, ‘one strategy for the justification of objective standard argues that they improve individual 
behaviour and thus benefit society.’2 
  
This thesis will conclude that the essentiality of reason behind objective standards, like a reasonable person, is 
not well understood. This thesis also submits that the objective nature of human reason as the foundation of 
law’s objective standards requires further analysis if law is to be made a more effective social engineering tool. 
 
This thesis does not propose that all persons exercising their human reason will unanimously agree that specific 
acts are, or are not, reasonable. Rather, despite the differences between the social constructs of reasonableness in 
different societies, all societies used objective standards to enable them to define reasonableness. Richard 
Hooker (1554-1600 A.D.)
3
 developed a legal taxonomy whereby ‘natural law’ or the ‘law of reason’ ‘binds 
reasonable creatures and with which by reason they may most plainly perceive themselves ‘bound' to 'obey’.’4  
  
In other words, Richard Hooker argued that human reason is naturally inclined to construct the existence of 
objective standards by which human beings should obey. Although Hooker argued that murder, rape and theft 
                                                          
1 Liza H Gold, Sexual Harassment: Psychiatric Assessment in Employment Litigation (American Psychiatric Publications, 2008) 158. 
2 Nicole A Vincent, Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2013) 149. 
3 Ian S Markham, The Blackwell Companion to the Theologians, 2 Volume Set (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) vol 1 337. See also; Mark Godfrey, Law and 
Authority in British Legal History, 1200-1900 (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 199; C Fitzsimons Allison, The Rise of Moralism: The Proclamation of the 
Gospel from Hooker to Baxter (Regent College Publishing, 2003) 1. 
4 Norman Doe, ‘Richard Hooker’ in Mark Hill QC and R H Helmholz (eds), Great Jurists in English History (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 119. 
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were always eternal violations of objective standards of the law, a position that this thesis neither affirms nor 
denies, Hooker nonetheless understood that the particular forms of punishment would vary from society to 
society according to other particular socio-cultural variants. Implicit in all socio-legal jurisprudence is the 
sociological observation that, as argued by Hooker, although every society is bound by objective standards 
derived from the natural law, ‘its subsidiary laws may vary according to the needs of particular times and 
places.’5   
 
Judges in any culture, or civilization, use objective standards to test the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the conduct 
of the defendant. If the defendant reached exactly or closely to the standard that should be kept by the defendant, 
there was no breach of the law and the defendant was acquitted.
6
 But to the extent there was a discrepancy, a 
judge would find guilt and the degree of discrepancy to determine the measure of penalty or punishment. 
 
Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini note:  
 
Moreover, the law does not take into account minor, individual differences of character or ability in establishing a 
standard against which to evaluate conduct, but exceptions do exist: children are held to the standard of a reasonable 
child of the same age; and a person's particular talent or training is also considered.7 
 
When enforcing liability, all societiestake into consideration the personal characteristics of the defendant.  
 
According to English common law, a child was held to objective standards established for a similar situated 
child and an impaired person was held to the standard of a hypothetical reasonable person with the same 
disability.
8
 In fact, this thesis shows that Jewish law,
9
 Roman law
10
 and English common law
11
 exempt minors 
                                                          
5 Harold Berman, Law and Revolution II (Harvard University Press, 2006) 234. 
6 Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 43. See also; Steven L Emanuel, 
Criminal Law (Aspen Publishers Online, 2007) 124; Nigel Eastman, Forensic Psychiatry (OUP Oxford, 2012) 336; Michael Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law 
(OUP Oxford, 2013) 185. 
7 Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini, Reasonableness and Law (Springer Science & Business Media, 2009) 346. See also; Mark A 
Rothstein, 'The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the Law and the Courts' (1999) 83(3) Judicature 116-126. 
8 Neal R Bevans, Tort Law for Paralegals (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2015) 314. 
9 Zeʹev Wilhelm Falk, Introduction to Jewish Law of the Second Commonwealth (Brill Archive, 1972) vol 1 29. See also; E Shochetman, 'Tort Liability of the 
Minor in Jewish Law' (1977) 3 Proceedings 489-502; Walter Jacob and  Moshe Zemer, Crime and Punishment in Jewish Law: Essays and Responses (Berghahn 
Books, 1999) 110; Amnon Carmi, Law and Medicine (Tamar Publishing Company, 1987) 18; Paul R Bindler, Proceedings of the Association of Orthodox 
Jewish Scientists: Behavioral and Social Sciences (Sepher-Hermon Press, 1990) 16. 
10 Simon Leeuwen, Commentaries on Roman-Dutch Law (Stevens and Haynes, 1886) vol 2 252. See also; William Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman 
Antiquities (Harper and Brothers, 1878) 328; Irina Metzler, Fools and Idiots: Intellectual Disability in the Middle Ages (Oxford University Press, 2016) 147; 
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and those who are mentally dysfunctional as being liable for their actions. The justification is because they are 
unable to meet the objective standard established for a reasonable person, since they do not possess the ability to 
reason to the standard of a reasonable person.  
 
Although subjective elements are taken into account, they do not undermine the objectivity thesis because fault 
is not assessed by subjectively. Subjective elements are taken into consideration to allow the defendant to be 
held to an objective standard he is able to satisfy. Objective standards are used to assess culpability when human 
conduct called into question.  
 
All legal systems used objective standards to judge human behaviour. Human beings exercising their reason 
have found that the use of objective standards when adjudicating human culpability, resonates with the 
expectations of that particular society.   
 
II DEFINING THE ‘REASONABLE PERSON’ 
 
English common law defines the reasonable person as the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus,’12 or the ‘reasonable 
man of ordinary intelligence and experience.’13 The ‘reasonable person’ has neighbours as diverse as the 
ordinary prudent man of business,
14
 the officious bystander,
15
 the fair-minded and informed observer,
16
 and ‘the 
reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderer.’17 Henry T. Terry identified that ‘a [reasonably 
prudent man] does not mean an ideal or perfect man, but an ordinary member of the community. He is usually 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Fowler Vincent Harper, Readings in Torts: Selected from Legal Periodicals and Other Sources (Bobbs-Merrill, 1941) 15; Charles Kendall Adams, Johnson's 
Universal Cyclopedia (D Appleton, 1899) vol 4 577. 
11 Barry Nurcombe, Child Mental and the Law (Simon and Schuster, 2010) 41. See also; Joseph Chitty and  H G Beale, Chitty on Contracts: General Principles 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 778; Richard Fox, 'The XYY Offender: A Modern Myth?' in Readings in William McCraney (eds) Criminal Psychology (Ardent 
Media, 1972) 37; James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013) 178; William Bell, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland 
(Bell & Bradfute, 1861) 434. 
12 McGuire v Western Morning News Co Ltd [1903] 2KB 100, 109. 
13 Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448, 457. 
14 Speight v Gaunt (1883) LR 9 App Cas 1, 19-20 (Lord Blackburn). 
15 Shirlaw v Southern Foundries [1939] 2 KB 206, 227 (MacKinnon LJ). 
16 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 52 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
17 Healthcare at Home Ltd v The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49. 
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spoken of as an ordinarily reasonable, careful, and prudent man.’18 The reasonable person was expected to 
exercise ordinary care, not extraordinary care.
19
 
 
English common law does not place the reasonable person in a vacuum. English jurisprudence has not given the 
reasonable person certain characteristics, save for the ability to reason.
20
 That is, as Roy Baker noted, the only 
characteristic that is necessarily exhibited by the reasonable person is the ability to reason.
 21
 There are no other 
characteristics that the reasonable person must contain. The reasonable person is not of a particular age, gender 
or socio-economic status. Although English common law has not provided a dogmatic list of characteristics 
possessed by the reasonable person, save for the ability to reason,
22
 English common law still regards objective 
standards as effective when testing the element of culpability and wrongdoing.  
 
III THE NATURE OF THE REASONABLE PERSON TEST 
Up until the landmark House of Lords decision in DPP v Camplin,
23
 the reasonable person test under English 
law was purely objective with none of the defendant’s personal characteristics taken into consideration.24 
Following this case, the reasonable person test transitioned into what Professor Victoria Nourse
25
 described as a 
‘hybrid standard’.26 Nourse wrote, ‘[t]his reflect[ed] common sense; taken to extremes, no one really want[ed] a 
                                                          
18 Henry T Terry, 'Negligence' (1915) 29(1) Harvard Law Review 47. 
19 Ibid. See also; Jacob E McKnite, 'When Reasonable Care Is Unreasonable: Rethinking the Negligence Liability of Adults with Mental Retardation' (2012) 
38(4) William Mitchell Law Review 1379. 
20 Trevor Adams, Dementia Care Nursing: Promoting Well-being in People with Dementia and Their Families (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 266. See also; 
Joanna Grace Tinus, The Reasonable Person in Criminal Law (Master's Thesis, Queen’s University, 2017) 24; Ngaire Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life: 
Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (Hart Publishing, 2009) 64; Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership (Harvard University Press, 2006) 326 327; Christine K Cassel et al., Geriatric Medicine: An Evidence-Based Approach (Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2006) 1235. 
21 Roy Baker, Defamation Law and Social Attitudes: Ordinary Unreasonable People (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 41. 
22 Adams, above n 20, 266. See also; Tinus, above n 20, 24; Naffine, above n 20, 64; Nussbaum, above n 20, 326 327; Cassel et al., above n 20, 1235. 
23 (1978) A C 705. 
24 Stanley M H Yeo, 'Lessons on Provocation from the Indian Penal Code' (1992) 41(3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 616. See also; 
Louise Sayers, 'The Failure of the Coroner’s and Justice Act 2009 to Recognise the Relevance of a Defendant’s Cultural Background to Successfully Raising the 
Partial Defence of Loss of Control’ (2012) Durham University 1.1;Tony Storey and Alan Lidbury, Criminal Law (Routledge, 2009) 6; Lucia Zedner and  Julian 
V Roberts, Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford University Press, 2012) 117. 
‘In Bedder v DPP [(1954) 1 W.LR. 1119] the House of Lords held that the reasonable man was an ordinary normal adult person; thus, a purely objective test 
was imposed. So, if the defendant was a juvenile, he was disadvantaged, as the self-control of an adult person would be expected of him’ Cf. Simon Parsons, 
'Provocation: To Be or Not To Be An Attributed Characteristic' (2000) 15(1) The Denning Law Journal 141. 
25 Professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center. Cf. George P Fletcher and Russell Christopher, George Fletcher's Essays on Criminal Law (OUP 
USA, 2013) xiii. See also; Markus Dirk Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) xx. 
26 Victoria Nourse, 'After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the Subjectivity Objectivity Question' (2008) 11 New Criminal Law Review 36. See, e.g., State v. 
Bellino, 625 A.2d 1381, 1384 (Conn. App. 1993) (‘It is settled that a jury’s evaluation of a claim of self-defence has both subjective and objective elements’). 
As Holly Maguigan notes, appellate courts sometimes obscure this dualism by using misleading terms for their own standards, using the term ‘subjective,’ for 
example, to describe a standard that is both subjective and objective, or using the term ‘objective’ to describe a similar standard. See Holly Maguigan, Battered 
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standard that [wa]s completely subjective or completely objective.’27 The reasonable person test considered the 
personal idiosyncrasies of the defendant. However, although subjective elements were taken into consideration, 
objective standards were ultimately used to assess culpability. For this reason, the presence of subjectivity in the 
reasonable person test does not undermine the objectivity thesis. The objective reasonable person text was 
versatile enough to take the personal idiosyncrasies of each defendant into account before accountability was 
assessed.
28
 Despite English common law’s temporal use of purely objective standards, it rejected the use of 
purely subjective standards. This was demonstrated in English common law’s rejection of the Robin Hood 
defence.
29
 Whilst a purely objective test was adopted in English common law, it was met with much criticism.
30
 
Despite English common law’s acceptance of wholly objective tests, it in no way undermines this thesis. This 
thesis does not contend that a hybrid test was, or is, necessary for a just legal system but rather, objective 
standards are necessary to judge human conduct. Whether a standard is purely objective or is a hybrid of 
objective/subjective elements, both litmus tests possess objectivity.  
 
Rather, the reasonable person test was a hybrid test
31
 that identified fault objectively
32
 while factoring in the 
personal idiosyncrasies of the individual concerned.
33
 Because objectivity is the basis by which fault was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Women and Self-Defence Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals (1991) 140(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 379, 410 (explaining 
that a majority of states use a combined standard). 
27 Nourse, above n 26, 36. 
28 Rachael Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 448. See also; Ipp Committee, Ipp Report 7.38; Nita Farahany, The Impact of 
Behavioral Sciences on Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 230; Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal 
Courtroom (NYU Press, 2003) 206-207; Katherine Hunt Federle, Children and the Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach with Cases, Materials and Comments 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) 233; Norrie, above n 6, 311. McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199 outlined that the standard of care expected of a child is said 
to the standard of a “reasonable person of that age”; however the law does not allow the particular folly or carelessness of the specific child to be taken into 
consideration. Cited in Wendy Bonython, 'The Standard of Care in Negligence: The Elderly Defendant With Dementia in Australia' (2011) 10 (2) Canberra Law 
Review 120, 124 - 125. 
29 Walker v Stones (2000) 4 All ER 412, 414 (Slade CJ). See also; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, 114–117 (Lord Millett) and 27-43 (Lord 
Hutton); Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (1995) 2 AC 378, 106 (Lord Nicholls). 
30 ‘…a purely objective standard is unduly harsh because it ignores the characteristics which inevitably and justifiably shape the defender’s perspective, thus 
holding him (or her) to a standard he simply cannot meet.’ Cf. Susan Estrich, 'Defending Women' (1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 1430, 1434. See also; 
Stephen Shute and A P Simester, Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford University Press, 2002) 85-87; Glanville Williams, 'Provocation 
and the Reasonable Man - Another View' (1954) Criminal Law Review 898; M D G, 'Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of 
the Reasonable Man' (1958) 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1021. 
31 Gordon Killeen, Annotated Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security Act (CCH Canadian Limited, 2009) 144. See also; Soper v The Queen (1997) 97 
D.T.C. 5407 (Fed C.A.); Ramadan, above n 33, 38; Lee, above n 28, 206; Whitley R P Kaufman, Justified Killing: The Paradox of Self-Defense (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2009) 10; Joel Samaha, Criminal Law (Cengage Learning, 2016) 178. 
32 Pierre Widmer and W H van Boom, Unification of Tort Law: Fault (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 33. See also; Ulrich Magnus,  Miquel Martín-Casals 
and  W H Van Boom, Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 30; Mayo Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: 
An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard (Oxford University Press, 2003) 18; Richard A Mann and Barry S Roberts, Smith and Roberson’s 
Business Law (Cengage Learning, 2016) 108; Richard A Mann and  Barry S Roberts, Business Law and the Regulation of Business (Cengage Learning, 2016) 
114; Len Young Smith, Smith and Roberson's Business Law (West Group, 1988) 82; Jean-Louis Baudouin and  Allen M Linden, Tort Law in Canada (Kluwer 
Law International, 2010) 106. 
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assessed, the subjective elements which are taken into account (including the personal features of a defendant), 
do not affect the objectivity thesis. The subjective elements taken into consideration are personal factors such as 
age
34
 and experience
35
 of the defendant. This hybrid approach created a flexible test. Not only was this test used 
in assessing the conduct of adults, but also of children.
36
 The pervasive use of this test showed that despite 
certain characteristics of the defendant, so long as he had the ability to reason, he could be held accountable to 
objective standards. In this way, the reasonable person test was used by the law to assess whether human 
individuals were conforming to societal standards or not.  
 
The assessment of reasonableness was always judged by objective standards to evaluate whether the defendant’s 
conduct conformed to social standards. For the defendant to be culpable of misconduct, he needed to possess the 
ability to reason.  
 
The unanimous opinion of the jurists in this multi-jurisdictional study has proclaimed that it was always 
objective standards that enabled judgement to be passed according to law. This thesis has demonstrated that 
subjective standards were never used as a sufficient foundation for judging human behaviour. English common 
law courts rejected the use of purely subjective standards
37
 to judge human behaviour as evident in the cases of 
Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan,
38 
Walker v Stones
39 
and
 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley.
40
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
33 Hisham M Ramadan, Reconstructing Jury Instructions in Homicide Offenses: Rethinking Homicide Law (University Press of America, 2004) 38. See also; 
Lee, above n 28, 206; Joseph Byrne, Administration Ethics: Executive Decisions in Canadian Healthcare (Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2017) 120; Joel Samaha, 
Criminal Law (Cengage Learning, 2016) 178; Juan Pablo Perez-Leon Acevedo, 'The Inconvenience of the Reasonable Person Standard in Criminal Law' (2014) 
73 Derecho Pontificia universidad católica del Perú 503; Wayne R LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law: Sections 9.1 to 17.5 (West Group, 2003) 149; Killeen, 
above n 31, 144; Yann Joly, Routledge Handbook of Medical Law and Ethics (Routledge, 2014) 43. 
34 James R Acker and  David C Brody, Criminal Procedure: A Contemporary Perspective (Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2011) 268. See also; William P Statsky, 
Essentials of Torts (Cengage Learning, 2011) 158; Michael T Molan, Cases & Materials on Criminal Law (Psychology Press, 2005) 75; Federle, above n 28, 
248; Kern Alexander and  M David Alexander, American Public School Law (Cengage Learning, 2004) 558; Ramadan, above n 33, 53. 
35 Green v R (1996) 191 CLR 369. See also; Moran, above n 32, 214; David Hill and  Carol Brown, Hill and Brown's Landlord and Tenant Law in a Nutshell 
(West Academic, 5th ed, 2010) 163; Lawrence C Levine, Julie A Davies and Edward J Kionka, A Torts Anthology (Anderson Publishing Company, 1999) 54; 
Patrick Kelley, 'Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the Law of Tort' (2003) 48 The American Journal of Jurisprudence 189-191; Kristin Harlow, 'Applying the 
Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness' 68(6) Ohio State Law Journal 1740; McKnite, above n 
19, 1381. 
36 David Lanham,  David Wood,  Bronwyn Bartal and Rob Evans, Criminal Laws in Australia (Federation Press, 2006) 205-206. See also; William P Statsky, 
Essentials of Torts (Cengage Learning, 2011) 158; Albert P Melone and  Allan Karnes, The American Legal System: Perspectives, Politics, Processes, and 
Policies (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) 381; Catherine Carpenter et al., Emanuel Multistate Review: MBE Refresher Course-Torts (Aspen Publishers Online, 
2008) 30; Barry Feld, Juvenile Justice Administration in a Nutshell (West Academic, 3rd ed, 2013) 135-138; Scott F Johnson and  Sarah E Redfield, Education 
Law: A Problem-Based Approach (LexisNexis, 2012) 692-693. 
37 Gary Watt, Cases & Materials on Equity & Trusts (Oxford University Press, 10th ed, 2016) 485. See also; Julian M Burling and Kevin Lazarus, Research 
Handbook on International Insurance Law and Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 14, Paul S Davies, Graham Virgo and Edward Burn, Equity & 
Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP Oxford, 2013) 886, Richard Clements & Ademola Abass, Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP Oxford, 
2011) 497, Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords, Great Britain. Privy Council. Judicial Committee, Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England 
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IV THE ‘REASONABLE PERSON’ AND HOW IT IS USED 
 
The Webster's New World Law Dictionary defined the reasonable person and explained how this standard was 
used: 
[The reasonable person was] an imaginary person who was used as the legal measuring stick against which to 
determine whether or not a defendant exercised appropriate caution in an undertaking, or whether he exhibited 
negligence by not taking the precautions that the hypothetical reasonable person may have taken under the given 
circumstances, or by doing something that a reasonable person would not have done.41 
The Oxford Dictionary of Law also explained the definition and function of the reasonable person as: 
An ordinary citizen sometimes referred to as the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus.’ The standard of care in actions for 
negligence was based on what a reasonable person might be expected to do considering the circumstances and the 
foreseeable consequences. The standard was not entirely uniform: a lower standard was expected of a child, but a 
higher standard was expected of someone, such as a doctor, who purported to possess a special skill.42 
The consecutive use of objective standards without any fundamental alteration illustrates its efficiency for 
human justice. This implementation therefore promotes the idea that reason, a capability assumed to be 
engraved into all mentally complete human beings, holds that human behaviour cannot be judged without the 
element of objectivity.   
It can be seen from these definitions that the term 'reasonable person' has not evolved extensively from its 
original meaning. Despite the differing perspectives of what constitutes a reasonable person and how he would 
react under a specific set of circumstances, it was universally agreed that this standard is objective.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Wales, The Law Reports: House of Lords, and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and peerage cases, Parts 7-12 (Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting for England and Wales, 2002) 172; Malcolm A Clarke and David Yates, Contracts of Carriage by Land and Air (CRC Press, 2013) 100–101. 
38 (1995) 2 AC 378, 106 (Lord Nicholls). 
39 (2000) 4 All ER 412, 414 (Slade CJ). 
40 [2002] UKHL 12, 114–117 (Lord Millett). 
41 Jonathan Wallace and  Susan Ellis Wild, Webster's New World Law Dictionary (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010) 216. 
42 Elizabeth A Martin, Oxford Dictionary of Law (OUP Oxford, 2009) 409. 
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Even though the reasonable person standard was co-opted to different purposes by law as societies evolved, the 
underlying standard has not changed. The reasonable person test was used to assess what a reasonable person 
would have, or should have, foreseen or done in the same circumstances.43  
According to English common law, if a neutral judge declared that the defendant had failed to act in the manner 
in which a reasonable person would act under the circumstances, the defendant was held liable for the crime 
with which he was charged.
44
  
Chief Justice Robert French AC explained that the law engaged the services of the reasonable person to judge 
human conduct.
45
 English common law used the reasonable person as the objective standard, the central figure 
that represented socially acceptable behaviour that the defendant was expected to mirror. Professor John 
Gardner remarked:
46
  
 
All of these colourful characters, and many others besides,47 provide important standard-setting services to the law. 
But none more so than the village's most venerable resident, that is to say the reasonable person.
48
 
 
According to Stephen Shute and Andrew P. Simester, English common law used objective standards to assess 
whether the defendant’s behaviour was permissible under particular circumstances.49 Lord Steyn stated - ‘in the 
event of a dispute, a neutral judge should decide the case applying an objective standard of reasonableness.’50  
 
                                                          
43 Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107, 120. See also; Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1843-60) AUU ER 47; S I Strong and  Liz Williams, Complete Tort Law: 
Text, Cases, & Materials (OUP Oxford, 2011) 66; Jennifer K Robbennolt and  Ms Valerie P Hans, The Psychology of Tort Law (NYU Press, 2016) 39; Andrew 
Burrows, Principles of the English Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 2015) 147; Alfred R Mele and  Piers Rawling, The Oxford Handbook of 
Rationality (OUP USA, 2004) 126; Thomas J Miceli, Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property and Litigation (Oxford University Press, 1997) 2.17; 
Peter Grovesm, Sourcebook on Intellectual Property Law (Cavendish Publishing, 1997) 646; Richard Schaffer,  Filiberto Agusti and  Lucien J Dhooge, 
International Business Law and Its Environment (Cengage Learning, 2011) 7; Moran, above n 32, 18. 
44 Mauro Bussani and Anthony J Sebok, Comparative Tort Law: Global Perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 29-30. See also; Chad J McGuire, 
Environmental Law from the Policy Perspective: Understanding How Legal Frameworks Influence Environmental Problem Solving (CRC Press, 2014) 246; 
Moran, above n 32, 18; William A Kaplin and  Barbara A Lee, The Law of Higher Education (John Wiley & Sons, 2013) 2.1.1; Baudouin and  Linden, above n 
32, 106. 
45 John Gardner, 'The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person' (2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 563. 
46 Ibid. 
47 For news of a recent arrival from the EU (‘the reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderer’) see Healthcare at Home Ltd v The Common 
Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49. 
48 Gardner, above n 45, 563. 
49 Shute and Simester, above n 30, 85. This thesis is also affirmed in Konrad Zweigert and  Ulrich Drobnig, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981) vol 7 194; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Cosimo Incorporation, 2009) 136; Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, 
and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 2014) 301; Duncan Fairgrieve, Comparative Law in Practice: Contract 
Law in a Mid-Channel Jurisdiction (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016) 40. 
50 Lord Steyn, 'Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men' (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 433. 
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While Lord Steyn has not explained why objective judgement by a neutral judge was required, his assertion was 
not new. This idea was observed in many legal systems, both ancient and modern. 
 
V REASONS FOR CHOOSING A REASONABLE PERSON AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF 
OBJECTIVE STANDARDS  
This thesis chooses to use a ‘reasonable person’ as an example of objective standards because it is universal and 
self-evident.  
(i) Universality  
A reasonable person standard was present in some of the most influential legal systems that have been known to 
the ancient and modern world. The universal application of a reasonable person standard has demonstrated its 
acceptance as an effective objective standard to judge human behaviour.  
Christopher Cherniak identified the universality of a reasonable person is in need of further research: 
The fact that a reasonable person concept turns up in such disparate social structures further suggests its universality. 
A cross-cultural hypothesis worth some systematic exploration, therefore, is that the reasonable person concept is as 
universal as the very idea of a legal code.51 
Even though the judicial application of objective standards required their application to the subjective facts of 
individual cases, objective standards are always in the background and were the basis upon which culpability 
was assessed. It is by the use of objective standards in various legal systems that we can conclude that, through 
universal reason, human beings viewed, and still view, objective standards as imperative for social justice.  
(ii) Self-evident 
Roy Baker stated that the reasonable person contained, by necessity, the ability to reason.
52
 The ability to reason 
is a capability that all mentally complete human beings are assumed to contain.
53
 This capability is assumed to 
                                                          
51 Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (MIT Press, 1990) 145. 
52 Baker, above n 21, 41. 
53 Manuel Velasquez, Philosophy: A Text with Readings (Cengage Learning, 2013) 67. See also; Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Broadview 
Press, 2002) 46; James A Arieti and  Patrick A Wilson, The Scientific & the Divine: Conflict and Reconciliation from Ancient Greece to the Present (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003) 13; Kyu-t'ak Sŏng and  Bum Jung Kim, Respect for the Elderly: Implications for Human Service Providers (University Press of America, 
2009) 8; Girma Yohannes Iyassu Menelik, The Issue Of Human Rights In Africa (GRIN Verlag, 2014) 29; Alan Dean, Complex Life: Nonmodernity and the 
Emergence of Cognition and Culture (Ashgate, 2000) 32; Steven W Gangestad and  Jeffry A Simpson, The Evolution of Mind: Fundamental Questions and 
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be possessed by the reasonable person that enabled him to distinguish between right from wrong. This capability 
allowed the reasonable person test to be used to assess the defendant upon the grounds of self-evident axioms.   
Objective standards were used to assess the defendant’s conduct upon the basis that he should have known what 
actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Such conduct was presumed to be self-evident to the 
defendant and, thus, was known to all mentally competent human beings under these circumstances. 
The defendant was expected to act in a manner that would have been self-evident to a reasonable person. Failure 
to act in accord with the objective standards established for a reasonable person resulted in culpability. In other 
words, how a reasonable person would act under those circumstances was the standard by which the defendant 
was judged.  
I note the disdain some individuals have for the reasonable person test as expressed by Ian Merry and  Alexander 
McCall Smith:  
Even though the courts have repeatedly said that the reasonable person test was anchored in realistic expectations of 
people, the reasonable person test has progressively failed to take account of the inherent human limitations of actual 
reasonable people.54 
Lord Fraser in Whitehouse v Jordan
55
 also expressed this perspective. Mayo Moran in his work titled, 
‘Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard’,56 argued that the 
orthodox understanding of the reasonable person needed to be amended. Moran contends for an egalitarian 
reconstruction of the reasonable person. Although the use of objective standards has been criticised
57
 this thesis 
will dismiss such claims as impractical and flawed when analysed. This thesis does not argue for ‘what’ should 
be the objective standard nor does it look to alter the manner we work out what is reasonable but rather, this 
thesis contends the mere existence of objective standards as a component in determining fault is engrained in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Controversies (Guilford Publications, 2016) 419; Virgil Zeigler-Hill, Lisa L M Welling and Todd K Shackelford, Evolutionary Perspectives on Social 
Psychology (Springer, 2015) 83 and David M Buss and  Patricia H Hawley, The Evolution of Personality and Individual Differences (Oxford University Press, 
2011) 244. 
54 Alan Merry and  Alexander McCall Smith, Errors, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 244-245. See also; Ewoud Hondius, The 
Development of Medical Liability (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 47. 
55 (1981) ALL ER 267, 281. 
56 Moran, above n 32. 
57 See for example, Ibid. 
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human reason. Despite Moran’s critique of ‘what’ should be the objective standard, Moran too disputes that 
objective standards are not only defensible but also essential in assessing criminal culpability.
58
 Moran argued:  
Thus, even for crimes whose mens rea requirements demand subjective foresight, the legal standard itself seems to 
be objective or independent of individual valuations of others in exactly the way that Wilson J insists is so important 
in her quote from Hill.59 Viewed in this light, it seems somewhat odd to insist that this independence of the legal 
standard from the moral makeup of the accused is the distinctive attribute of the objective standard, for this seems 
essential to any legal standard—including those that are uncontroversially subjective.60 
Here Moran was really criticizing Wilson J’s separation of the moral makeup of the accused from the objective 
standard applied. The moral makeup of the accused included his capacity to reason. His moral makeup 
connected with and relied on objective standards that were accessible by human reason.  
Although some may take issue with the reasonable person being used as an objective standard, this thesis does 
not contend that the reasonable person test is the ‘ideal’ standard of objectivity. Rather, a reasonable person test 
is used in this thesis as an illustration of objective standards that was applied throughout all the legal systems 
assessed.  
VI THESIS APPROACH 
Objective standards were used throughout the ancient and modern world.
61
 This thesis provides a historical 
analysis of the presence of a reasonable person test within English common law, Jewish law, ancient Athenian 
law, Roman law and canon law.  
Although some of these legal systems may have influenced each other to use objective standards, influential 
factors do not aid in proving my argument. Human beings have not yet found a methodology to construct a legal 
system that negates the use of objective standards. 
 
Using the results of this survey, the universal use of objective standards will aid in showing that objectivity was 
used in all the legal systems assessed. Specifically, my research question will address the following: 
                                                          
58 Ibid i. 
59 R v Hill (1986) 25 CCC (3d) 322, 345. 
60 Moran, above n 32, 237. 
61 Ruth Sefton-Green, Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 247. See also; Douglas N Husak, 
The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2010) 7; Michael J Moser and  Fu Yu, Doing Business In China (Juris Publishing 
Incorporation, 2014) I-6.1.120; M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) 423; Ronald I 
C Bartsch, International Aviation Law: A Practical Guide (Routledge, 2016) 111; Cees van Dam, European Tort Law (OUP Oxford, 2013) 265; Vladimir Đuro 
Degan, Sources of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) 82. 
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Primary Question: 
 What can be inferred from the presence of a reasonable person test in Jewish law, ancient Athenian 
Law, Roman law, canon law, and English common law? 
Secondary Question: 
 Where did the reasonable person come from historically?  
VII THESIS STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
This thesis will show that objective standards were used in every legal system examined.  
The universal use of objective standards is the central focus of this thesis. The chapters that follow this 
introductory chapter are summarised and set out below. 
 
CHAPTER TWO - THE REASONABLE PERSON IN JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Charting the historical presence of a reasonable person test in the ancient world, chapter two will identify the 
presence of this test, or tests similar or equivalent to it, in Jewish law. In acknowledgement of the ambiguity that 
surrounds the term ‘Jewish law’, this term will refer to historical Jewish law in ancient times down to and 
including Maimonides in the twelfth century. A reasonable person standard was used in Jewish law to evaluate 
human behaviour.  
 
This chapter begins by showing that a reasonable person test was used in the Jewish legal system in relation to 
advertisement
62
 to determine whether an advertisement was deceptive to the reasonable purchaser. If it was 
deceptive, it was prohibited under Jewish law. Aaron Levine used this example to explain that a reasonable 
person standard was used extensively in Jewish business law to regulate trade.
63
 
 
                                                          
62 Aaron Levine, Economic Morality and Jewish Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 18. See also; Aaron Levine, Case Studies in Jewish Business Ethics 
(KTAV Publishing House Incorporated, 2000) 34 & 38; Nicola Lacey, Cecilia Wells and Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 
2003) 56; Aaron Kirschenbaum, 'Punishment in Criminal Law' in The Jewish Law Annual (Taylor & Francis, 1991) 132. 
63 Levine, above n 63, 34–54. 
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This discussion then identifies the use of a reasonable person test in the Jewish law of bailment.
64
 The chapter 
explains how a reasonable person test was used to determine whether property had been abandoned,
65
 especially 
when a third party had taken possession of that property.  
 
The chapter then outlines the use of a reasonable person test in assessing damages under Jewish law whilst also 
providing specific examples mentioned in the Torah.
66
 In Jewish law, the principle of liability for damage 
caused by the defendant was called negligence.
67
 That is, conduct that he should have foreseen would lead to 
damage
68 
since the resulting damage was so usual that most people in his place would have foreseen it.
69 
 
Finally, the discussion moves onto the presence of a reasonable person test in Jewish law concerning the charge 
of homicide and the exemption from criminal liability for children and those who are declared insane. 
CHAPTER THREE – THE REASONABLE PERSON IN ANCIENT ATHENIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
This chapter examines the use of objective standards in ancient Athenian Law. This chapter begins by providing 
a brief description of the introduction of the Draconian Constitution that was introduced by the first Athenian 
legislator,
70
 Draco (seventh century B.C.).
71
 This historical analysis introduces Athens’ second legislator, Solon 
of Athens, who abolished observance to Draco’s laws, save for homicide. This chapter then proceeds to 
demonstrate that Athenian law used a reasonable person standard when assessing the charge of homicide. 
Christopher Carey in his work The Shape of Athenian Laws
72
 notes:  
 
                                                          
64 Judah Bleich, 'Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature' (2003) 37(3) Tradition 87. See also; Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, 
Principles (Jewish Publication Society, 1994) vol 4 1695; A Zvi Ehrman, The Talmud with English Translation and Commentary (El-ʻAm, 1969) 45; Levi 
Meier, Jewish Values in Bioethics (Human Sciences Press, 1986) 70. 
65 Talmud Bavli, Tractate Bava Metzia 24b; Talmud Bavli, Tractate Bava Metzia, Vol. I, notes 20-21, at 24b2, (Schottenstein ed, 2001).  
66 Bernard S Jackson, Modern Research in Jewish Law (Brill Archive, 1980) 7. Shana Schick, ‘Negligence and Strict Liability in the Babylonian and 
Palestinian Talmuds: Two Competing Systems of Tort Law in the Rulings of Early Amoraim’ (2013) Dine Israel 141 & 163. 
67 Avraham Steinberg & Fred Rosner, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics: A Compilation of Jewish Medical Law on All Topics of Medical Interest 
(Feldheim Publishers, 2003) vol 2 627. 
68 Jackson, above n 67, 7. See also; Schick, above n 67, 163. 
69 Schick, above n 67, 141. 
70 Ralph Mark Rosen and  Joseph Farrell, Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald (University of Michigan Press, 1993) 298. See also; Thomas 
J Figueira, Excursions in Epichoric History: Aiginetan Essays (Rowman & Littlefield, 1993) 236; Mitchel P Roth, Crime and Punishment: A History of the 
Criminal Justice System (Cengage Learning, 2010) 10; Antoine-Yves Goguet and Alexandre Conrad Fugère, The Origin of Laws, Arts, and Sciences, and Their 
Progress Among the Most Ancient Nations (A Donaldson and J Reid, 1761) vol 3 32; William Pinnock, The Guide to Knowledge (Proprietor and Published, 
1836) vol 4 111; Aristotle and  Frederic George Kenyon (eds), Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2003) xlviii. 
71 Bhagat Singh,  Camana Lāla and  Bhupendra Hooja, The Jail Notebook and Other Writings (LeftWord Books, 2007) 84. See also; Robert R Bolgar, Classical 
Influences on Western Thought AD 1650-1870 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 371; Michael Gagarin, Greek Law: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research 
Guide (Oxford University Press, 2010) 25 and Carlson Anyangwe, Criminal Law: The General Part (Langaa RPCIG, 2015) 18. 
72 Christopher Carey, 'The Shape of Athenian Laws' (1998) 48(1) The Classical Quarterly 93-109.  
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Perhaps the most interesting area for this discussion is homicide. The processing and punishment of cases of 
homicide varied according to a number of factors relating to the alleged crime and the person who were party to the 
legal process. Some of these factors were objective (e.g. the status of the victim); some were subjective, specifically 
the issue of intent.73 
 
Particularly, this chapter signifies the importance of a reasonable person test in differentiating and assessing the 
ratio of intent in cases dealing with intentional and unintentional homicide. The discussion then moves on to 
show how a defendant charged with homicide used a reasonable person test to remove all criminal culpability. 
Finally, in dealing with the topic of homicide, I demonstrate how the Athenian courts used objective standards 
to determine the negligibility of the victim’s actions that may have caused their own death, thereby vindicating 
the defendant of all criminal liability. 
 
Though I focus on the concept of homicide and how it was treated under the Draconian Constitution, I am 
making a larger point. For even when the Draconian Constitution was reformed to ameliorate its harshness, the 
objective standards that were used to judge whether self-defence intentional killing was reasonable were 
retained because their objectivity continued to resonate with Athenian values. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR – THE REASONABLE PERSON IN ROMAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the presence of an objective standard like English common law’s reasonable 
person test in Roman law at the time it was codified by Justinian (533 A.D.). This chapter identifies Roman 
laws’ equivalent concept of a reasonable person in assessing the standard of care relating to the sale of 
property
74
 and in the concept of fault in both civil and criminal law.
75
 In Roman law, the terms bonus 
paterfamilias,
76
 diligens paterfamilias, homo diligens and homo constantissimus - the 'constant man,
77
 referred 
to a fictitious man whose standard was used to objectively assess the conduct of the defendant and whether the 
defendant’s actions under the circumstances were reasonable.  
                                                          
73 Ibid 97. 
74 Rudolf Sohm, The Institutes of Roman Law (Clarendon Press, 1892) 286–287.  
75 John Bell and David Ibbetson, European Legal Development (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 53. 
76 Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1st ed, 1953) 377. See also; Gaspar Stoquerus, De Musica Verbali Libri 
Duo (University of Nebraska Press, 1988) 59; Articles 450 and 1374 of the Code of Napoleon; Vladimir Gsovski and Kazimierz Grzybowski, Government, Law, 
and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (F A Praeger, 1959) vol 1 506; Christian von Bar, Benevolent Intervention in Another's Affairs (Walter de 
Gruyter, 1 Jan 2006) 221; Jürgen Basedow, The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (Sellier European Law Publications, 2009) 253. 
77 Digest 4.2.6 (Gaius). 
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This chapter begins by presenting the role of a reasonable person test in assessing culpa. Culpa in the wide 
sense is expressed to be fault and, in the narrow sense, negligence.
78
  
 
When literally translated, the Latin word culpa means ‘guilt’.79 The presence of the principle of culpa begins to 
show how objective standards were used in the criminal sphere within Roman law. The Roman legal principle, 
culpa levis in abstracto, referred to the failure to exhibit the degree of care expected of a bonus paterfamilias 
under the specific set of circumstances.
80
 Expanding upon this concept, William Warwick Buckland and Arnold 
D. McNair stated that the failure to show the care which a bonus paterfamilias would show is the same as the 
conduct of a reasonable man.
81
  
 
After discussing the use of a reasonable person in assessing the standard of care in Roman law, I then identify 
the use of this objective standard in the legal concept of doli incapax.
82
 Doli incapax is the legal principle that 
presumed that the defendant was incapable of committing crime due to their inability to form criminal intent. 
According to Roman law, children under the age of seven and those who are declared ‘insane’, are not liable for 
crimes committed since they do not possess the cognitive ability to form malicious intent. This chapter explores 
how a reasonable person, in conjunction with the legal principle doli incapax, was used to determine the 
culpability of the defendant who was a child under the age of seven and a person who was declared insane. 
 
This chapter outlines how a reasonable person test was used to determine whether this person should have 
known that placing themselves in particular circumstances could cause foreseeable harm to themselves. 
 
                                                          
78 G MacCormack, 'Culpa in the Scots Law of Reparation' (1974) 19 The Judicial Law Review 13. See also; John Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Reparation 
(T & T Clark, 1864) 58; Arthur Glegg, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Reparation (Edinburgh Green, 2nd ed, 1905) 19; Thomas Smith, A Short Commentary 
on the Law of Scotland (W Green & Son Ltd, 1962) 283, 657; David Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (W Green & Son Ltd, 1966) vol 1 32, 47. 
79 Julius E Heuscher, Psychology, Folklore, Creativity and the Human Dilemma (Charles C Thomas Publisher, 2003) 92. See also; Elizabeth Heimbach, Latin 
Everywhere, Everyday: A Latin Phrase Workbook (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2004) 40; Joseph Esmond Riddle et al., A Copious and Critical English-Latin 
Lexicon (Harper & Brothers, 1856) 354; P J Nerhot, Law, Interpretation and Reality: Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence (Springer 
Science & Business Media, 2013) 364; James Arthur Ballentine, A Law Dictionary of Words (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1916) 102. 
80 Frederick Henry Lawson, The Roman Law Reader (Oceana Publications Incorporation, 1969) 125. See also; William Warwick Buckland, Elementary 
Principles of the Roman Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 1912) 290; G C Venkata Subbarao, Analytical and Historical Jurisprudence: Jurisprudence 
& Ancient Law (Andhra Law Times, 1956) 380; Thomas Collett Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1917) 324; George 
Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012) 199; Patrick Fraser, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland: As 
Applicable to the Personal and Domestic Relationships (T & T Clark, 1846) vol 2 150. 
81 William Warwick Buckland and Arnold D McNair, Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 
365. 
82 Capable of committing a crime or tort. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE REASONABLE PERSON IN CANON LAW 
 
This chapter will focus on canon law issued before 1582 when Pope Gregory XIII revised and promulgated the 
Corpus Juris Canonici (the body of canon law).  
 
This chapter begins by defining the terms ‘canon law’ and ‘ecclesiastical law’ – Catholic ecclesiastical law and 
English ecclesiastical law. This chapter identifies the use of objective standards in the Didascalia Apostolorum 
(The Teaching of the Apostles), which was a handbook for the churches, written in Syria around c. 250 A.D. 
This chapter will show that objective standards were used in the judicial reasoning anticipated by this document.  
 
Amongst the topics discussed in this chapter, this chapter focuses on the concept of homicide. Like Jewish and 
ancient Athenian jurisprudence, objective standards were used to assess the culpability of homicide. Although 
canon law prohibited killing another human being, the law recognised approved circumstances. Canon law 
identified circumstances that reduced a person’s guilt from voluntary to involuntary homicide by inferring a 
person’s intent. This objective standard was used in the Nomocanon of Photios, a collection of ecclesiastical law 
compiled by Photios, Patriarch of Constantinople, in 883 AD.  
 
Common law used a similar standard to English common law’s reasonable person, the homo constantissimus. 
This objective standard was used address duress and appeared in the Decretum Gratian, Glossa Ordinaria, 
Decretals of Gregory IX and in Pope Alexander III’s second decretal, Veniens ad nos. It has been argued that the 
homo constantissimus was the ancestor of English common law’s reasonable person.83  
This study of canon law will contribute to my thesis by revealing whether canon law used objective standards in 
its judicial procedures or whether relative standards were used in judicial reasoning. If I can demonstrate that 
canon law did not use subjective standards to assess human behaviour but rather, incorporated objective 
standards to address this issue, then I am able to assert that objective standards that those who recorded the 
canon law believed that objectively was essential to the fair assessment of human conduct.  
 
 
                                                          
83 James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal (JHU Press, 2015) 63. 
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CHAPTER SIX – THE REASONABLE PERSON IN ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND CRIMINAL 
LAW 
 
In this chapter, I will explain how English common law used objective standards to determine liability and guilt 
in civil and criminal cases. English common law’s reasonable person test will be used to show this particular 
legal system used objective standards. The defendant was required to meet the objective standards set for the 
reasonable person to negate all fault. The reasonable person test was used to assess what a reasonable person 
would have, or should have, foreseen or done in the same circumstances of the defendant.
84  
 
I use the term ‘common’ law to distinguish itself from civil law, and I will focus primarily upon English 
common law; however, I will provide various examples of the reasonable person test in other common law 
jurisdictions. I will not examine how English common law came to be introduced and adopted. I am only going 
to trace the development of the reasonable man idea after 1700 A.D. However, I will also provide examples 
where objective standards were used prior to the eighteenth century to demonstrate that objective standards did 
not just appear fully developed after 1700 A.D.  
 
This chapter will begin by defining the term ‘common law’. It will then provide examples of objective standards 
that were used before the eighteenth century in English law’s earliest creeds, the laws of Ethelbert (600 A.D.), 
the laws of Ine (c. 690 A.D.) and the laws of Alfred (892 – 893 A.D.). However, I will focus on the use of 
objective standards post 1700 A.D. for convenience sake.   
 
This chapter provides a brief historic overview of the origin of the reasonable person in English civil and 
criminal law. The objective standards established for this person were used to judge human behaviour. Until the 
landmark House of Lords decision in DPP v Camplin (1978),
85
 the reasonable person test was purely objective. 
None of the defendant’s personal characteristics were taken into consideration.86 However, this test slowly 
                                                          
84 Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 120. See also; Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1843-60) AUU ER 47; Strong and Williams, above n 43, 66; Robbennolt 
and Hans, above n 43, 39; Burrows, above n 43, 147; Mele and  Rawling, above n 43, 126; Miceli, above n 43, 2.17; Grovesm, above n 43, 646; Schaffer,  
Agusti and  Dhooge, above n 43, 7; Moran, above n 32, 18. 
85 A.C. 705. 
86 Yeo, above n 24, 616. See also; Sayers, above n 24, 1.1; Storey and Lidbury, above n 24, 6; Zedner and Roberts, above n 24, 117. 
‘In Bedder v DPP [(1954) 1 W.LR. 1119] the House of Lords held that the reasonable man was an ordinary normal adult person; thus a purely objective test was 
imposed. So, if the defendant was a juvenile, he was disadvantaged, as the self-control of an adult person would be expected of him’ Cf. Parsons, above n 24, 
141. 
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transitioned into a ‘hybrid standard’ which took into consideration the defendant’s personal idiosyncrasies.87 
This chapter reveals that English common law rejected a purely subjective standard as evidenced by the 
rejection of the Robin Hood defence.
88
  
 
By using the reasonable person test as an illustration, I look to prove that regardless of the ontological 
underpinnings of particular objective standards, human beings will look to some form of objectivity to assess 
what is right or wrong. 
 
The reasonable person standard is used in two areas of English common law jurisprudence. Firstly, in the maxim 
volenti non fit iniuria and secondly, in assessing the validity of the defence of irresistible impulse which relied 
upon the defendant suffering from an irresistible impulse.  
 
As Tindal C.J. said in the English common law case Vaughan v Menlove,
89
 the defendant's conduct was to be 
judged by the standard of care which a person 'of ordinary prudence'
90
 would have exercised in identical or 
similar circumstances.
91
 The ratio decidendi of the Menlove case was also demonstrated in Brown v Kendall.
92
 
English common law’s reasonable person test allocated responsibility based on the extent to which the social 
reality of an individual resembled the reasonable person's attributes.
93
  
 
If the defendant failed to act in the manner that a reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances, 
the defendant was held accountable for the crime he was accused of.
94
 By identifying the use of objective 
                                                          
87 Nourse, above n 26, 36. See, e.g., State v. Bellino, 625 A.2d 1381, 1384 (Conn. App. 1993) (‘It is settled that a jury’s evaluation of a claim of self-defence 
has both subjective and objective elements’). As Holly Maguigan notes, appellate courts sometimes obscure this dualism by using misleading terms for their 
own standards, using the term ‘subjective,’ for example, to describe a standard that is both subjective and objective, or using the term ‘objective’ to describe a 
similar standard. See Maguigan, above n 26, 410 (explaining that a majority of states use a combined standard). 
88 Walker v Stones (2000) 4 All ER 412, 414 (Slade CJ). See also; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, 114–117 (Lord Millett) and 27-43 (Lord 
Hutton); Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (1995) 2 AC 378, 106 (Lord Nicholls). 
89 (1837) 3 Bing NC 468. 
90 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing NC 468, 475. 
91 Douglas Hodgson, The Law of Intervening Causation (Routledge, 2016) 66. See also; Arthur Best and  David W Barnes, Basic Tort Law: Cases, Statutes, and 
Problems (Aspen Publishers Online, 2007) 91; M E Bayles, Principles of Law: A Normative Analysis (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012) 225; Marc 
Franklin,  William Cardi and  Michael Green, Gilbert Law Summaries on Torts (West Academic, 24th ed, 2008) 132. 
92 (1850) 60 Mass. 292. 
93 Moran, above n 32, 203. 
94 Cathy Okrent, Torts and Personal Injury Law (Cengage Learning, 2014) 34. See also; Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, Partial Excuses to Murder (Federation 
Press, 1990) 49; Roger E Meiners, Al H Ringleb and Frances L Edwards, The Legal Environment of Business (Cengage Learning, 2016) 122-123; Gordon 
Brown, Business Law with UCC Applications (McGraw-Hill Education, 2005) 100; Nance Kriscenski and  Thomas Wright, Legal Studies Capstone: Assessing 
Your Undergraduate Education (Cengage Learning, 2011) 138; Mary Jo McGrath, School Bullying: Tools for Avoiding Harm and Liability (Corwin Press, 
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standards in this chapter, this thesis has therefore shown the use of objective standards in English civil and 
criminal law, Jewish law, ancient Athenian law, Roman law, and canon law. The universal use of objective 
standards to judge human conduct suggests universal acceptance of the premise that objective standards are an 
essential part of a just legal system. 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN – AN ARGUMENT FROM TRADITION 
 
Chapter seven discusses a possible objection to my thesis that human reason expects the use of objective 
standards as a tool for differentiating between right and wrong. The objection is that tradition could have 
influenced, or determined, why human cognition believed objective standards were important in assessing 
human conduct. The objection thereby insinuates that human reason alone did not hold to this conclusion as a 
properly basic belief
95
 but rather, this conception was merely an adoption of preceding philosophies.  
This chapter begins by outlining the possible objection to this thesis from tradition. Then, I define the term 
‘legal tradition’ to distinguish itself from the ‘tradition’ that this argument objects to. After expounding upon the 
nature of this argument, I then introduce Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr’s understanding of legal tradition and its 
relationship in adopting legal precedents. This will show that legal tradition does not allow for the incorporation 
of legal precedents blindly. These precedents are assessed to ensure that they are befitting to society before they 
are adopted. The incorporation of a preceding legal philosophy or system must conform to human logic and 
reason. This process of incorporation therefore undermines this potential argument against my thesis.  
After responding to this potential objection, this chapter proceeds to assess whether the traditional belief that 
objective standards were indispensable when judging human conduct, simplified or expedited this process of 
assessment.  
I then discuss the characteristics of legal tradition as the objection seems to presuppose an incorrect 
understanding of said tradition. After explaining the characteristics of legal tradition, I then demonstrate how the 
objection to this thesis incorporated a misconstrued view of tradition thereby, nullifying the objection.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2007) 46; Henry R Cheeseman, Contemporary Business Law (Prentice Hall, 2000) 89; West Publishing Company, West's Pacific Digest: Beginning 585 P.2d 
(West Publication Corporation, 2009) vol 41(1) 274. 
95 A belief is defined as properly basic if ‘it is rational to accept it without accepting it on the basis of any other propositions and beliefs at all.’ Dieter 
Schönecker, Plantinga's 'Warranted Christian Belief': Critical Essays with a Reply by Alvin Plantinga (Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2015) 10, citing 
Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) 72. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT – THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEVIATING FROM REASON  
Chapter eight presents the consequences that follow if objective standards are not used to judge human 
behaviour. This chapter will discuss the present day implications of this research and what we can learn from the 
universal use of objective standards in adjudicating human behaviour.  
This chapter will explain why it is important we understand that all human judgement relies on objective 
elements like those evident in the reasonable man test of English common law. The present day implications of 
this research will be discussed. It will also discuss what we can learn when we understand the role of objective 
standards in judicial reasoning.  
Using subjective standards to judge human behaviour would place the court at the mercy of the party or 
parties.
96
 All culpability would be removed.
97
 ‘The defendant would effectively become his own judge and 
jury.’98  
I will provide two examples that show the present day implications of this research. That is, the repercussions of 
using subjective standards in judicial reasoning – Australia’s mandatory sentencing laws and strict liability laws.  
This chapter will conclude that the absence of using an objective standard like the reasonable person in judicial 
reasoning is the catalyst of unjust laws.  
CHAPTER NINE – CONCLUSION  
Chapter nine provides the conclusion of this thesis. It argues that the universal application of an objective 
standard like common law’s reasonable person demonstrates that objectivity is an important component in 
evaluating human behaviour. By demonstrating the pervasive use of objective standards in all the legal systems 
considered, this thesis also suggests that lawmakers and judges should be taught that objective elements are an 
important part of any law that is to be perceived just in the long term.  
 
 
                                                          
96 Roger C Henderson, 'Practice and Problems Under Nebraska’s New Divorce Laws' (1972) 52 (1) Nebraska Law Review 14. 
97 Ed Hindson and Ergun Caner, The Popular Encyclopedia of Apologetics: Surveying the Evidence for the Truth of Christianity (Harvest House Publishers, 
2008) 419. 
98 Christopher M V Clarkson and ‎Mtrehta‎H‎gtreaeK,‎Criminal Law: Text and Materials (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 796. 
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VIII RESEARCH METHODS 
The legal research methodology in this thesis will involve naturalistic enquiry incorporating some of the main 
kinds of naturalistic enquiry: case studies, historical studies and comparative studies. The reason for using 
naturalistic enquiry as the methodology is because it encourages multiple data types and sources, potentially 
greater validity and it emphasises real and complex nature of evaluation context.
99
 This thesis is comprised of 
primary sources such as judicial decisions, statute law and extrinsic materials as well as secondary resources 
such as classic literary works, scholarly books and journal articles. 
IX CONCLUSION: SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis aims to provide a better understanding of human cognition in relation to assessing right from wrong 
by identifying the universal use of objective standards in English common law, Jewish law, ancient Athenian 
law, Roman law and canon law. The universal application of objective standards suggests that human reason 
expects the use of objective standards in the search for human justice.  
 
This thesis will aid in understanding how the human cognitive faculty reasons, concluding that modern day legal 
systems have deviated from reason. The existence of objective standards in all the areas assessed aids in 
demonstrating this thesis’ hypothesis that all legal systems depended upon objective standards to function. 
Epistemologically, this rationale stemmed from human reason.  
 
The presence of objective standards, like a reasonable person test in the areas assessed, will establish that human 
reason, a characteristic which all mentally complete human beings are assumed to have in them; dictated that 
objective standards are indispensable to purport a moral judgement.  
In conclusion, the pervasive use of objective standards in all the legal systems considered, confirms that 
objective standards are essential to the perception of the delivery of justice by any legal system. This thesis also 
suggests that lawmakers and judges need to understand that objective elements are essential if any law is to be 
perceived just in the long term. 
 
                                                          
99 William MacNeil, Novel Judgements: Legal Theory as Fiction (Routledge, London, 2012) 14-15. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
THE REASONABLE PERSON IN JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE  
I INTRODUCTION 
Charting the historical presence of a reasonable person test in the ancient world, chapter two will identify the 
presence of this test, or tests similar or equivalent to it, in Jewish law. The term ‘Jewish law’ can be quite 
ambigious given the wide array of definitions. This chapter will use this term to refer to historical Jewish law in 
ancient times down to and including Maimonides in the twelfth century. Bernard S. Jackson identifies that a 
reasonable person standard was used to objectively assess the reasonableness of the defendants conduct in 
Jewish law. If a defendant acted like a reasonable person, he was not liable for the crime for which he was 
charged. However, liability was placed upon the defendant if he acted contrary to what a reasonable person 
would do.
100
  
 
Identifying a test that functioned like the ‘reasonable person’ test of the English common law in the Jewish legal 
system, shows that Jewish law also used objective standards to judge human conduct. The consistent 
development of objective tests as the only way to judge the rightness or wrongness of human conduct in 
multiple legal systems suggests that objective reason has been accepted as the best way that human beings living 
together in society can assess their own conduct.  
This chapter suggests that the reasonable person test of English common law has origins in Jewish law.
101
 This 
chapter further indicates that Jewish law used a reasonable person like test to evaluate human behaviour.
102
 The 
presence of this test was identifiable in the Torah
103
 even when it dealt with business. In conjunction with the 
                                                          
100 Jackson, above n 67, 7. 
101 Levine, above n 63, 21-22, 38-39, 120-121. See also; Sol Azuelos-Atias, 'A Pragmatic Analysis of Legal Proofs of Criminal Intent' (2008) 15 (1) The 
International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law 115. 
102 Levine, above n 63, 21-22, 38-39, 120-121. 
103 The Torah was the first five books of the Hebrew Bible–Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. Its authorship is still under contention. 
Some, such as pre-modern Judaism, have assumed that Moses was the author of the Torah. Cf. Jewish philosopher Philo, the Jewish historian Josephus and the 
Babylonian Talmud (See Baba Bathra 14b.) Whilst others hold to the 'Documentary Hypothesis' prompted by the French Roman Catholic priest, Richard Simon 
(1638-1712) that states that the Torah was compiled from a number of other sources, some of which may have been derived from Moses. 
See Barry L Bandstra, Reading the Old Testament: Introduction to the Hebrew Bible (Cengage Learning, 2008) 19-20. See also; Allan I MacInnes and Arthur H 
Williamson, Shaping the Stuart World: 1603-1714 (BRILL, 2006) 187; Donald A Carson, The Enduring Authority of the Christian Scriptures (Wm B Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2016) 159; John D Woodbridge, Biblical Authority: A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal (Zondervan, 1982) 96-97. 
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Torah, the Talmud
104
 included many examples of a reasonable person standard.
105
 Not only was Jewish law 
concerned with providing practical legal advice; Jewish law also encouraged individuals to go beyond the 
requirements of the law and practice the ‘way of the pious’.106  
If I can demonstrate the existence of a reasonable person test in Jewish law, then I can assert that objective 
standards are significant if human beings are to perceive and accept that a given legal system is just. 
Because there are many examples of reasonableness standards in Jewish law, I only chose a limited number of 
examples. I have chosen the following examples because they are representative and common, showing that the 
idea of objective reasonableness was pervasive in that legal system. This chapter will demonstrate the use of a 
reasonable person test in Jewish law within the areas of advertising, bailment, abandonment, damages and 
within the law of homicide. Objective standards were also used to exempt minors, lunatics, deaf-mutes, and 
imbeciles from criminal liability. I will provide examples from civil law and criminal law to show that the 
Jewish legal system was saturated with objective standards. 
As a disclaimer, I do not warrant that the objective standards used in Jewish law were correct or even wise; that 
analysis would require a different analysis that was sociological, theological or ethical. The aim of this thesis is 
not to defend or assess the Jewish concept of reasonableness but rather to identify whether a standard equivalent 
to modern objective reasonableness existed in the mind of Jewish jurists.  
Questions concerning how and why Jewish law perceived specific conduct as reasonable are not under 
examination in this chapter. This chapter simply identifies the idea of reasonableness in Jewish law as opposed 
to analysing whether or not Jewish law found the correct answer as to what was reasonable. The aim of this 
thesis is to prove that objective standards of reasonableness are ontological in nature. I will focus on how a 
society uses the reasonableness tool to achieve its goals. My point is to show that all societies use objective 
standards to regulate themselves. To prove how and why different societies decided what was reasonable, this 
thesis will show that all human legal systems begin and are founded upon the idea of objectivity. 
                                                          
104 The source of Jewish oral law. See Shimon Shetreet and ‎arleta‎Mtetlar,‎Jewish and Israeli Law - An Introduction (Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 
2017) 5. See also; Ronald H Isaacs, Rites of Passage: A Guide to the Jewish Life Cycle (KTAV Publishing House Incorporation, 1992) 8; Asher Meir, The 
Jewish Ethicist: Everyday Ethics for Business and Life (KTAV Publishing House Incorporation, 2005) xii. 
105 Isaacs, above n 105, 9. 
106 Hershey H Friedman, ‘The Impact of Jewish Values on Marketing and Business Practices’ (2001) 21 (1) Journal of Macromarketing 74. See also; Talmud, 
Shabbat, 120a; Bava Mezia, 52b; Hullin, 130b; Reuven P Bulka, Critical Psychological Issues: Judaic Perspectives (University Press of America, 1992) 66; 
Jerry W Anderson, Corporate Social Responsibility: Guidelines for Top Management (ABC-CLIO, 1989) 37. Hershey H Friedman wrote in an article titled, 
‘Let Justice Pierce the Mountain’: Morality, Ethics, and Law in the Talmud' which explains the manner in which the pious person would act. Cf. Hershey H 
Friedman, Let Justice Pierce the Mountain: Morality, Ethics, and Law in the Talmud (2 June, 2015) Social Science Research Network 
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This chapter will begin by identifying the presence of objective standards in the Jewish law about advertising. 
II THE REASONABLE PERSON IN JEWISH LAW 
A THE LAW OF ADVERTISEMENT 
Misleading and deceptive advertising was prohibited in Jewish law under the Babylonian Talmud, Chullin 
(94a).
107
 Chullin (94a) prohibited acts that created a false impression (geneivat da’at).108 The biblical source of 
the geneivat da’at prohibition was disputed by Talmudic interpreters109 yet the rule remained. 
In Hebrew, the concept of geneivat da'at proclaimed that it was wrong to steal another’s thoughts. This meant 
that it was wrong to conduct oneself in a manner that caused another party to possess a mistaken assumption, 
                                                          
107 ‘It [wa]s forbidden to mislead people, even a non-Jew.’ Cf. This quote was attributed to the Talmudic sage Samuel of Nehardea in Talmud Chullin (94a): 
Indeed, one Midrash stated that geneivat da'at was the worst type of theft. Geneivat da'at was the worst because it directly harmed the person, not merely their 
money. 
108 Levine, above n 63, 39. 
109 Aaron Levine, 'Advertising and Promotional Activities As Regulated In Jewish' (1981) 1(2) Law Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 6–7.  
Nonetheless, Rabbi Jonah b Abraham Gerondi places such conduct under the rubric of falsehood (sheker)109 whilst Rabbi Yom Tov Ishbili incorporates the 
concept of geneivat da’at under the Torah’s admonition against theft (lo tignovu, as per Leviticus 19:11). The concept of lo tignovu enjoins the theft of property 
and the ‘theft of the mind’ by means of deception.109 Although disputed, rabbinic exegesis generally associated the concept of geneivat da’at with Genesis 
31:26 and II Samuel 15:6. Genesis 31:26 (New American Standard Bible (NASB) states, ‘Then Laban said to Jacob, ‘What have you done by deceiving me and 
carrying away my daughters like captives of the sword?’ II Samuel 15:6 (King James Version) states, ‘And on this manner did Absalom to all Israel that came to 
the king for judgment: so Absalom stole the hearts of the men of Israel.’ The phrase ‘what have you done by deceiving me’ in Genesis 31:26 literally means; 
‘you have stolen my heart’. This phrase is also found in II Samuel 15:16 and is used as an idiom for deception. Both these verses illustrate the example of 
geneivat da’at–false impression. The Tosefta, a collation of the Jewish oral law from the late 2nd century, states that there are seven types of thieves. The 
Tosefta outlines that the worst thief is one who ‘steals the mind of people’109 that is, the one who commits geneivat da’at. To demonstrate this, the Tosefta uses 
the example of 2 Samuel 15:16. These two examples are used to illustrate biblical events in which geneivat da’at was performed. The prohibition of these events 
set the standard in which a reasonable person should not be acquainted to in the area of advertisement. A reasonable person ought not to be deceived in like 
manner. See Jonah b Abraham Gerondi (Spain, ca. 1200-1264), Sha'arei Teshuva, Sha'ar 3, at 184. See also; Aaron Levine, 'False Goodwill and the Halacha' 
(2000) 34(1) Tradition 8; Donna Kendall, The Consistent Choice: For Better Living in a Better World (Balboa Press, 2012) 104; Shlomo Zevin, Encyclopedia 
Talmudit (Yad Harav Herzog, 1965) vol. 6 225. See also; Fred Rosner and David Weinbe1'er, 'Jewish Concerns About Gifts To Physicians From Drug 
Companies' (1998) 32(3) Tradition 24; Martin Luther and Helmut T Lehmann, Luther's Works: Lectures on Genesis (Concordia Publishing House, 1986) 43; 
Hersh Goldwurm,  Yisroel Simcha Schorr and  Chaim Malinowitz, Talmud Bavli (Mesorah Publications, 2004) 7b; Charles Augustus Briggs and Samuel Rolles 
Driver, Brown–Driver–Briggs (Hendrickson Publishers, 1994) H170; Doug Redford, The Pentateuch (Standard Publishing, 2008) 104; James L Kugel, 
Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the Bible As It Was at the Start of the Common Era (Harvard University Press, 2009) 393; Robert Charles, The Book of 
Jubilees (Clarendon Press, 1913) 175; James VanderKam, The Book of Jubilees (E Peeters, 1989) 185; Levine, above n 63. See also; Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 
1:8; Kieran Beville, How To Interpret The Bible: An Introduction to Hermeneutics (Christian Publishing House, 2016) 126; Darrell L Bock, Blasphemy and 
Exaltation in Judaism and the Final Examination of Jesus: A Philological-historical Study of the Key Jewish Themes Impacting Mark 14:61-64 (Mohr Siebeck, 
1998) 66; Mechilta, Mishpatim 13, 135; Elliot N Dorff and  Louis E Newman, Jewish Choices, Jewish Voices: Power (Jewish Publication Society, 2009) 17; 
Tosefta, Bava Kamma (Lieberman Edition) 7:8; Elliot N Dorff and Cory Willson, The Jewish Approach to Repairing the World (tikkun Olam): A Brief 
Introduction for Christians (Jewish Lights Publishing, 2008) 67; Rabbi Netanel Wiederblank, 'To Tell or Not to Tell: The Obligation to Disclose Medical 
Information to a Potential Spouse' (2011) 12(19) Verapo Journal 240; Levine, above n 63; Fred Rosner and Robert Schulman, Medicine and Jewish Law 
(Yashar Books, 2005) vol 3 184; Patrick E Murphy,  Gene R Laczniak and Andrea Prothero,‎Ethics in Marketing: International Cases and Perspectives 
(Routledge, 2012) 35. 
 
 
34 
 
belief, or impression.
110
 Thus, the term was used in Jewish law to indicate deception, cheating, creating a false 
impression, and acquiring undeserved goodwill.
111
 Geneivat da'at went beyond lying.
112
  
Under Jewish law, a reasonable person test was used to determine whether an advertisement was deceptive or 
misleading. A representation about a product or service was misleading or deceptive if it misled or deceived a 
reasonable purchaser.
113
 The Halakhah identified a reasonable man as the average man, the man on the street.
114
 
The purchaser was a reasonable person.
115
 Jewish law’s reasonable person standard adopted a hybrid approach. 
This standard implemented a subjective approach by adopting the perspective of the hypothetical purchaser 
whilst incorporating objective standards established for a reasonable person. That is, rather than incorporating a 
purely objective standard, Jewish law took into consideration the subjective perspective of how a reasonable 
person would perceive the advertisement in question. Thus, Jewish law used objective standards when assessing 
the validity of advertisements in commercial dealings. While subjective elements were used to adapt the law to 
individual circumstances, they were not used to assess culpability.   
According to Jewish law, the advertiser’s conduct was required to conform to the objective standard understood 
by a reasonable person. All Jewish businessmen were held to this standard.  
Jewish law required that an advertised product be required to convey a message that any reasonable person 
would perceive as an accurate representation.
116
 It was the obligation of the advertiser, or seller, to ensure that a 
reasonable person would not be misled by such representations.
117
 The buyer was also expected to function in 
the marketplace as a reasonable person.
118
  
Whilst the seller was only allowed to publicise material that would not mislead or deceive a reasonable person, 
the buyer was also required to act reasonably. If the buyer failed to function in the marketplace as a reasonable 
                                                          
110 Rosner and Schulman, above n 110, vol 3 181. See also; Paola Triolo, Martin Palmer and Steve Waygood, Capital Solution: Faith, Finance and Concern 
for a Living Planet (Pilkington Press Limited, 2000) 47; Nathan Lee Kaplan, Management Ethics and Talmudic Dialectics: Navigating Corporate Dilemmas 
with the Indivisible Hand (Springer, 2014) 93; Elliot N Dorff et al, The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Ethics and Morality (Oxford University Press, 2016) 373-
374. 
111 Ronald H Isaacs, Sidrah Reflections: A Guide to Sidrot and Haftarot (KTAV Publishing House Incorporation, 1997) 153. See also; Meir Tamari, The 
Marketplace: Jewish Business Ethics (Targum/Feldheim, 1991) 76; Aaron Levine, The Oxford Handbook of Judaism and Economics (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 407; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 228:6; A Yehuda Warburg, Rabbinic Authority: The Vision and the Reality (Urim Publications, 2014) 91. 
112 Yosef Śafran, Bezalel Safran and Eliyahu Safran, Porat Yosef: Studies Presented to Rabbi Dr Joseph Safran (Ktav, 1992) 167. See also; Hershey H 
Friedman, Geneivat Da'at: The Prohibition Against Deception in Today's World (2002) Jewish Law Articles <http://jlaw.com/Articles/geneivatdaat.html>. 
113 Levine, above n 63, 18. See also; Levineabove n 102, 38. 
114 Lacey, Wells and Quick, above n 63, 56. See also; Kirschenbaum, above n 63, 132; Levine, above n 63, 34; Levine, above n 63, 18. 
115 Aaron Levine, Moral Issues of the Marketplace in Jewish Law (Yashar Books, 2005) 382, 387. See also; Levine, above n 63, 33–34. 
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118 Paola Triolo and Martin Palmer, A Capital Solution–Faith, Finance and Concern for a Living Planet (Pilkington Press, 2000) 46. 
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person and suffered some disadvantages because of his own misunderstanding, confusion, or misperception, the 
seller was not held accountable.
119
 Therefore, the Jewish law relating to the advertisement of goods engaged 
objective standards to determine whether an advertisement for a product was misleading or deceptive. A 
reasonable person test was also used to assess whether the purchaser acted in a reasonable manner.  
From this example, Jewish law required that a reasonable person should not deceive and the nature of deceptive 
conduct was held to be self-evident for a reasonable person. Since such conduct was considered self-evident, 
both the seller and buyer were held to this standard, because both parties had the ability to reason. The ability to 
reason required a person to act in a manner that was socially acceptable and was self-evident to all reasonable 
members of society.  
In its rules about advertising, Jewish law dictated that a reasonable person must not act in a manner that would 
mislead or deceive another individual. Conduct that might mislead or deceive was said to be self-evident and 
thus it was fair to hold all people to this standard. Since all men possessed the ability to recognise conduct that 
was socially acceptable, all except the mentally incompetent were held to this standard. I will discuss how 
Jewish law dealt with the mentally incompetent later on in this chapter. 
The following section will demonstrate the presence of a reasonable person standard within the Jewish law of 
bailment. 
B THE LAW OF BAILMENT 
The law surrounding bailment was another area of Jewish law that adopted a reasonable person standard.
120
 In 
Jewish law, bailment issues sometimes arose in cases of lost property
121
 and always when the property was 
given for safekeeping.
122
 According to Jewish law, one remained a bailee until the owner claimed the object,
123
 
or as Maimonides
124
 stated, ‘until Elijah comes’125 [and the owner’s identity was revealed].126  
                                                          
119 Levine, above n 63, 41. 
120 Bleich, above n 65, 87. See also; Elon, above n 65, 1695; Ehrman, above n 65, 45; Meier, above n 65, 70. 
121 ‘The lost article is to be kept in good order by the finder until claimed; the finder is considered in law a bailee and is not entitled to a reward.’ Cf. Adele 
Berlin, The Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion (Oxford University Press, 2011) 452. See also; Solomon ben Joseph Ganzfried, Code of Jewish Law 
(Hebrew Publishing Company, 1961) vol 1 64; Judah David Bleich and  Arthur J Jacobson,‎Jewish Law and Contemporary Issues (Cambridge University Press, 
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State of Israel (Central Book Company, 1963) 602. 
122 Judah David Bleich, 'Religious Traditions and Public Policy' (1988) 1(1) Jewish Medical Ethics 21. See also; Gordon Reginald Dunstan and ‎ Elliot A 
Shinebourne, Doctors' Decisions: Ethical Conflicts in Medical Practice (Oxford University Press, 1989) 218; Fred Rosner, Contemporary Biomedical Ethical 
Issues and Jewish Law (KTAV Publishing House Incorporation, 2007) 127; Meier, above n 65, 70; Berachyahu Lifshitz, The Jewish Law Annual (Routledge, 
2010) vol 18 277. 
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A bailee had a duty of care, obliging him to safeguard the property given to him on bail.
127
 The bailee was held 
to the standard of care known as kede-natri inshi (as a people safeguard).
128
 That is, the bailee was required to 
provide the same quality of care that a prudent person would exercise with regard to his own property.
129
 This 
was outlined in Baba Mezi'a 93b.
130
 As in the case for Jewish advertising laws, the bailee’s conduct was 
compared to an objective kede-natri inshi standard. All members of society were to treat property entrusted to 
them by others as if it were their own.
131
 
Another objective standard enforced in Jewish bailment law was the concept of b'dereh hashomrim, ‘the manner 
of bailees’. That is, the bailee was expected to preserve the property in the same manner that an ordinary bailee 
would guard the possessed property. 
The standard of care expected of a bailee under Jewish law was that of an ordinary (or reasonable) person.
132
 
The gratuitous bailee (shomer hinam) owed the duty of preserving the property in the ‘manner of bailees’ 
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(b'dereh hashomrim).
133
 Accordingly, if the property entrusted to a bailee was stolen, lost or damaged, the bailee 
was held to the standard of the way of bailees (b'dereh hashomram). If a bailee followed this standard, the bailee 
was absolved from liability
134
 because he had acted in accordance with the standard understood by a reasonable 
person or ‘the way of the bailee’. Thus, the bailee demonstrated that he did not act in a negligent manner.135  
The ‘b'dereh hashomram’ was defined by establishing how various objects were kept by a reasonable person.136 
The manner in which a reasonable person would keep the assigned object was the standard to which bailees 
must adhere. 
For example, if the object bailed was money, the bailee was expected to securely place the money in a safe place 
in his house. If he failed to do so, the bailee was liable, for he did not guard the bailment in the manner of 
bailees as outlined in Baba Mezi'a 42a.
137
 Jewish law took into consideration the personal idiosyncrasies of the 
bailee. However, ultimately, the bailee was assessed in accordance with the objective standard established for a 
reasonable person. Again, while the personal circumstances and character of the defendant were subjectively 
taken into account, objective standards were still used to assess culpability.    
The Jewish laws surrounding advertising and bailment demonstrate that men involved in the business of 
bailment should have known, through intuition, how to conduct themselves appropriately. Given their ability to 
reason, ancient Jewish businessmen were found in breach of their commercial law if they deviated from the 
objective standard. The use of a reasonable person test in Jewish law demonstrated the underlying Jewish belief 
that all competent human beings were able to act in accord with reason as reasonable men and women. 
Therefore, since they had the ability to act reasonably, they were subject to Jewish law’s reasonable person 
standard. Thus, a reasonable person standard was adopted in Jewish law that surrounded the area of bailment 
and advertising to determine the standard of care that was expected of bailees and Jewish businessmen.  
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The following section will identify how a reasonable person standard was used to assess whether property had 
been abandoned under Jewish law.  
C THE LAW ON ABANDONED PROPERTY 
Abandonment in Jewish property law was called ye’ush.138 The Talmud declared that once a man had given up 
hope of ever retrieving a lost article, the bonds of ownership was loosened.
139
 The Mishnah
140
 determined ye’ush 
by assessing whether the goods were presumed to have been abandoned. This was done by deducing whether 
they had been placed intentionally
141
 or fallen accidentally
142
 and whether they had a mark of ownership on 
them - a siman,
143
 such as someone’s initials. That is, abandonment of goods in Jewish law was determined by 
establishing whether a reasonable person would believe that the goods had been intentionally placed or had 
fallen accidentally and whether the goods contained a signature identifying ownership that a reasonable person 
would have recognised.
144
  
Jewish law adopted a reasonable person standard when assessing whether property was considered abandoned 
by its prior owner. This standard applied even when the owner was standing and shouting that he wanted his 
money or property back.
145 
 
For example, Baba Mezi'a 23b reported a case where a man had found pitch
146
 near
147
 a winepress. This man 
appeared before Rab to discuss what he had found. Rab counseled this man to take possession of the pitch, 
however, Rab saw that the man was hesitant, being uncertain that he was entitled to the pitch. To alleviate his 
                                                          
138 Isaac Cohen, Acts of the Mind in Jewish Ritual Law (Urim Publications, 2008) 827. 
139 Bava Kamma 66a. See also; Aaron Kirschenbaum, Equity in Jewish Law: Beyond Equity: Halakhic Aspirationism in Jewish Civil Law (KTAV Publishing 
House Incorporation, 1991) 112; Daniel Neustadt, ינויד הכלה (Feldheim Publishers, 1998) 509. 
140 The Mishnah may be defined as a deposit of four centuries of Jewish religious and cultural activity in Palestine, beginning at some uncertain date (possibly 
during the earlier half of the second century BC) and ending with the close of the second century AD The object of this activity was the preservation, cultivation, 
and application to life of 'the Law' (Torah), in the form in which many generations of like-minded Jewish religious leaders had learnt to understand this Law. Cf. 
Herbert Danby, The Mishnah: Translated from the Hebrew with Introduction and Brief Explanatory Notes (Hendrickson Publishers, 2012) xiii. 
141 Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, The Talmud, The Steinsaltz Edition: A Reference Guide (Random House, 1989) vol 2 184.  
142 Bava Metzia 21a. 
143 Bava Metzia 21b. 
144 Emanuel B Quint, A Restatement of Rabbinic Civil Law: Laws of Lost and Found Objects, Laws of Inheritance, and Laws of the Unpaid Bailee (J Aronson, 
1998) 34. 
145 Bava Metzia 24b; Talmud Bavli, Tractate Bava Metzia, Vol. I, notes 20-21, at 24b2, (Schottenstein ed 2001).  
146 Pitch ‘refers to a black, gummy substance used for waterproofing, which is extracted from pine wood. The Hebrew word can also refer to mineral pitches 
that are obtained from natural asphalt or bitumen deposits.’ Cf. William David Reyburn and  Euan Mc G Fry, A Handbook on Genesis (United Bible Societies, 
1997) 158. 
147 Aaron Amit stated that the pitch was ‘in the winepress.’ Cf. Aaron Amit, 'The ‘Halakhic Kernel’ as a Criterion for Dating Babylonian Aggadah: Bavli 
Hullin 110a-b and Parallels' (2012) 36(2) Association for Jewish Studies Review 199. 
 
 
39 
 
concern, Rab told the man to share the pitch with ‘Hiyya my [Rab’s] son’.148 Following this proposal, the 
relationship between the location of an article and how ownership can be assumed was raised. If an article was 
found in a location that seemed unlikely that an individual would intentionally leave it there with the hope of 
retrieving it, the finder was permitted to keep it. This was illustrated in Baba Metzia 24a: 
Come and hear: If one finds money in a Synagogue or a house of study, or in any other place where crowds are 
frequent, it belongs to the finder, because the owner has given it up.149 
The question then arose, ‘[s]hall we then say that Rab is of the opinion that the place [where an article was 
found] does not constitute an identification mark?’ Rabbi Abba answered, ‘[i]t [the pitch] was deemed to have 
been abandoned by the owners, as it was seen that weeds had grown upon it [the pitch]’.150  
By ‘identification mark,’ Baba Metzia was not referring to a siman. Instead, this phrase was used to find out 
whether the location of an article could help determine whether it was intentionally placed. If it was, the finder 
was unable to keep it. Alternatively, if the article was placed in a location that seemed unlikely that a person 
would intentionally place it there, the finder was allowed to keep it.  
For example, if an article was placed on top of the bonnet of a car, a reasonable person would assume that this 
article was intentionally placed and therefore, had no right to claim it. The location of this article resembled an 
‘identification mark’ of ownership. However, if an article was found in the middle of the road, it can be 
presumed that it was not intentionally placed. Therefore, the finder was entitled to keep it. This article possessed 
no ‘identification mark’ signifying ownership.  
Rab concluded that the pitch was abandoned because ‘[the appearance of weeds] showed that the pitch had been 
there for a long time and [thus] had been given up by the owner’.151 To a reasonable person, the presence of 
weeds would provide the impression that the land was abandoned.
152
 Excessive growth of weeds illustrated that 
the land was presumed abandoned and therefore was free according to Jewish law.
153
 The presence of weeds did 
not immediately determine that the property was abandoned. The presence of weeds was one of the 
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characteristics that helped determine whether the property was abandoned but did not necessarily determine 
whether the property was abandoned or not.  
Jewish law also recognised distinctions between lost chattels that belonged to the finder immediately upon 
possession,
154
 property that was possessed by the finder whilst the true owner was located,
155
 and property that 
the finder could not take.
156
 A reasonable person standard was used in these circumstances to determine whether 
the finder was the owner of the newly discovered property. 
According to Jewish law, the finder might have attained a title to the lost property if the property was 
abandoned. Rabbi Zvid
157
 presented a case that dealt with contention between two people. These two individuals 
were arguing over ownership of land that was abandoned. Rabbi Zvid stated that ‘the general principle in regard 
to a loss [of property] is if (the loser) has said 'Woe! I have sustained a monetary loss,' he has abandoned his 
object [and the finder is entitled to keep it].’158  
Rava Abba ben Joseph bar Ḥama (c. 280 – 352 CE)159 stated: 
It is an abandonment, because when he becomes aware that he lost it he gives up the hope [of recovering it] as he 
says [to himself], 'I cannot recognise it by an identification mark,' it is therefore as if he had given up hope from 
the moment [he lost it].160
 
 
Rava Hama showed that abandonment occurred when the owner of an article acknowledged its loss, did not 
attempt to find it, and proclaimed that the article did not contain an identifying mark. In this occurrence, it was 
as if the article was abandoned as soon as it was lost. Therefore, since the article did not contain any identifying 
marks in conjunction with the owner’s neglect of finding the article, a reasonable person would rightly assume 
the article was abandoned. Therefore, the finder was entitled to keep it.  
According to Jewish law, scattered coins belonged to the finder at once,
161
 even if they were found in an 
assembly hall, the study hall, or the marketplace.
162
 However, coins in a bag must be announced and returned to 
                                                          
154 Bava Metzia 21a. See also; Joseph Karo and Shneur Zalman of Liadi, Shulchan Arukh: Hoshen Mishpat 262:7. 
155 Bava Metzia 24a. 
156 Bava Metzia 25b. 
157 Broyde & Hecht, above n 127, 226. 
158 Bava Meziah 23a (emphasis mine). See also; Moses Maimonides, Mishnah Torah, Theft and Abandonment 14:3. 
159 Israel Abrahams, A Short History of Jewish Literature: From the Fall of the Temple 70 C.E. to the Era of Emancipation 1786 C.E. (T Fisher Unwin, 1906) 
25. See also; Jacob Culi et al., The Torah Anthology (Maznaim Publication Company, 1987) vol 3 345; Judah Nadich, Jewish Legends of the Second 
Commonwealth (J Aronson, 1994) 229. 
160 Bava Metzia 21. 
 
 
41 
 
the owner.
163 
If coins were scattered, it would have been reasonable for the finder to assume that the coins were 
abandoned, because there was no mark of ownership.
164
 However, if the coins were in a bag, a reasonable 
person would consider that someone owned them.
165
 Therefore, the finder was not entitled to keep a bag of coins 
until he had taken reasonable steps to try and find the owner.  
The Mishnah provided:  
The following objects have to be proclaimed: If one finds fruit in a vessel, or a vessel by itself, money in a purse, or 
a purse by itself; heaps of fruit, heaps of coins, three coins on top of each other, bundles of sheaves in private 
premises, home-made loaves, fleeces of wool from the craftsman's workshop, jars of wine or jars of oil, they have to 
be proclaimed.166  
Rabbi Isaac maintained that if coins were found arranged in a pyramid structure,
167
 the finder must advertise that 
they have been found. However, the claimant of these coins must notify the finder how he arranged the coins 
because it was assumed that only an owner would have intentionally placed them in such a manner.
168
 
Jewish law declared that a reasonable person would assume that money kept in a bag was not abandoned 
because the packaging was a mark of ownership. This mark obligated the finder to provide restitution to the 
owner if he could be found. Jewish law used a reasonable person standard to determine whether property had 
been abandoned. 
The examples I have presented concerning advertising, bailment, and property abandonment in Jewish law, 
show how Jewish people were held to objective standards like English common law’s reasonable person 
standard. This standard was used in the interests of communitarian consistency. 
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The following section will continue this theme by showing that objective standards were also used in the Jewish 
criminal law of homicide. 
D THE LAW ON HOMICIDE 
Jewish law included provisions concerning the taking of human life, as does every human society. Taking away 
human life is one of the first prohibitions in custom and law in any organised society.
169
  
In Jewish law, homicide was an act that breached moral law.
170
 Its prohibition was found in the Old Testament 
in Exodus 20:13.
171
 The King James Version (KJV) translates the phrase s trə·ṣāḥ. lō as ‘thou shalt not kill’ 
whilst the New American Standard Bible (NASB) translates this phrase as ‘you shall not murder’. 
Although the KJV translates the Hebrew verb r-ṣ-ḥ172 as ‘kill’, the proper understanding of this word is better 
translated in the NASB as ‘murder’, relating specifically to unlawful killing.173 
A JUSTIFIED HOMICIDE 
Although Jewish law prohibited killing another human being, the law recognised exceptional circumstances. 
Jewish law outlined certain circumstances that justified the reasonable use of deadly force. For example, 
someone accused of an unlawful killing could defend himself by showing that he took the life concerned as part 
of his obligation as a soldier defending the nation.  
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I WARFARE 
Jewish law distinguished between the moral and legal prohibition of shedding innocent blood and killing in 
battle.
174
 Jewish law recognised situations that required taking a human life.
175
 According to Maimonides, war 
was such a circumstance.
176
  
[In] the 187th mitzvah … we are commanded to kill and destroy the seven nations [of Canaan]177 because they are 
the prime worshippers and original source of idolatry. 
The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement [citing Deuteronomy 20:17]178 (exalted be He), ‘You must wipe 
them out completely.’ [Quoting Scripture, Deuteronomy 20:18]179 explains the reason for this commandment is to 
keep us from learning from their heresy. Many verses encourage and urge that they be killed, and waging war against 
them is a milchemes mitzvah [mandatory war].180 
Maimonides justified killing in the circumstances of war because it was commanded by God as revealed in the 
Jewish scriptures. The Halakhah permitted fighting a defensive war, a war ‘to save Israel from an enemy that 
[wa]s attacking it.’181 Jewish law also permitted war for the purposes of conquering the land of Israel, as 
codified by Nahmanides (1194 - 1270 A.D.) a medieval Jewish scholar and Rabbi.
182
  
Nahmanides argued that this was a biblical command that was binding on all generations.
183
 However, the 
nature of this conquest was, and still is, the subject of a dispute.
184
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Some understood the nature of this conquest to include the use of military force, a war of conquest in its simple 
sense. Rabbi Zevi Yehudah Kook and his disciples took this view. R. Kook stated that – ‘[r]egarding the 
commandment to conquer the land of Israel, we bear the obligation; the commandment is issued to us, to enter 
into a state of war to do so, even if we are killed!’185  
As Professor Aviezer Ravitsky
186
 summarised – ‘[o]thers, however, have emphasised that halakhic discourse has 
long recognised a notion of ‘conquest’ through non-military means, such as development and settlement’.187 
Some Jewish writers understood this command to include the use of military force.
188
  
The precise understanding of the Jewish concept of conquering land is not under examination in this thesis. 
Neither is this thesis assessing the use or abuse of objective standards to justify one’s actions. Both views 
acknowledge and appeal to commands given by God.  
Killing within the context of war conformed to the objective standard that distinguished unjust from just actions 
committed by the Jewish people.  
This objective standard distinguished from unjust actions committed by the Jewish people. When objective 
standards like this are created, even genocide killing can be justified in war. In virtually all societies, human 
beings are considered to be justified in killing another combatant during a war.
189
  
The scope of this thesis does not seek to justify all forms of war. However, if my thesis is sound and objective 
standards are universally used to convince law consumers that the relevant assessment is just, then those making 
decisions about the proclamation of war, would do well to use objective standards in their justifications.  
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Hemdah (Jerusalem, 1957) sec. 1; Aviezer Ravitzky, 'Prohibited Wars in Jewish Religious Law' (2006) 6(1) Meorot 6. 
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This thesis will not examine or propose an objective standard that should be used to judge man’s law. This 
question falls outside the scope of this thesis.
190
 However, objective standards would be used to examine the 
validity of’ ‘man191 made’ law.  
The next section will demonstrate the creation and use of objective standards that allowed for deadly force for 
the purposes of self-defence.  
II SELF-DEFENCE 
According to Exodus 22:2,
192
 Jewish Law permitted the homeowner to kill an intruder to protect himself and his 
family.
193
 In commenting on Exodus 22:1 – 2, the Talmud wrote: 
Rava said: What is the reason for this breaking-in [rule that the thief may be killed]? It is based on the assumption 
that, given that no person would simply surrender his money [to another], this [thief] would say, 'If I go [towards 
him] he will stand against me, and not release me. And if he does, I will kill him.' [Given that,] the Bible says, 'If 
someone comes to kill you, rise to kill him first.'194 
In identifying the rationale behind this explanation, David Jacobs explained: 
[i]n this passage, the Talmud beg[an] with Rava's assumption [because] people w[ould not have] freely surrendered 
their possessions to a thief … an intruder [wa]s presumed to be life-threatening, and his force may [have] been 
anticipated and repelled by deadly force.195 
Under this assumption, Jewish law recognised that a reasonable person would not freely surrender his 
possessions. Therefore, using deadly force under these circumstances was justified, since the presence of an 
intruder was presumed to be life-threatening. Maimonides and Samuel Mendelsohn196 also held this view.197 
                                                          
190 See John M Finnis, 'Grounding Human Rights in Natural Law' (2015) 60(2) The American Journal of Jurisprudence 199-225. See also; Richard P Francis, 
'Natural Law as Fundamental to Positive Law' in, Tom Campbell (eds) Biotechnologie, Ethik und Recht Im Wissenschaftlichen Zeitalter (Franz Steiner Verlag, 
1991) vol 1 49–53; Harold R McKinnon, 'Natural Law and Positive Law' (1948) 23(2) Notre Dame Law Review 125-139. 
191 I do not use the term ‘man’ to refer to the male gender exclusively but rather, humankind.  
192 ‘If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him.’ (KJV) 
193 Richard H Hiers, Justice and Compassion in Biblical Law (A&C Black, 2009) 92. See also; Albert R Jonsen,  Stephen Edelston Toulmin and  Stephen 
Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (University of California Press, 1988) 222; W B Gerard, W B  E Derek Taylor and  Robert G 
Walker, Swiftly Sterneward: Essays on Laurence Sterne and His Times in Honor of Melvyn New (University of Delaware, 2011) 62; Jacob ben Asher, Tur on the 
Torah: Exodus: Sh'mot-Pekudey (Lambda Publishers, 2005) 657. 
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(1990) 63 Temple Law Review 36. 
196 Late nineteenth century Jewish rabbi and commentator on Jewish law. Cf. Samuel Mendelsohn, The Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews (M 
Curlander, 1891). See also; Robert Weisberg, Self-defense (George Mason University School of Law, 2006) 313. 
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Rabbi Yishma'el’s Mekhilta, a source used in conjunction with the Mishneh,198 derived rules for a threatened 
resident and concluded that: ‘the resident [wa]s justified in killing in anticipation of the threat’.199  
In other words, a homeowner was justified in killing an intruder because Jewish jurisprudence held that a 
reasonable person in those circumstances would assume his life was in danger and consequently use deadly 
force to protect himself.  
The right for a homeowner to kill an intruder coincides with the Jewish legal maxim, im ba lehorgekha hashkem 
lehorgo that translates to - ‘if one is coming to kill you, arise first and kill him.’200  
This maxim was the ‘license or right, based on an independent principle authorising the use of force within … 
the law in [order to serve] the interest of self-preservation in the face of a threat’201 and was derived from 
Exodus 22:1-3.
202
 This principle was enshrined in Sanhedrin 72a.
203
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III, 2014) 173; Benjamin Freedman, Duty and Healing: Foundations of a Jewish Bioethic (Routledge, 2004) 336; Uri Gabbay, The Exegetical Terminology of 
Akkadian Commentaries (BRILL, 2016) 3; Helena Miller,  Lisa D Grant and Alex Pomson,‎International Handbook of Jewish Education (Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2011) 375; Sorel Goldberg Loeb and ‎eraerar‎ eaeGta‎ grGGte, Teaching Torah: A Treasury of Insights and Activities (Behrman House 
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Rozwaski, Jewish Meditations on the Meaning of Death (Jason Aronson Incorporated, 1994) 212; Mona Mandel Abramowitz, The Journey of Rabbi and Rachel 
Abramowitz (AuthorHouse, 2012) x; Abraham P Bloch, One a Day: An Anthology of Jewish Historical Anniversaries for Every Day of the Year (KTAV 
Publishing House Inco, 1987) 196. 
200 Sanhedrin 72a. See also; Byron L Sherwin, In Partnership with God: Contemporary Jewish Law and Ethics (Syracuse University Press, 1990) 179; Gregory 
M Reichberg,  Henrik Syse and  Nicole M Hartwell, Religion, War, and Ethics: A Sourcebook of Textual Traditions (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 54; 
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201 Shlomo Zuckier, ‘A Halakhic-Philosophic Account of Justified Self-Defense’ (2012) 16 The Torah u-Madda Journal (2012-13) 33. 
202 Ibid 26-27. See also; Robert Eisen, Religious Zionism, Jewish Law, and the Morality of War: How Five Rabbis Confronted One of Modern Judaism's 
Greatest Challenges (Oxford University Press, 2017) 43. 
203 Mishnah: A burglar who enters a house by tunnelling (ha-ba ba-mah. teret) is judged on account of his ultimate end. If a burglar was entering a house by 
tunneling and broke a barrel, then if his [the burglar’s] blood is accountable, he is liable for the damage. But if his [the burglar’s] blood is not accountable, he is 
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Gemara: Rava said: What is the reason for the [license to kill the] tunneler? There is a presumption that a person does not hold himself back from defending his 
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David B. Kopel explained: 
All the Hebrew Scriptures have been the subject of extensive commentary by a long line of rabbinic scholars. 
Various scholars have drawn slightly different lessons about self-defence from Exodus 22:2-3, but they have all 
agreed with the core principle that self-defence is permissible in cases of necessity.204 
Jewish law justified the use of lethal force against an intruder as expressed in Maimonides’commentary:205 
 [The intruder] was thought to enter with an intention to murder someone206… ‘When a person breaks into [a home] 
—whether at night or during the day—license is granted to kill him. If either the homeowner or another person kills 
him, they are not liable.207 
To warrant his position, Maimonides relied upon the objective standard outlined in Exodus 22:1-2.
208
 To explain 
this, Maimonides asked, ‘why d[id] the Torah [referring to Exodus 22:1 – 2] permit the blood of such a thief [to 
be shed] although he [wa]s only attempting [to steal] money?’209 
A footnote in the Mishneh Torah explained the historical dispute over using deadly force against daytime 
intruders as sanctioned by Maimonides:  
Although Exodus 22:2 speaks of ‘the sun shining upon him,’ this is interpreted, as explained in Halakhah10, as 
referring to a person who one knows will not kill him, and not to a theft that takes place during the day.210 
Maimonides, echoing the Hebrew principle known as pikuach nefesh,
211
 held that deadly force was only 
justified if it was necessary to protect one’s life, but not one’s property.212  
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208 If a thief is found breaking in and is struck so that he dies, there shall be no bloodguilt for him (ESV). 
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thief entering his house to steal is in effect a pursuer seeking to killing another. Therefore, he should be killed, ‘whether he is an adult or a minor, or a man or a 
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Maimonides, above n 208, 226-228. (the bracketed items are insertions by the translator) . Cf. David B Kopel, 'The Torah and Self-Defense' (2004) 109(1) Penn 
State Law Review 33. 
210 Maimonides, above n 208, 226-228. 
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Guide (Jewish Publication Society, 2010) 548. 
212 [Different rules apply with regard to] a thief who stole and departed, or one who did not steal, but was caught [leaving the tunnel through which he entered 
the home] . Since he turned his back [on the house] and is no longer [intent on killing its owner] , he may not be slain. Similarly, a person who breaks into a 
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Because human life was so important in Judaism, the pikuach nefesh principle also required Jewish citizens to 
protect the lives of others.
213
 This exemption will be further discussed in the next section. The Hebrew maxim, 
pikuach nefesh, expressed its objective status from the biblical command in Leviticus 19:16, ‘neither shall you 
stand idly by the blood of your neighbour’.214 This maxim was derived from the objective standard built into 
Leviticus 19:16 and thus demonstrates the objectively reasonable response of using deadly force in 
circumstances that required the preservation of human life.  
In Jewish law, there was no tension between protecting possessions and the taking of life; it was between 
protecting a life and taking a life. In Jewish custom, no one would break and enter without knowing they were 
taking a capital risk. That custom operated as a deterrent against robbery.  
If a reasonable person, in the defendant’s position, would not consider the circumstances to be life threatening, 
he was not permitted to use deadly force against the intruder.215 Leviticus 19:16 was the starting point for the 
Hebrew maxim, pikuach nefesh. The Hebrew Scriptures governed and guided the Jewish people.
216
 This is why 
passages from the Torah were used to guide the Jews in later circumstances, even if the scriptures were not 
purposely analogous.    
Objective standards can be detected through all the reasoning and exposition that followed (which were derived 
from it). This was demonstrated in Maimonides’ treatment of this principle: 
[Different rules apply with regard to] a thief who stole and departed, or one who did not steal, but was caught 
[leaving the tunnel through which he entered the home]. Since he turned his back [on the house] and is no longer 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
garden, a field, a pen or a corral may not be killed, for the prevailing assumption is that he came merely [to steal]money, for generally the owners are not found 
in such places.  
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expected to give up his or her life.’ See George Robinson, Essential Judaism: A Complete Guide to Beliefs, Customs and Rituals (Atria Books, 2001) 200. 
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[intent on killing its owner], he may not be slain217… [i]f it is clear that the thief [who breaks in] will not kill him and 
instead is only seeking financial gain, it is forbidden to kill [the thief].
218
  
 [B]ecause it is an accepted presumption [in Jewish thought] that if the house-owner arises and attempts to prevent 
[the thief from stealing], [the thief] will slay him. And thus the thief entering his house to steal is in effect a pursuer 
seeking to kill another.
219
  
This ideology was based upon the Jewish interpretation of Exodus 22:1:
220
 
This is all implied by Exodus 22:1, which literally reads: ‘He has no blood’. The license mentioned above applies to 
a thief caught breaking in or one caught on a person's roof, courtyard or enclosed area, whether during the day or 
during the night.221 
Maimonides appealed to objective standards as presented in the Torah to justify his position of using lethal 
force.  
Maimonides explained two scenarios where deadly force was not justified according to objective standards - if 
the intruder had stolen assets and left the property and if the intruder was caught. A common theme is shared in 
these situations, namely the absence of the presumption of danger. For this reason, Maimonides argued that it 
would be unreasonable to use deadly force under these circumstances. Jewish law permitted the use of lethal 
force only in circumstances where a Jewish citizen experienced imminent harm.
222
 The codified law in the 
Shulchan Arukh (1565)
223
 had stated that 'if it [wa]s known [or understood]' that the intruder had no murderous 
intent, it was prohibited to kill him.
224
  
                                                          
217 Maimonides, Laws of Theft Chapter 9 Halacha 11. See also; Maimonides, above n 208, 226-228. 
218 Ibid (the bracketed items are insertions by the translator) [Citing reference mine]. Cf. Kopel, above n 210, 33. 
219 Maimonides, above n 220, 226-228.  
220 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Laws of the One Who Injures or Damages 1:16. See also; Sohail H Hashmi and  Steven P ett,‎Ethics and Weapons of Mass 
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and Why (Oxford University Press, 2013) 50; Dorff and  Newman,‎above n 110, 52. 
221 Maimonides, Genevah - Chapter Nine 7-8.  
222 Sanhedrin 72a-72b. See also; Stephen Passamaneck, 'Aspects of Physical Violence against Persons in Karo's Shulhan Arukh' (1991) 9 Jewish Law Annual 
56-58. 
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Cope When Body Or Spirit Fails (Jewish Lights Publishing, 2010) 165. See also; Mordechai Katz, Understanding Judaism: A Basic Guide to Jewish Faith, 
History, and Practice (Mesorah Publications, 2000) 373-374; Lloyd Ridgeon, Major World Religions: From Their Origins To The Present (Routledge, 2003) 
152. 
224 Joseph Karo and Shneur Zalman of Liadi, Shulchan Arukh: Choshen Mishpat 425:1 (emphasis mine) - One who ‘tunnels [in [to a house] in order steal’ has 
this rule of pursuer applied to him, however if it is understood that his only intent is monetary gain, and that he would not kill the owner in a confrontation, then 
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Since a reasonable person in these two circumstances would not infer that an intruder possessed murderous 
intent, it was unreasonable to use deadly force in this context. This principle was found in the Midrash
225
 that 
appealed to Exodus 22:3 for its objective foundation.
226
 
Regarding criminal law in general, Maimonides explained that a Jewish person was justified in using physical 
force against a robber:
227
 
[e]very one also may guard against a robber and resist him, which he cannot do against a thief; and lastly, a robber is 
known and may be pursued, and exertions used to recover the things of which a person has been robbed, whilst a 
thief is unknown.228  
In the words of David B. Kopel,
229
 ‘implicit in Maimonides’ statement [wa]s the idea that the victim of a 
robbery [wa]s likely to resist, would pursue the robber, and would exert himself to recover his own goods—
rather than passively submitting.’230 Therefore, a reasonable person in the victim’s situation would resist, pursue 
the robber, and exert the force necessary to recover his goods. If the victim’s conduct aligned with the conduct 
of a reasonable person in these circumstances, the victim's conduct was seen to be justified.  
Whilst Maimonides believed that a homeowner and a guest231 were justified in killing an intruder, Rashi
232
 
believed that a guest was not justified in using deadly force against an intruder. Rashi proclaimed that only the 
homeowner was able to use deadly force against an intruder because ‘[the] thief contemplate[d] killing only the 
homeowner’.233  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
it is forbidden to kill him. See also Sefer Meirat Einayim and Isaac b Sheshet, Responsa Rivash II (Sifriyah Mishpatit, 1967) 239; Stephen Passamaneck, 
'Aspects of Physical Violence against Persons in Karo's Shulhan Arukh' (1991) 9 Jewish Law Annual 57. 
225 What does it mean ‘if the sun rose’? As sun signifies existence of peace, so if the householder knows that he can expect peaceable intentions from the 
intruder (and still kills him), he is culpable. [Cf. AishDas, Ki Teitse 5764 <http://www.aishdas.org/midrash/5764/kiTeitse.html#t4>.]  
226 The Classic Midrash: Tannaitic Commentaries on the Bible (Reuven Hammer trans., Paulist Press 1995) 410-411. See also; David B Kopel, The Morality of 
Self-defense and Military Action: The Judeo-Christian Tradition (ABC-CLIO, 2017) 12; Nachum Amsel, The Jewish Encyclopedia of Moral and Ethical Issues 
(J Aronson, 1994) 254; David L Lieber et al., Etz Hayim: Torah and Commentary (Jewish Publication Society, 2001) 464. 
227 Kopel, above n 210, 34. 
228 James Townley, The Reasons of the Laws of Moses from the ‘More Nevochim’ of Maimonides (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2001) 235 (reprinting 
Maimonides, ch. 16). 
229 Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado, www.davekopel.org; Adjunct Professor, University of Colorado at Denver, 2005; Adjunct 
Professor, New York University School of Law, 1998-99; J D University of Michigan 1985; B A Brown University, 1982.  
230 Kopel, above n 210, 35. 
231 Maimonides, above n 208, 226. 
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Because Jewish law only allowed the use of deadly force under life threatening circumstances, according to 
Rashi, a thief would not intend to kill a guest, only the homeowner. For this reason, the guest was not in a life 
threatening circumstance and therefore, he was not justified in killing the intruder.  
Despite the differing views between Rashi and Maimonides, both commentators agreed that it was objectively 
reasonable to project lethal force in life-threatening circumstances.  
Commenting on Exodus 22:2, Rashi wrote: 
Here the Torah teaches you the rule: ‘If one comes with the intention of killing you, be quick and kill him’. — And 
this burglar actually came with the intention of killing you, for he knew full well that no one can hold himself in 
check, looking on whilst people are stealing his property before his eyes and doing nothing. He (the thief) therefore 
obviously came with this purpose in view — that in case the owner of the property would resist him, he would kill 
him (Sanhedrin 72a).234 
Like Maimonides, Rashi outlined how a reasonable person would act if an intruder broke into his home. Rashi 
held that a reasonable person would not keep ‘himself in check’ whilst an intruder was stealing his property. A 
reasonable person would assume that if he resisted the intruder, the intruder would kill him. Thus, a reasonable 
person in that situation would believe that he was in a life-threatening situation. Therefore, a homeowner was 
justified in using deadly force against an intruder, since a reasonable person would perceive this circumstance as 
life-threatening.  
Murder was strictly prohibited according to Jewish law.
235
 However, the charge of murder was dropped if the 
accused satisfactorily argued that he acted in a reasonable manner. That is to say, the accused used deadly force 
that was justified under the approved circumstances. Sanhedrin 72b decreed that a homeowner would strike an 
intruder that broke into his home:  
                                                          
234 Pentateuch with Targum Onkelos, Haphtoroth and Rashi's Commentary (M Rosenbaum & A M Silberman trans., Hebrew Publications Corporation, 1934) 
116. See also Rashi, The Torah: With Rashi's Commentary Translated, Annotated, and Elucidated (Yisrael Isser Zvi Herczeg et al. eds, Mesorah Publications, 
4th ed, 1997) 277. 
235 See Exodus 20:13 and Deuteronomy 5:17. Cf. David Novak, The Sanctity of Human Life (Georgetown University Press, 2009) 46. See also; Louis E 
Newman, Past Imperatives: Studies in the History and Theory of Jewish Ethics (SUNY Press, 2012) 211; David C Thomasma,  David N Weisstub and ‎ haaheare‎
MtaaH,‎Personhood and Health Care (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013) 35; Greta Austin, Shaping Church Law Around the Year 1000: The Decretum 
of Burchard of Worms (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009) 167. 
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Our Rabbis taught: [If a thief be found breaking up,] and be smitten, — by any man; that he dies, — by any death 
wherewith you can slay him. Now, [the exegesis] 'And be smitten, — by any man' is rightly necessary, for I might 
think that only the owner may be assumed not to remain passive.236 
Sanhedrin 72b provided a circumstance that demonstrated the use of reasonable force under these conditions.
237
 
The phrase, ‘for I might think that only the owner may be assumed not to remain passive’238 established that 
Jewish law used a reasonable person standard to assess the reasonability of the accused’s actions. Jewish 
jurisprudence believed that a homeowner would not remain passive if an intruder broke into his home. 
Therefore, if the accused struck and killed an intruder, he was not held liable for he acted reasonably under the 
circumstances. The Mishneh observed, ‘someone who br[oke] in [wa]s judged according to his end’.239  
The Old Testament precepts, as recorded in Exodus, in conjunction with the rabbinical commentaries on these 
precepts, show that Jewish law used objective standards to evaluate human behaviour.  
III PRESERVATION OF HUMAN LIFE 
Reasonableness in Jewish law also required bystanders to preserve the life of a fellow Jew. Sanhedrin 73a
240
 
proclaimed that ‘if one s[aw] a wild beast ravaging [a fellow] or bandits [who came] to attack him . . . he [wa]s 
obligated to save [the fellow]’.241  
                                                          
236 Sanhedrin 72b. ‘If a thief be found breaking in, and be smitten so that he dieth, there shall be no bloodguiltiness for him. If the sun be risen upon him, there 
shall be bloodguiltiness for him ...’ Cf. Exodus 22:1-2 (Jewish Publication Society trans. 1917). 
237 Peter Ochs, Another Reformation: Postliberal Christianity and the Jews (Baker Academic, 2011) 153. See also; J Patout Burns, War and Its Discontents: 
Pacifism and Quietism in the Abrahamic Traditions (Georgetown University Press, 1996) 3; Landes, above n 222, 172. 
238 Sanhedrin 72b. 
239 Sanhedrin 8:6. 
240 Mishnah: These are those whom we save with [at the cost of] their lives: One who pursues his fellow to kill him (ha-rodef ah. ar h.avero lehorgo), or a male 
[to sodomize him], or a betrothed na‘arah [to violate her]. But one who pursues a beast [for bestiality], or one who is desecrating the Sabbath, or engaging in 
idol worship, we may not save them with [at the cost of] their lives. 
Gemara: The Rabbis taught: ‘From where do we know that, if someone pursues his fellow to kill him, that he should be saved at the cost of his life? Scripture 
teaches: ‘Do not stand [idly] by the blood of your fellow (Leviticus 19:16).’ But does the verse really come to teach this? We need this verse to teach that which 
was taught in a Baraita: ‘From where do we know that if one sees his fellow drowning in a river, or a wild beast ravaging or bandits coming upon him, that he is 
obligated to save him? Scripture teaches: ‘Do not stand [idly] by the blood of your fellow.’ Indeed it is so. But from where do we derive that he should be saved 
at the cost of his [the attacker’s] life? It may be derived through an a fortiori argument from [the case of] the betrothed na‘arah. If in the case of a betrothed 
na‘arah, whose pursuer comes only to blemish her, the Torah states that she should be saved at the cost of his life, when one pursues his fellow in order to kill 
him, how much more so! But can we derive a punishment on the basis of a logical inference? A Baraita of the academy of Rabbi taught: ‘It is derived from a 
Scriptural analogy: ‘For like a man who rises up against his fellow and murders him, [so is this thing, the rape of a betrothed na‘arah]’ (Deut. 22:26). Just as a 
betrothed na’arah should be saved from rape at the cost of his life, so, too, a murderer should be saved at the cost of his life.’ And from where do we know this 
very law about the betrothed na‘arah? As the Baraita of the academy of R Yishmael taught, for a Baraita of the academy of R Yishmael taught: ‘But she had no 
rescuer’(Deut. 22:27)’ The implication is that, if there was someone to rescue her, he could rescue her in whatever way possible.’  
241 Vilna Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 73a (alterations in original). 
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The duty to use force to defend an innocent bystander was based on two passages
242
 from the Hebrew 
Scriptures, Leviticus 19:16
243
 and Deuteronomy 22:23-27.
244
 The penultimate positive Mitzvot, number 247, 
required one ‘[t]o save a person who [wa]s being pursued even if it [wa]s necessary to kill the pursuer’.245 The 
Mitzvot also provided a negative command ‘[n]ot to have pity on a pursuer. Rather, he should be killed before he 
kills or rapes the person he is pursuing’.246 Maimonides also upheld this principle whilst also using 
Deuteronomy 25:12
247
 to justify his position.248  
Jewish law shared the idea that law was objective in nature.
249
 If the accused committed an act that seemed 
negligent, the accused was pardoned if the arbitrator declared that a reasonable person would have acted in the 
same manner under the same circumstances. Jewish law used objective standards established for a reasonable 
person to determine the criminal culpability of the accused.  
                                                          
242 Kopel, above n 210, 33. See also; Zuckier, above n 202, 27–28. 
243 You shall not go around as a slanderer among your people, and you shall not stand up against the life of your neighbor: I am the LORD. (ESV) 
244 23 ‘If there is a betrothed virgin, and a man meets her in the city and lies with her, 24 then you shall bring them both out to the gate of that city, and you 
shall stone them to death with stones, the young woman because she did not cry for help though she was in the city, and the man because he violated his 
neighbor's wife. So you shall purge the evil from your midst. 25 ‘But if in the open country a man meets a young woman who is betrothed, and the man seizes 
her and lies with her, then only the man who lay with her shall die. 26 But you shall do nothing to the young woman; she has committed no offense punishable 
by death. For this case is like that of a man attacking and murdering his neighbor, 27 because he met her in the open country, and though the betrothed young 
woman cried for help there was no one to rescue her.  
‘This implies furthermore that it was the duty of bystanders to heed a woman’s cries, and come to her rescue’. Cf. 2(a) The Mishneh: Sefer Nezekin (Matis 
Roberts trans., Mesorah Publications, 1987) 150-151. See also; Vilna Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 73a.  
245 Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Eliyahu Touger transl., Moznaim Publication Corporation, 1996-97) 58 (emphasis mine). 
246 Ibid 85 (quoting from negative commandment number 293). 
‘This principle was also reflected in a 1998 Israel law, derived from Levitical law, that mandated a person to aid another who was in immediate danger if aid can 
be rendered without danger to the rescuer’. Cf. Daniel Friedman, To Kill and Take Possession: Law, Morality and Society in Bible Stories (Hendrickson 
Publication, 2002) 90-91. 
247 Then you shall cut off her hand. Your eye shall have no pity. 
248 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Rotzeach uShmirat Nefesh 1:14-15 (translated by Eliyahu Touger). This principle was also taught by Jesus Christ in The 
Parable of the Good Samaritan recorded in the Gospel of Luke 10:25–37. The widespread concept of a 'Good Samaritan' is one who acts purely out of the 
kindness of his heart to help a stranger in distress, without any obligation. Jewish law took an opposite view. It imposed unwavering obligation to help all those 
in distress, even when doing so may have endangered the rescuer. By the time of the 'Good Samaritan' parable, the obligation to rescue under Jewish law was 
already well established. That is, Christ as Rabbi was explaining to Jews that their obligation to care for others extended to robbery victims, and that even 
Samaritans recognise that because of the spirit of God (or reason) which resonates within them.For a detailed view on how the parable of the Good Samaritan 
fits into a Jewish law context, see Michael N Rader, 'The ‘Good Samaritan’ in Jewish Law' (2001) 22(3) Journal of Legal Medicine 375-399. 14 Whenever a 
person can save another person's life, but he fails to do so, he transgresses a negative commandment, as Leviticus 19:16 states: ‘Do not stand idly by while your 
brother's blood is at stake.’ Similarly, this commandment applies when a person sees a colleague drowning at sea or being attacked by robbers or a wild animal, 
and he can save him himself or can hire others to save him. Similarly, it applies when he hears gentiles or mosrim conspiring to harm a colleague or planning a 
snare for him, and he does not inform him and notify him of the danger. 15 When a person sees a rodef pursuing a colleague to kill him, or a woman forbidden 
as an ervah to rape her, and he has the potential to save the victim and yet fails to do so, he has negated the observance of the positive commandment: ‘You must 
cut off her hand,’ and has transgressed two negative commandments: ‘You may not show pity,’ and ‘Do not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake.’ 
This principle was expanded and explicated in Torat Kohanim, Kedoshim, chap. 4. Cf. Esther Farbstein, Hidden in Thunder: Perspectives on Faith, Halachah 
and Leadership During the Holocaust (Feldheim Publishers, 2007) vol 1 18; Zuckier, above n 202, 28. 
249 Wayne Allen, Further Perspectives on Jewish Law and Contemporary Issues (Trafford Publishing, 2011) 114-115. See also; Sherwin, above n 201, 21; 
Fred Rosner, Biomedical Ethics and Jewish Law (KTAV Publishing House Incorporation, 2001) 112; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Cosimo, 
Incorporation, 2009) 136; Zweigert and Drobnig, above n 49, 194. 
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Jewish law used objective standards to judge human behaviour. As a result, Jewish law contributes to the thesis 
argument that human reason requires the use of objective standards if any criteria of judgement are to be 
perceived as fair. Jewish law from Moses to Maimonides implemented a reasonable standard of conduct,
250
 
using objective standards to enable their reasoning.  
V THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 
Jewish law assessed negligence by comparing the defendant’s conduct with that of a reasonable person.251 If the 
defendant acted in a manner that was contrary to how a reasonable person would act, the defendant was liable 
for damages. This was the standard by which negligence was assessed in Jewish law.
252
 This principle was 
established in the Mishnah. The Mishnah declared that an act not performed in accordance with the custom of 
caretakers was negligent.
253
 In other words, a caretaker was negligent if he did not follow the custom of 
reasonable caretakers in the circumstances under consideration.
254
  
Before further analysing the law of negligence in Jewish law, it is important to first neutralise the false 
understanding of the Jewish concept ‘an eye for an eye’,255 otherwise known as the principle of lex talionis.256 
This concept has been generally misunderstood
257
 to authorise personal retaliatory revenge.
258
 This rubric was 
                                                          
250 For example, the Australian conception of reasonableness is as follows. There is no support for an unbridled right of property defence, although some 
support for the permission to use reasonable force.' See also: R v McKay [1957] VR 560. Discussed in Norval Morris, 'The Slain Chicken Thief' (1958) 2 Sydney 
Law Review 414; R v Martin (Anthony) [2002] 1 CAR 27; Paul A Fairall and Stanley Yeo, Criminal Defences in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 
2005) 169-170; Simon Bronitt, Miriam Gani and Saskia Hufnagel, Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2012) 124. 
251 W Gunther Plaut,  Mark Washofsky and Central Conference of American Rabbis,‎ Teshuvot for the Nineties: Reform Judaism's Answers to Today's 
Dilemmas (CCAR Press, 1997) 310-311. See also; Bernard S Jackson, The Jewish Law Annual (Taylor & Francis, 1998) vol 12 228; Shimshon Ettinger, Self-
help in Jewish Law (Open University of Israel, 1993) vol 6 136. 
252 Plaut, Washofsky and Central Conference of American Rabbis,‎ above n 252, 310-311. See also; Noʻam Zohar, Quality of Life in Jewish Bioethics 
(Lexington Books, 2006) 49; Ettinger, above n 252, vol 6 82. 
253 Cf. Bava Metzi’a 42a. See also; Benjamin Freedman, Duty and Healing: Foundations of a Jewish Bioethic (Routledge, 2004) 181; Noʻam Zohar, Quality of 
Life in Jewish Bioethics (Lexington Books, 2006) 49. 
254 Noʻam Zohar, Quality of Life in Jewish Bioethics (Lexington Books, 2006) 49. See also; Benjamin Freedman, Duty and Healing: Foundations of a Jewish 
Bioethic (Routledge, 2004) 182. 
255 This phraseology is found in Exodus 21:24 (KJV) - Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.  
256 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 147. See also; Alan John Mitchell Milne, Human Rights and Human Diversity: 
An Essay in the Philosophy of Human Rights (Sterling Publishing Company Incorporation, 1986) 144; Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction (Taylor 
& Francis, 2017) 248; Ronald L Eisenberg, Dictionary of Jewish Terms: A Guide to the Language of Judaism (Taylor Trade Publications, 2011) 236. 
257 In the Talmud the rabbis list nine arguments to prove that eye for eye cannot be taken literally. Jacob Chinitz, 'Eye for and Eye - An Old Canard' (1995) 
23(2) Jewish Bible Quarterly 79-84. 
258 Roslyn Muraskin and ‎Hreehtu‎Hwarhaae,‎Morality and the Law (Prentice Hall, 2001) 110. See also; George E Mendenhall and  Gary A Herion, Ancient 
Israel's Faith and History: An Introduction to the Bible in Context (Westminster John Knox Press, 2001) 95; James Davis, Lex Talionis in Early Judaism and 
the Exhortation of Jesus in Matthew 5.38-42 (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005) 168; John Woodland Welch and  Stephen J Fleming, Lectures on Religion and the 
Founding of the American Republic (Brigham Young University, 2003) 63. 
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not a principle of vengeance or retaliation, but an equitable principle of equivalence,
 259
 a principle of justice that 
belonged to the courts of law.
260 The logic of equivalence demanded that the punishment must fit the crime,261 
thus requiring re-compensation that was proportionate to the harm done.
262
   
The principle of liability for damages caused by the defendant under Jewish law was called negligence.
263
 That 
is, the defendant was liable for damages for conduct that he should have foreseen would lead to damage.
264 
When was a person obliged to foresee that his action and conduct would cause damage? When the resulting 
damage was so common that most individuals in the place of the defendant would have foreseen it.
265 
According 
to Jewish law, negligence was determined objectively.
266
 The defendant was liable for conduct that ordinary 
persons would have normally foreseen as being likely to cause damage.
267
  
However, if a reasonable person would not have foreseen the damage caused by the defendant, the defendant 
was not liable.
268
 For the same reason, the defendant was also obligated to exercise reasonable care. If the 
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care, the defendant was liable for negligence.
269
  
In Jewish law, people were responsible for all damages caused by their actions if they failed to take the care that 
a reasonable person would take in these circumstances.
270
 However, if the defendant caused a fire that spread 
because of an unusual wind, he was not liable because a reasonable person could not control the element of 
wind; it was an act of God.
271
  
                                                          
259 Stan Windass, The Rite of War (Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986) 116. See also; John Woodland Welch and  Stephen J Fleming,‎Lectures on Religion and 
the Founding of the American Republic (Brigham Young University, 2003) 63. 
260 John Stott, A Deeper Look at the Sermon on the Mount: Living Out the Way of Jesus (InterVarsity Press, 2013) 95. 
261 John Wall,  William Schweiker and  W David Hall, Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought (Psychology Press, 2002) 150. See also; Pamela 
Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 157–159; Arend Soeteman, Pluralism and Law (Springer Science & Business 
Media, 2001) vol 1 24; Gerald F Gaus and ‎DatG‎y' Ktheaet,‎The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy (Routledge, 2013) 772. 
262 David VanDrunen, Divine Covenants and Moral Order: A Biblical Theology of Natural Law (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 2014) 299. See also; Gunther 
Plaut, The Torah — A Modern Commentary (Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1981) 572. For in-depth analyses of this general topic, see William Ian 
Miller, Eye for an Eye (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
263 Steinberg & Rosner, above n 68, 627. 
264 Baba Kamma 21b; 52a/b and 99b. See also; Jackson, above n 67, 7; Schick, above n 67, 163. 
265 Jackson, above n 266, 7. See also; Schick, above n 67, 141. 
266 Jackson, above n 266, 15. See also; Harold J Berman, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 1993) 269. 
267 See R Ulla's statement, Baba Kamma 27b; Tosef. Baba Kamma 10:29. See also; Jackson, above n 266, 15; B Geist, State Audit: Dev. in Public 
Accountability (Holmes & Meier, 1981) 379. 
268 Shalom Albeck, Principles Of The Law Of Tort In The Talmud (Tel Aviv, 1965) 44. See also; Rif, Halakhot on Baba Kamma 61b; Jackson, above n 67, 7; 
Izhak Englard, Tort Law (Gad Tedeski ed, 2nd ed, 1976) 196-99. 
269 Shimshon Ettinger, Self-help in Jewish Law (Open University of Israel, 1993) vol 6 79. 
270 Ronald L Eisenberg, What the Rabbis Said: 250 Topics from the Talmud (ABC-CLIO, 2010) 127. See also; Cyrus Adler,  Solomon Schechter and  Abraham 
Aaron Neumank, The Jewish Quarterly Review (Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, 1917) vol 7 159. 
271 Jackson, above n 266, 7. 
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However, in Bava Kamma 3b, Rashi stated - ‘one ought to foresee that a normal wind will spread a fire’.272 That 
is, if a reasonable person could have foreseen damage was likely to arise, the defendant was liable for 
negligence. Liability was imposed because the defendant failed to meet the objective standard established for a 
reasonable person. For example, liability was incurred if an ordinary wind spread a fire
273
 or if the tortfeasor 
fenced a courtyard with thorns in a place where it was frequently occupied by citizens who frequently leant on 
it.
274
 In both these circumstances, a reasonable person could have foreseen that damages would arise as a 
consequence of his actions.  
Jewish law decreed that a person was not liable for damages if the damages were caused by ‘an act of God’.275 
To assess whether an ‘act of God’ occurred, a reasonable person test was used. The defendant was not liable if a 
reasonable person would have been unable to prevent damage from occurring, if the damage was unforeseeable, 
or if the damage seemed to have been caused by divine intervention. As Professor Bernard Jackson
276
 noted: 
For instance, if he [the defendant] caused a fire which spread as a result of an unusual wind, for which he obviously 
cannot be held responsible, it [wa]s an act of God … [therefore] he [wa]s not liable.277 
If the resulting damage could not have been caused by human conduct, the defendant was not liable for 
damages. Jewish law also incorporated a reasonable person test to evaluate damages that arose due to negligence 
in cases pertaining to the ownership and maintenance of pits.
278
 Jacob Weingreen quoted from Exodus 21:33 – 
34 to explain,
279
 ‘when a man l[eft] a pit (a cistern or a well) uncovered, or when he d[u]g one but d[id] not 
cover it, [if] an ox fell into it (and died), then the owner of the pit (well, or cistern) … ma[d]e good the loss’.280  
A reasonable person in the owner’s position would have foreseen that if he had left the pit uncovered, there was 
a potential hazard. Therefore, since the owner did not take reasonable precautions to avoid a foreseeable risk, he 
was liable for the damages that arose due to his negligence.  
                                                          
272 Ibid. 
273 Baba Kamma 56a. 
274 Baba Kamma 29b. 
275 Levine, above n 63, 80. See also; Jackson, above n 266, 7; Neil S Hecht, An Introduction to the History and Sources of Jewish Law (Clarendon Press, 1996) 
193; Elliot N Dorff and ‎ aehwa‎ thhtee,‎Living Tree, A: The Roots and Growth of Jewish Law (SUNY Press, 2012) 40. 
276 Professor Jackson was Alliance Professor of Modern Jewish Studies at the University of Manchester, Co-Director of its Centre for Jewish Studies and 
Director of its Agunah Research Unit and Professor of Law and Jewish Studies at Liverpool Hope University. Cf. Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew 
Studies, Report of the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies (The Centre, 1984) 58. See also; Martin Goodman,  Jeremy Cohen and  David Sorkin, The 
Oxford Handbook of Jewish Studies (OUP Oxford, 2002) x; Alejandro F Botta, In the Shadow of Bezalel. Aramaic, Biblical, and Ancient Near Eastern Studies 
in Honor of Bezalel Porten (BRILL, 2012) xxxviii. 
277 Jackson, above n 266, 7 (emphasis mine). 
278 Nelson P Miller, 'The Attributes of Care and Carelessness: A Proposed Negligence Jury Instruction' (2005) 29 New England Law Review 799. 
279 Jacob Weingreen, 'Concepts in Ancient Biblical Civil and Criminal Law' (1989) 14 Irish Jurist 113, 133. 
280 Exodus 21:33–34. 
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A reasonable person test was also used to assess damages that arose from negligent conduct in the course of the 
construction and navigation of a boat,
281
 the construction and maintenance of a home or wall,
282
 and the 
ownership and control of an ox.
283
 If damage flowed from such events, a reasonable person test was used to 
assess whether such damages were caused by the negligence of the defendant. If the defendant acted in a manner 
that was contrary to that of a reasonable person, the defendant was charged with negligence and thus, was liable 
for damages.  
For example, Heidi Lie Feldman has explained that damages flowed because the standard of care expected of 
the defendant was that of a reasonable person, namely prudence and carefulness.
284
 Fleming James listed these 
characteristics as a ‘reasonable man’s common attributes’.285 If the defendant did not exhibit prudence and 
carefulness and damage subsequently followed, the defendant was charged with negligence because he failed to 
meet the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.  
As seen throughout this section, Jewish law integrated a standard of care into the assessment of all human 
conduct. This standard was assessed in accordance with what an ordinary, or reasonable, person in the position 
of the defendant would have done. If the defendant failed to follow the standard expected of this ordinary 
person, the defendant was liable for any damage caused due to his lack of care. However, if the defendant acted 
in a manner that reflected the conduct of a reasonable person and damage still arose, the defendant was not 
liable. Therefore, Jewish law used objective standards to evaluate human behaviour.  
VI THE MINOR, THE DEAF-MUTE, THE LUNATIC AND THE IMBECILE: CRIMINALLY 
EXEMPT  
As mentioned in chapter one, the reasonable person has the ability to reason. Criminal liability is not imputed to 
individuals who lack this ability since they cannot be held to a reasonable person standard because they do not 
possess the ability to reason. This exemption was present in Jewish law’s treatment of minors, lunatics, deaf-
                                                          
281 See, e.g., Reuven Yaron, The Laws of Eshnunna (Brill Academic Publishers, 2nd ed, 1988) 47. (‘If a boatman was negligent and caused the boat to sink—
whatever he caused to sink, he shall pay in full.’ (quoting Laws of Eshnunna, 18th century BC). 
282 See, e.g., Reuven Yaron, ‘The Goring Ox in Near Eastern Laws’ in Jewish Law In Ancient and Modern Israel: Selected Essays (Haim H Cohn ed, 1971) 50, 
56. (‘If a wall was threatening to fall and the ward [authorities] have had [it] made known to the owner of the wall, but he did not strengthen his wall and the 
wall fell down and caused a son of a man to die, [it is a case concerning] life: decree of the king.’ (quoting Laws of Eshnunna, 18th century BC). 
283 Jacob Finkelstein, ‘The Ox that Gored’ (1981) 71 Transactions Of The American Philosophical Society 20 (‘[I]f the ox was previously reputed to have had 
the propensity to gore, and its owner had not kept it under control, he shall make good ox for ox, but will keep the dead one for himself.’ (quoting Exodus 
21:36). 
284 Heidi Li Feldman, ‘Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law’ (2000) 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1431, cited in Patrick J 
Kelley & Laurel A Wendt, ‘What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions’ 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review 587, 592 (2002). 
285 Fleming James Jr, ‘The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases’ (1951) 16 Missouri Law Review 1. 
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mutes and imbeciles.
286
 According to Jewish law, these groups of individuals were unable to reason and 
therefore, could not meet the criterion of a reasonable person. Since they did not meet the criterion, they were 
not judged by this objective standard.  
Whilst it may be contested that ‘deaf-mutes’ possess the ability to reason, this thesis does not argue for or 
against this proposition. Rather, this chapter outlines the position of the deaf-mute in Jewish law. When 
reviewing the position of minors, imbeciles, deaf-mutes, and lunatics in Jewish law in relation to criminal 
responsibility, it is crucial not to impose anachronistic modern ideas on ancient Jews. The point of this thesis is 
not to show that every civilisation used precisely the same objective tools to implement reason into their judicial 
system. Instead, this thesis explains how Jewish law treated individuals who lacked the capacity to reason. 
However, competent people were held to objective standards because they could understand them. This chapter 
shows how Jewish legal philosophy used a reasonable person standard to come to this conclusion.  
Jewish jurisprudence placed deaf-mutes in the same criminally exempt category as someone who was a lunatic 
and one who was a minor. This is not to say that deaf-mutes were the same as minors or lunatics, but rather, 
Jewish jurisprudence did not consider that they possessed the proper functioning cognitive faculties to be held to 
a reasonable person standard. Whilst this categorisation may be scientifically incorrect and even discriminatory 
according to modern standards, it nonetheless explains the Jewish perspective that individuals who were 
perceived to lack the ability to act in the same manner as a reasonable person were exempt from criminal 
liability.  
According to Jewish law, minors, deaf-mutes, lunatics
287
 and imbeciles were not legally obligated to 
compensate the victims of their harmful acts.
288
 Baba Kamma 501 – 502 stated: 
A deaf-mute, an idiot, and a minor are awkward to deal with, as he who injures them is liable (to pay), whereas if 
they injure others they are exempt.289  
 
                                                          
286 Thomas Maeder, Crime and Madness: The Origins and Evolution of the Insanity Defense (Harper and Row, 1985) 3. See also; Falk, above n 9,vol 2 176; 
Marvin Firestone, ‘Psychiatric Patients and Forensic Psychiatry' in Shafeek S Sanbar (eds), Legal Medicine (Elsevier Health Sciences, 2007) 621; Richard 
Rosner, Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry (CRC Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 213; Cohen, above n 139, 672; Walter Jacob, Contemporary American 
Reform Responsa (CCAR Press, 1987) 9; Jacob and Zemer, above n 9, 110. 
287 The Babylonian Talmud, Baba Kamma 10a.  
288 Jacques M Quen, The Psychiatrist in the Courtroom: Selected Papers of Bernard L Diamond (Routledge, 2013) 38. See also; William J Chambliss, Juvenile 
Crime and Justice (SAGE Publications, 2011) 4; ‎etaeraG‎ ewrae‎Jraahte,‎The Jewish Law Annual (Taylor & Francis, 1992) 222; Carmi, above n 9, 18; Jacob, 
above n 287, 9; Jacob and Zemer, above n 9, 110. 
289 The Babylonian Talmud, Baba Kamma 501–502. 
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Elaborating on this principle, the Code of Maimonides proclaimed: 
 
To clash with a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is bad, seeing that if one wounds one of these, he is liable, 
whereas if they [the deaf-mute, imbecile or minor] wound others, they are exempt. Even if a deaf-mute becomes 
normal, or an imbecile becomes sane, or a minor reaches majority, they are not liable for payment inasmuch as they 
were legally irresponsible when they caused the wound.290 
 
These Jewish sources reveal that deaf-mutes, minors, imbeciles, lunatics, and idiots were not liable for any 
injury they caused to others. This exemption was also outlined in Baba Kamma 59b. The Encyclopaedia 
Judaica noted, ‘a person who lack[ed] mental capacity – such as a deaf-mute, idiot, or minor – was exempt from 
liability for damage caused by the act of his person because he [wa]s incapable of foreseeing damage’.291 
Examples of this exemption in Jewish literature are also set out in the Babylonian Talmud. The Talmud 
explained that minors, imbeciles, deaf-mutes, and lunatics were not criminally liable
292
 because they were 
unable to distinguish between good and evil.
293
 
   
Since minors, deaf-mutes, lunatics, and imbeciles did not possess the capacity to reason, a capability necessary 
to a reasonable person. As a result, they were not subject to the standard set for a reasonable person. Jewish law 
held that these individuals were not legally liable for their acts.
294
 
 
The capacity to reason was necessary if a person was to be held to objective standards. So long as the accused 
was able to reason to the same extent as a reasonable person, they could be held to the objective standard that 
was set for all reasonable people. Jewish jurisprudence required that objective standards form part of the 
assessment of liability in every case when a person was accused of a crime.  
 
                                                          
290 Maimonides, The Code of Maimonides: The Book of Torts, Book Eleven. 
291 Thomson Gale, Encyclopaedia Judaica, vol 11 (1971) Torts, 'Liability' 241. 
292. Rita J Simon and David E Aaronson, The Insanity Defense (Praeger, 1988) 10, citing Barbara A Weiner, ’Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane 
Approach’ (1980) Chicago-Kent Law Review 1057-85. See also; Simon Ahn-Redding, The Insanity Defense the World Over (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) 4. 
293 As expressed by Thomas Maeder: 
Ancient Hebraic law [referring to Bava Kamma ch. VIII, Mishnah III] stated simply that idiots, lunatics and children below a certain age ought not be held 
criminally responsible because they could not distinguish good from evil, right from wrong and were thus blameless in the eyes of God and man. It is an ill thing 
to knock against a deaf mute, an imbecile, or a minor. He that wounds them is culpable, but if they wound others they are not culpable . . . for with them only the 
act is a consequence while the intention is of no consequence. [Cf. Maeder, above n 287, 3.]  
See also; Falk, above n 9,vol 2 176; Firestone, above n 287, 621; Rosner, above n 287, 213; Cohen, above n 139, 672.  
294 Quint, above n 145, 208. 
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I THE MINOR ACCORDING TO JEWISH LAW  
 
The purpose for outlining the Jewish perspective of a minor in relation to criminal liability is not to demonstrate 
that all societies believe minors should not be subject to objective standards. Rather to demonstrate that Jewish 
law exempted minors from criminal liability as an aspect of their reasonable person standard. The weight of 
Jewish jurisprudential authority held that a minor was not yet developed enough to function as a reasonable 
person. Therefore, minors were exempt from the reasonable person standard that applied to all competent adults. 
 
The definition of a minor in Jewish law was ambiguous. The Talmud divided the age of minors into three 
periods – infancy, impubescence and adolescence. Infancy began from birth until the person was six years of 
age;
295
 pubescence began from the beginning of the seventh year to the first day of the twelfth or thirteenth year, 
depending upon whether the person was male or female.
296
 However, neither male nor female was considered 
pubescent even after they had reached the prescribed age unless they were able to show at least two hairs, except 
on their head, on any part of the body.
297
  
 
Adolescence began from the age of pubescence to twenty years.
298
 However, adolescence did not begin until six 
months after the male reached the age of adolescence and three months after for the female.
299
 
 
While the Talmud illustrated these distinctions, rabbinical law did not specify the particular age at which a 
person ceased to be a minor, for the purposes of punishment.
300
 However, the Talmud identified that a person 
who was younger than nine years and one day was exempt from capital punishment.
301
  
 
Isadore Fishman said that according to Jewish law, ‘[a] minor under the age of eight [years] [wa]s presumed to 
be incapable of committing any criminal offence and c[ould] not be convicted’.302 Avraham Steinberg argued 
                                                          
295 Kethuboth 65b. See also; Baba Bathra 155b. 
296 Naaruth (Kethuboth 29a; Nidda 45b).  
297 Kiddushin 16a. See also; Nidda 45b. See also; Samuel Mendelsohn, The Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews: Compiled from the Talmud and 
Other Rabbinical Writings, and Compared with Roman and English Penal Jurisprudence (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1891) 82. 
298 Bagruth (Kiddushin 4a; Baba Bathra 155b.) 
299 Tractate Yebamoth I, s 2 para. 3a. See also; Kethuboth 39a and Sanhedrin 69a. 
300 Mendelsohn, above n 298, 82-83. 
301 Sanhedrin 69b. 
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from the oral law that ‘liability for punishment by the Court (Beit Din) beg[an] at age thirteen years and one 
day’.303 
 
Whilst opinions may vary as to the precise age at which a person was held criminally responsible in Jewish law, 
the common factor between competing views remains consistent: the presence of objective standards. Jewish 
law proclaimed that a minor was not criminally responsible because minors did not possess the ability to form 
malicious intent. Minors did not possess the properly functioning cognitive faculty necessary to be subject to 
objective standards.  
 
According to Jewish law,
304
 a minor could not to be found guilty of a capital crime.
305
 This principle was 
reflected in the Hebraic maxim, ‘a child has no discretion.’306 In normal cases, a child was exempt due to his age 
rather than his mental development.
307
 Jewish jurisprudence presumed that a minor did not possess the proper 
functioning cognitive ability required to form malicious intent. Since the ability to reason was a necessary 
characteristic of a reasonable person, the minor was not subject to the objective standard that applied to adults 
because a minor did not possess the required ability. 
 
Despite the ambiguity as to the precise age of a minor, the theme remained the same. Those who did not have a 
fully developed capacity to reason were exempt from being assessed by a reasonable person test. Since minors 
did not possess the ability to reason like a reasonable person, they were exempt from all criminal liability.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
302 Isodore Fishman, 'The Capacity of the Minor in Jewish Law' in J Israelstam and L Weiwoww (eds), Ye Are My Witnessess: Sermons and Studies by Former 
Students of Rabbi Dr. Samuel Daiches (M L Cailingold, 1936) 211. Fishman also notes, ‘between the age of eight and fourteen, he is still presumed to be 
incapable of committing a criminal offence.’ 
303 Steinberg & Rosner, above n 68, 682. See Midrash Tanna'im on Deuteronomy 24:16. This view is also held by John Allen, Modern Judaism or A Brief 
Account of the Opinions, Traditions, Rites and Ceremonies of the Jews in Modern Times (R B Seeley & W Burnside, 1830) 312; Daniel C Matt, The Zohard: 
Pritzker Edition (Stanford University Press, 2003) 187; Moses Margoliouthm, The Fundamental Principles of Modern Judaism Investigated (B Wertheim, 1843) 
23; Isidore Singer and ‎ Dawh‎ Glta,‎The Jewish Encyclopedia: A Descriptive Record of the History, Religion, Literature, and Customs of the Jewish People from 
the Earliest Times to the Present Day (Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1904) 270. 
304 Sanhedrin 69b. 
305 Mendelsohn, above n 298, 83. See also; Roberta Rosenberg Farber and ‎ aeahr‎Dahheret,‎Jewish Studies in Violence: A Collection of Essays (University 
Press of America, 2007) 48; Israel Lebendiger, 'The Minor in Jewish Law' (1916) 7(2) Jewish Quarterly Review 172. 
306 Makhshirin III § 8 VI, § 1. See also; Mekhilta § 4.  
307 Steinberg, above n 68, 682. 
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II THE DEAF-MUTE AND THE IMBECILE ACCORDING TO JEWISH LAW 
 
According to Jewish law, a deaf-mute
308
 and an imbecile
309
 were unable to distinguish between right and 
wrong.
310
 Jewish law categorised them together in relation to their lack of criminal liability.
311 Louis Jacobs 
noted that imbeciles were not held responsible for their actions because they lacked the ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong:  
 
[a]n imbecile whose powers of distinguishing between right and wrong are weak and inadequate is not guilty even if 
he commits ‘intentional’ murder312 … It is axiomatic in Jewish law that an imbecile, shoteh in Hebrew, is held 
responsible for his actions neither by a human court nor by the divine judgement.313 
 
Since a reasonable person was able to distinguish right from wrong, an imbecile was not held to the standard 
established for a reasonable person because he did not possess the ability to make this distinction.
314
 Deaf-mutes 
also did not possess this ability. Therefore, they too were not subject to the objective standards. Like an 
imbecile, a deaf-mute
315
 was also exempt from criminal liability.
316
 
                                                          
308 ‘[i]s always one who neither hears nor speaks.’– Mishnah, Terumot 1:2.  
309 In this chapter, ‘imbecile’ is used to render the Hebrew shoteh. ‘The Tosefta (Terumot 1:3, repeated with a variation at Babylonian Talmud Hagigah 3a–4b) 
defines a shoteh as someone who goes out alone at night, spends the night in a cemetery, tears his clothes, or destroys everything he is given’. See Benjamin Lau 
and Lenn Schramm (trans.), 'Marriage in Sign Language' (2014) Responsum 7 fn 5. 
310 Simon Ahn-Redding, The Insanity Defense the World Over (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) 4. See also; Shelomoh Yosef Zevin, Encyclopedia Talmudica: A 
Digest of Halachic Literature and Jewish Law from the Tannaitic Period to the Present Time (Feldheim Publishers, 1969) 377. For a detailed analysis on this 
topic please see Bonnie L Gracer, 'What the Rabbis Heard: Deafness in the Mishnah' (2003) 23(2) Disability Studies Quarterly 192-205. 
The rabbis seem to have linked deafness with some sort of moral or cognitive deficiency. Rabbinic pedagogy relied heavily on verbal communication. Vital 
activities included questioning, discussing and verbal arguing. Because deaf people were unable to participate in these activities, deaf people may have been 
seen as having no way to develop or communicate halachic or other reasoning skills. See Bonnie L Gracer, 'What the Rabbis Heard: Deafness in the Mishnah' 
(2003) 23(2) Disability Studies Quarterly 196. 
The Mishnah Arachin 1:1 states, for example, ‘[a] deaf mute, a mentally defective person, and a minor’ may not vow or dedicate the worth of another, because 
they possess no understanding (da'at) (to formulate vows nor to make assessments). Cf. Bonnie L Gracer, 'What the Rabbis Heard: Deafness in the Mishnah' 
(2003) 23(2) Disability Studies Quarterly 197.  
311 Fred Rosner, Medicine in the Bible and the Talmud: Selections from Classical Jewish Sources (KTAV Publishing House Incorporation, 1995) 31-32. See 
also; Julius Preuss, Biblical and Talmudic Medicine (Jason Aronson Incorporated, 2004) xxiv; Ephraim Ben Baruch and ‎ntare‎ Ntweree,‎ Studies in 
Educational Administration and Policy Making: The Case of Israel (Ben Gurion University, 1985) 60. 
312 Louis Jacobs, A Concise Companion to the Jewish Religion (Oxford University Press, 1999) 66. 
313 Ibid 100. 
314 How this is possible will not be examined in this thesis. ‘Clearly, the ability to distinguish between right and wrong was regarded as innate in the normal 
human intellect just as the axioms of logic are grasped as a priori truths.’ Cf. Bleich and ‎Jratehte,‎retat‎e‎122, 2. 
315 Jacob Neusner, The Talmud of the Land of Israel: Terumot (Alan J Avery-Peck trans., University of Chicago Press, 1988) vol 6 71. See also; Moses Moses 
Maimonides and  Isadore Twersky (eds), A Maimonides Reader (Behrman House Inc, 1972) 434; David L Balch, Homosexuality, Science, and the ‘Plain Sense’ 
of Scripture (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 2000) 293; Simcha Fishbane, Deviancy in Early Rabbinic Literature: A Collection of Socio-Anthropological Essays 
(BRILL, 2007) 108. 
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This ability was also necessary for a human being to function as a reasonable person. Since imbeciles and deaf-
mutes lacked this ability, they were exempt from acting in accordance with the objective standard set for a 
reasonable person. This Jewish law exemption demonstrates that the ability to reason was an essential element 
in order for human beings to be subject to objective standards.  
 
I have demonstrated in this chapter that objective standards were present in Jewish law within the area of 
commercial advertisements, bailment, abandoned property, homicide, as well as the relationship between 
criminal liability and minors, deaf-mutes, imbeciles, and the encompassing law of negligence. Each case is an 
example of the use of objective standards in Jewish legal practice. 
 
III CONCLUSION 
The data in this chapter indicates the important role objective standards had in Jewish law and the way the 
Rabbis used objective standards to construct a just legal system. Their use of objective standards suggests that 
human reason dictates that objective standard should be used to qualitatively assess all conduct that is called into 
question.  
 
Objective standards were used to investigate whether advertisements were misleading or deceptive in Jewish 
law. The conduct was assessed by determining whether a reasonable purchaser would view the advertisement as 
misleading or deceptive. The Halakhah identified a reasonable man as the average man, with Jewish law asking 
whether a reasonable purchaser would have perceived the advertisement as misleading. 
 
Objective standards were also incorporated into the bailment laws. Bailees were expected to function like a 
reasonable person. Bailees were held to the standard of care known as kede-natri inshi (as a people safeguard). 
Bailees were also liable to the owner if they had not taken the same care of the bailed goods as if they were his 
own property.  
Another objective standard enforced in Jewish law was the concept of b'dereh hashomrim, the ‘manner of 
bailees’. The bailee was expected to preserve the bailed property in the same manner that an ordinary bailee 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
316 Moshe HaLevi Spero, Judaism and Psychology: Halakhic Perspectives (Ktav Publishing House: Yeshiva University Press, 1980) 126. See also; Jacob 
Newman, ‎dreaatl‎ avan and ‎ aeta‎nterhahtAA,‎Judaism A-Z: Lexicon of Terms and Concepts (Department for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora of 
the World Zionist Organization, 1980) 134; Bernard Stuart Jackson, Jewish Law Annual (Brill Archive, 1981) vol 4 331; Shalom Albeck, 'Accidental Damage in 
Talmudic Law' (1979) 16-17 Annual of Bar-Ilan University 86-99. 
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(b'dereh hashomrim) would preserve it. As in the case of Jewish advertising laws, the bailee was expected to act 
in a manner that was in accord with the objective standard established for a reasonable person. Failing to act 
reasonably saw the bailee held liable for damages that arose from his negligent conduct.  
Concerning the laws on abandoned property, Jewish law used a two-fold approach to determine whether 
property had been abandoned. This included the use of a reasonable person standard. The first limb established 
whether a reasonable person in the position of the finder would believe that the goods were intentionally placed 
or had fallen accidentally. The second limb examined whether the goods contained a signature identifying 
ownership and whether a reasonable person would identify this signature as a mark of ownership.  
Under the laws that predated, but guided, the Jewish law considered in this chapter, a man was justified in using 
deadly force if a reasonable person, under those circumstances, would have acted in the same manner. 
Specifically, using deadly force was justified for the purposes of self-defence, the preservation of life, and in 
warfare. However, using lethal force in circumstances where a reasonable person would not use similar force 
imputed guilt to the defendant.  
 
This chapter then examined the Jewish principle concerning the rights of a homeowner when his property was 
being intruded upon. A homeowner was always justified in killing an intruder because anyone in Jewish society 
would anticipate that a robber would kill if caught in the act. Jewish law held that killing an intruder was only 
justified to protect one’s life, not one’s property. Jewish jurisprudence held that a reasonable person would use 
deadly force in circumstances where imminent harm was experienced. Therefore, Jewish citizens were justified 
in using lethal force in such circumstances.  
 
The Jewish concept of negligence incorporated a reasonable person standard to assess the tortfeasor’s conduct. 
The foreseeability of damage in negligence practice was assessed by determining whether the resulting damage 
was so common that most individuals in the place of the defendant would have foreseen it.  
The standard of care expected of Jewish citizens was that of a reasonable person. If the defendant failed to take 
appropriate care, being the care that a reasonable person would have taken, he was liable for his actions. On the 
other hand, if the damage caused was such that no reasonable person could control it, the cause was attributed to 
God, and exonerated the defendant from all liability.  
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Minors, a deaf-mutes, imbeciles, and lunatics, were all criminally exempt under Jewish law because they did not 
possess the ability to reason.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated the use of objective standards in the form of a reasonable person in Jewish law. 
The use of these standards illustrates that objective standards in Jewish law played an important role in judging 
human conduct and in holding individuals to account. The Jewish concept of reasonableness was founded upon 
the idea of objectivity. Jewish lawyers used objective standards because they worked. The idea of objectivity 
was convincing. It resonated with human reason. Using objective standards to judge human behaviour was 
reasonable in the mind of all Jews.  
 
In Jewish law, objective tests were applied, subject to capacity-based exceptions. This approach respected the 
principle of moral autonomy, by ensuring that no person was held liable or convicted that lacked the capacity to 
conform his behaviour to the standard required.
317
 
 
The numerous examples of objective standards used in the Jewish legal system demonstrate the efficiency and 
practicality of objective standards as the foundation by which human behaviour is assessed.  
 
The following chapter will review Athenian jurisprudence to identify the way in which ancient Greek lawyers 
used objective standards as the basis for their assessment of human conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
317 Jeremy Horder, Ashworth's Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 208. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE REASONABLE PERSON IN ANCIENT ATHENIAN JURISPRUDENCE  
  I INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will examine ancient Athenian jurisprudence to understand and establish how the Greeks judged 
human behaviour and whether, like the Jews under the Mosaic law, they developed and implemented objective 
standards as part of their judicial process. In this chapter, I will identify the presence of a reasonable person 
standard in ancient Athenian law
318
 as an example of objective standards used to assess human behaviour. The 
purpose of identifying this standard in various civilisations is to establish that every legal system required 
objective standards to retain its overall credibility and integrity. This demonstrates that the idea of objective 
reasonableness was, and is, pervasive. This study of Athenian jurisprudence will thus contribute to this thesis by 
identifying whether or not the Greeks used fixed objective standards like the reasonable person
319
 as a part of 
their judicial processes.  
In this chapter, I identify the presence of a reasonable person standard in Athenian law relating to homicide and 
I explain how this standard was used to judge human conduct. I have only treated homicide as an example 
because the objective standards remained from even Draco's severe laws right through Greek legal history when 
punishments were moderated because the objectivity of the laws and punishments from the Draconian 
precedents remained compelling.  
II ANCIENT ATHENIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
Athenian law was based upon the concept of ethics and morality.
320
 Athenian law did not implicitly or explicitly 
use a purely objective standard to assess negligence.
321
 This is because the elements of age, level of education 
and place of residence of the tortfeasor were taken into consideration when judgements were made.322 A 
reasonable person did not determine the objective standards, but rather objective standards with subjective 
elements were established for a reasonable person. Greek jurists held that the ability to reason allowed man to 
                                                          
318 Or otherwise referred to in this chapter as ‘Athenian law’.  
319 Common law’s reasonable person standard.  
320 R D Yadav, Law of Crime and Self Defence (Mittal Publications, 1993) 49. See also; Boudewijn Bouckaert, Property Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2010) 8. 
321 Michael Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists (University of Texas Press, 2010) 140. See also; Philosophy 
of Education Society, Philosophy of Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (The Society, 1991) vol 47, 207. 
322 Widmer and van Boom, above n 32, 125. See also; Areios Pagos 1274/1977. 
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appeal to objective standards
323
 that incorporated subjective elements and conform to societal standards. The 
standard set for a reasonable person in historical Athenian law was neither purely objective nor subjective but 
rather a hybrid of both.
324
  
 
In the following section, a discussion on homicide will be used to provide an example of how Athenian criminal 
jurisprudence used objective standards when adjudicating the guilt of those who committed what would today 
be called culpable homicide or murder. The appeal to objective standards was considered integral to their 
society.  
A HOMICIDE 
Homicide was a favourite subject of the orators in Classical Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.
325
 
Homicide was their favourite because it was one of the most serious crimes and focused the need to balance 
justice for the family of the victim against the need for order and safety in a developing society. Jurisdictional 
factors made it necessary to differentiate between intentional and unintentional homicide and lawful homicide. 
These considerations determined which court was appropriate to hear the case.
326
 Athenian jurisprudence used a 
reasonable person standard to assess the charge of homicide. The following section will identify a reasonable 
person standard in the Draconian Constitution and how this standard was used to assess whether the use of lethal 
force was justified. Though I begin by explaining how self-defence homicide was treated under the Draconian 
Constitution, I am making a larger point. For even when the Draconian Constitution was reformed to ameliorate 
its harshness, the objective standards that were used to judge whether self-defence intentional killing was 
reasonable were retained because their objectivity continued to resonate with Athenian values.  
 
                                                          
323 ‘Although it is difficult to talk about the spirit of Greek Law, since Greek jurisprudence and court practice underwent only a slight development from Solon 
to Aristotle, yet the conception of law is originally Greek and is the result of a long process of thought. The Greeks used several words for law: Όρυός (oruos), 
λόγος (logos), νόμος (nómos), τό δίκαιον (to dikaion). όρυός is a metaphor belonging to geometry; it means that which is right, the right line, rectum, regula, as 
in orthopaedics; there is no equivalent in Greek to the Latin jus, that which unites or binds men... The word λόγος (logos) means law made by reason and based 
upon reason, in opposition to fatality or Destiny; it means also relation, principle or formula’. (Cf. Maurice Le Bel et al., Natural Law Institute Proceedings 
(College of Law, University of Notre Dame, 1949) vol 2 7. Cf Ibid 9, 18, 20–21, 38).  
324 R v Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689 is the leading common law case that adopted this hybrid approach titled the ‘Ghosh test’. See Jacqueline Martin and Tony 
Storey, Unlocking Criminal Law (Routledge, 2015) 72, 461–465; Nicola Monaghan, Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 253-254. 
325 From the extensive literature, see especially Douglas M MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester University Press, 
1963); Michael Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law (Yale University Press, 1981); Stephen C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1993) 271–6. 
326 For an article discussing how jurisdictional factors determined which court heard a case in the Athenian legal system see Adriaan Lanni, 'The Homicide 
Courts and the Dikasteria: A Paradigm not Followed' (2000) 41 Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 311-330; Walter Woodburn Hyde, 'The Homicide Courts 
of Ancient Athens' (1918) 66(7) University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 319-362. 
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I THE DRACONIAN CONSTITUTION: HOMICIDE AND THE REASONABLE PERSON  
The Draconian Constitution, or Draco’s code, was a written law code created by Draco in the seventh century 
B.C.
327
 Draco was considered the first Athenian legislator,
328
 and some of his laws remained in force until 
atleast the fourth century B.C.
329
 However, Draco’s code imposed severe penalties for crime.330  
The Greek moralist
331
 Plutarch (45-120 C.E.)
332
 described Draco’s attitude towards the death penalty in his 
work, the Life of Solon. He wrote:
333
  
[a]nd Draco himself, they say, being asked why he made death the penalty for most offenses, replied that in his 
opinion the lesser ones deserved it, and for the greater ones no heavier penalty could be found.334 
Some Athenians of Aristotle's era (fourth century B.C.) began to consider Draco's laws as unjust and unfair.
335
 
Draco’s laws were used to resolve conflict amongst the ruling families336 and were designed to be enforced by 
                                                          
327 Bhagat Singh,  Camana Lāla and  Bhupendra Hooja, The Jail Notebook and Other Writings (LeftWord Books, 2007) 84. See also; Robert R Bolgar, Classical 
Influences on Western Thought AD 1650-1870 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 371; Michael Gagarin, Greek Law: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research 
Guide (Oxford University Press, 2010) 25; Anyangwe, above n 72, 18 
328 Rosen and  Farrell, above n 71, 298. See also; Figueira, above n 71, 236; Roth, above n 71, 10; Goguet and Fugère, above n 71, 32; Pinnock, above n 71, 
111; Aristotle and  Kenyon, above n 71, xlviii. 
329 Michael Gagarin, Early Greek Law (University of California Press, 1989) 64. See also; Matthew R Christ, The Litigious Athenian (JHU Press, 1998) 21; 
Peter John Rhodes, Athenian Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2004) 136; Margaret Howatson, The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature (OUP 
Oxford, 2013) 214. 
330 Demosthenes 21.43. See also; Rosalie F Baker and  Charles F Baker III, Ancient Greeks: Creating the Classical Tradition (Oxford University Press, 1997) 
35; Helen Corke, A Book of Ancient Peoples (Clarendon Press, 1931) 138; Gagarin, above n 330, 66; Donald Morris, Tax Cheating: Illegal--But Is It Immoral? 
(SUNY Press, 2012) 76. 
331 Gilbert Highet, The Classical Tradition : Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature  (Oxford 
University Press, 1949) 210. See also; Stephen D Moore and  J C A Anderson, New Testament Masculinities (BRILL, 2004) 217; Jacques Brunschwig et al., 
Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 2000) 708. 
332 Eleni Kechagia, Plutarch Against Colotes: A Lesson in History of Philosophy (OUP Oxford, 2011) 4. See also; Plutarch and  Andrew Lintott (eds), Plutarch: 
Demosthenes and Cicero (OUP Oxford, 2013) 1; Simon Verdegem, Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades: Story, Text and Moralism (Leuven University Press, 2010) 19. 
333 Michael Powell, Curious Events in History (Sterling Publishing Company Incorporated, 2008) 11. 
334 Plutarch, Life of Solon 17.2. See also; Kaye Stearman, The Debate about the Death Penalty (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2007) 9; Plutarch, Delphi 
Complete Works of Plutarch (Delphi Classics, 2013) 17.2; Michael Burger, Sources for the History of Western Civilization: From Antiquity to the Mid-
Eighteenth Century (University of Toronto Press, 2nd ed, 2015) vol 1 90; Plutarch and Arthur Hugh Clough (eds), Greek and Roman Lives (Courier 
Corporation, 2012) 30. For example, the punishment for stealing a cabbage was death. See David Hirschel and William O Wakefield, Criminal Justice in 
England and the United States (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995) 160.  
335 Popular sentiment that Draco's laws are 'unjust' is indicated in Plutarch, Demades 23. 64 . In late antiquity Libanius, Declamations 1. 1 . 145 protests: 'Who 
has spoken ill of Draco or declared his laws invalid, however harsh the rule that death must come before justice be done?'. See Edwin Carawan, Rhetoric and the 
Law of Draco (Clarendon Press, 1998) 2. 
336 Edwin Carawan, Rhetoric and the Law of Draco (Clarendon Press, 1998) 1. See also; E O Blunsom, The Past And Future Of Law (Xlibris Corporation, 
2013) 87; Daniel Ogden, Drakon: Dragon Myth and Serpent Cult in the Greek and Roman Worlds (OUP Oxford, 2013) 263; Leonard Whibley, A Companion to 
Greek Studies (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 1931) 479; William Blackstone and  Ruth Paley, Commentaries on the Laws of England - Of Public Wrongs 
(Oxford University Press, 2016) 157. 
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courts of law in Athens.
337
 Edwin Carawan
338
 noted that Draco’s laws expressed the end of remedies given by 
the gods, and established a way of justice more accessible to man. In response, Draco instituted a grand jury to 
assess disputes that parties could not settle themselves. This was achieved by majority verdict. Draco’s laws 
expressed the antithetical attitude, ‘that justice was determined by reasoned argument before a body representing 
the community.’339 Thus, Draco’s Constitution set the stage for the introduction of the jury trial into the 
Athenian judicial system.
340
 The courts of Athens implemented the objective standards outlined in Draco’s laws.  
Draco’s laws seem bald when compared to modern standards of justice. This is because Draco’s laws were 
constructed upon an ancient foundation of self-help and private settlement against a thief, adulterer, or a 
murderer. This philosophy allowed parties to take matters into their own hands, allowing them to kill the 
offender with impunity.
341
  
The Draconian Constitution provided the right to use lethal force in immediate self-defence when confronted by 
an intruder: 
And if in immediate self-defence he kills someone carrying or leading away [his property or himself]342 forcibly and 
without justification, the death shall be uncompensated.343 
This defence was also used against ordinary attackers.
344
 
The Draconian Constitution set out exceptional circumstances where it was reasonable to use deadly force. 
Firstly, if the victim was in the process of stealing the defendant’s property and secondly, if the victim attempted 
to kidnap the defendant. Under these circumstances, Athenian law recognised that a reasonable person would 
not freely surrender himself or his property. Therefore, deadly force was justified since the presence of an 
                                                          
337 Fil Munas, Mission To Earth (A New Authors Press, 2014) 437. See also; Elisabeth Meier Tetlow, Women, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Law and 
Society: Ancient Greece (A&C Black, 2005) vol 2 267; Charles Bazerman, Handbook of Research on Writing: History, Society, School, Individual, Text 
(Routledge, 2009) 157; Michael Gagarin, Writing Greek Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 103. 
338 Professor of Classical Languages at Missouri State University. His research focuses on law and rhetoric in ancient Athens. See Arum Park, Resemblance 
and Reality in Greek Thought: Essays in Honor of Peter M Smith (Taylor & Francis, 2016) xii. 
339 Edwin Carawan, Rhetoric and the Law of Draco (Clarendon Press, 1998) 2.  
340 For a further study of that development, see ibid.  
341 Ibid 2. 
342 It is common for the use of φέρω (pheró) and ἄγω (agó) together to refer to seizing inanimate property and living creatures (animal or human) respectively 
is common as early as Homer (e.g., II. 5.484). The purpose of seizing a person would commonly be ransom, as is indicated by Demosthenes' discussion of the 
law in 23.61. Cf. Michael Gagarin, 'Self Defence in Athenian Homicide Law' (1978) 19(2) Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 113. 
343 Inscriptiones Graecae I3 104.37-38. This law was quoted by Demosthenes (23.60 = Drakon's Law, lines 37-38), cited in Dennis P Kehoe and Thomas 
McGinn, Ancient Law, Ancient Society (University of Michigan Press, 2017) 49; David Phillips, The Law of Ancient Athens (University of Michigan Press, 
2013) 57. 
344 Inscriptiones Graecae I3 104.33–36. Ronald Stroud, Drakon's Law on Homicide (University of California Press, 1968) 56. See also; Kehoe and McGrinn, 
above n 344, 49; Gagarin, above n 343, 119. 
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intruder was presumed to be life threatening. In other words, the defendant was justified in killing the intruder 
because Athenian jurisprudence held that a reasonable person in those circumstances would use deadly force to 
protect himself or his property.  
Both when the intruder was kidnapping and when he was stealing, Athenian law held that it was reasonable to 
use deadly force against an intruder and an attacker for the purposes of self-defence. Therefore, judges, or other 
officials in early Athenian jurisprudence under the Draconian Constitution, held that a reasonable person could 
use lethal force if attacked or confronted by an intruder in accordance with the rights granted in the law. This 
self-defence intentional homicide example shows that objective standards permitted the use of deadly force in 
these situations; any person who used similar force against intruders came to be held justified. Thus, it is evident 
that objective standards were used to judge the reasonableness of the conduct of someone accused of culpable 
homicide in ancient Athens. 
Even when many of Draco’s other laws were repealed or amended by Solon of Athens (c. sixth century B.C.),345 
his law of homicide with its reasonable person standard was left intact
346
 because it continued to satisfy the 
Athenian idea of justice in a homicide case.
347
 Draco’s law of homicide was retained because it resonated with 
human reason and it worked. Other aspects of his code that did not work so well were dropped. Such adoption 
took into consideration cultural compatibility and whether this adoption was socially advantageous.
348
 The 
following extract from Draco’s law remained in force:  
                                                          
345 Gregory Claeys and  Lyman Tower Sargent, The Utopia Reader (NYU Press, 1999) 15. See also; April Carter, Authority and Democracy (Routledge, 2013) 
vol 5 72; Harvey Yunis, Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens (Cornell University Press, 1996) 187; Gloria Ferrari, Figures of 
Speech: Men and Maidens in Ancient Greece (University of Chicago Press, 2002) 146; Josine Blok and  A P M H Lardinois, Solon of Athens: New Historical 
and Philological Approaches (Brill, 2006) 105; S A Paipetis, Science and Technology in Homeric Epics (Springer Science & Business Media, 2008) 499; 
Michael Grant, Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation (Routledge, 2004) 153; Ian Driscoll and  Matthew Kurtz, Atlantis: Egyptian 
Genesis (Ian Driscoll, 2010) 9.  
346 Geoffrey W Bromiley, The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 1979) vol 1 288. See also; Maria Brouwer, 
Organizations, Individualism, and Economic Theory (Routledge, 2012) 184; Theodore Ziolkowski, The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of Legal Crises 
(Princeton University Press, 2003) 31; Arjan Zuiderhoek, The Ancient City (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 88; Douglas Maurice MacDowell, The Law in 
Classical Athens (Cornell University Press, 1986) 43. Next Solon established a constitution and laid down other laws; and they stopped observing the ordinances 
of Draco, except those relating to homicide. They wrote up the laws on the wooden tablets [mounted on pillars revolving on an axis], and set them up in the Stoa 
(porch) of the Basileus, and everyone swore to observe them. And the nine archons used to swear an oath upon the stone, declaring that they would dedicate a 
golden statue if they transgressed any law. This is the origin of the oath to that effect which they take to the present day. Solon fixed his laws for a hundred 
years, and he ordered the constitution in the following manner […]. Cf, Aristotle, Athenian Constitution 7.1–2. 
347 As Plutarch records, ‘because [Draco’s laws] were too harsh and burdensome in their penalties’. Cf. Plutarch, Life of Solon 17.1. See also; Rosen and  
Farrell, above n 71, 290; Frank N Magill, The Ancient World: Dictionary of World Biography (Routledge, 2003) vol 1 373; James F McGlew, Tyranny and 
Political Culture in Ancient Greece (Cornell University Press, 1996) 105; Roth, above n 71, 11. 
348 Sue Farran,  James Gallen and  Christa Rautenbach, The Diffusion of Law: The Movement of Laws and Norms Around the World (Routledge, 2016) 13. See 
also; Andrew Harding and  E Örücü, Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Academic, 2002) 13; Penelope Nicholson and  Sarah Biddulph, Examining 
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71 
 
 
If a man kills another unintentionally in an athletic contest, or overcomes him in a fight on the highway, or 
unwittingly in battle, or [if this man is having] intercourse with his wife [literally, 'on top of his wife'], or mother, 
or sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for procreation of legitimate children, he shall not go into exile as a 
manslayer on that account.349 
 
The above extract set out reasonable circumstances under which Athenian citizens could use deadly force. It was 
reasonable for the defendant to kill the victim if the victim was having intercourse with the defendant’s wife, 
mother, sister or daughter or a concubine that the victim held for the production of free children.  
 
These exceptional circumstances reveal the Athenian view of how a reasonable person would act. In other 
words, the accused was justified in using deadly force in these circumstances because a reasonable person would 
act in the same way. Therefore, Athenian jurisprudence used a reasonable person standard to assess human 
behaviour. If the accused acted as a reasonable person, he was not criminally liable.  
 
Homicide was considered one of the most serious of crimes to Athenians.
350
 When an Athenian citizen 
committed homicide, not only did he commit a crime against the victim’s family, but also against his society 
and the gods.
351
  
 
In the Third Tetralogy (Ant. 4)
352
 attributed to Antiphon
353
 the Sophist (fifth century B.C.),
354
 the accuser 
remarked, ‘[w]hoever kills someone in violation of the law sins against the gods … [and] breaks the rules of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Relations Law The University of Melbourne, 1 June 2006) 8; David Nelken, ‘Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation’ in David Nelken and Johannes Feest 
(eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing, 2001) 15-20. 
349 Demosthenes 23.53. Cf. 23.55. See also; Plutarch, Life of Solon 23, cited in Michael Gagarin, Athenian Homicide Law: Case Studies (27 March 2003) 
Center for Hellenic Studies <https://chs.harvard.edu/CHS/article/display/1188>; Daniel Ogden, Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods 
(Clarendon Press, 1996) 33; Susan Deacy and  Karen F Pierce, Rape in Antiquity (The Classical Press of Wales, 1997) 26. 
350 James H McGregor, The Athenian Agora (Belknap of Harvard University Publications, 2014) 91. See also; Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian 
Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) 99; David Sacks,  Oswyn Murray and  Lisa R. 
Brody, Encyclopedia of the Ancient Greek World (Infobase Publishing, 2014) 188; Adriaan Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 110; Roth, above n 71, 10. 
351 James H S McGregor, Athens (Harvard University Press, 2014) 91. See also; Hyde, above n 327, 326; Kirk Ormand, A Companion to Sophocles (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2012) 289; Edward Harris, Delfim Leao and P J Rhodes, Law and Drama in Ancient Greece (A&C Black, 2013) 125; William Newman, Politics 
of Aristotle: With an Introduction, Two Prefatory Essays and Notes Critical and Explanatory (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 269. 
352 For Antiphon's Tetralogies I shall use the Blass-Thalheim Teubner text (1914). Stroud, above n 345. 
353 Even those who deny Antiphon's authorship of the Tetralogies on stylistic grounds admit that in general they accurately reflect Attic law. Cf. Wilhelm 
Schmid and Otto Stahlin, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur I.3 (C H Beck, 1940) 118 n.2; Louis Gernet, Antiphon, Discours (Les Belles Lettres, 1923) 6-
16; Gagarin, above n 343, 113. 
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human society’.355 This was because ‘the god [sic] speaks in the same terms about relatives as the law of 
Solon’.356 Therefore, homicide was a violation of the moral obligation given by the gods to preserve human life. 
 
The Third Tetralogy revealed that the gods gave the objective standard to which Athenian society appealed. 
Whilst this thesis does not affirm or deny the truth of this claim, this proclamation does signify the vital role 
objective standards played in the Athenian legal system. Objective standards were used to establish whether the 
conduct under examination was socially acceptable. The presence and the reliance on objective standards in the 
Athenian legal system confirm that the ancient Greeks  gave objective standards and important place in  their 
system of adjudication. Chapter two showed that objective standards were also found and used in Jewish law to 
determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. This Athenian use of objective standards is very 
similar to the Jewish use of objective standards that was observed in chapter one.  
  
When assessing a case of homicide in ancient Greece, the intent of the accused was examined to identify 
whether he committed the homicide intentionally or unintentionally, as I explain below. A reasonable person 
standard was used to differentiate between the two.  
II HOMICIDE: UNINTENTIONAL AND INTENTIONAL 
To distinguish intentional from unintentional homicide, Athenian law assessed the element of intent by 
identifying the issue of premeditation (pronoia).
357
 Athenian law differentiated between intentional and 
unintentional homicide by assessing the facts of the case
358
 and evaluating whether the defendant’s actions were 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
359
 This assessment was made using an objective standard to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
354 (Fifth century BC). Athenian orator. Howatson, above n 330, 51. See also;  Edward Craig, Concise Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 
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355 Antiphon, Third Tetralogy 4.1.2. Cf. Harris, Leao and Rhodes, above n 352, 125; Ormand, above n 352, 289. 
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267. 
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Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy VI: Before Plato (SUNY Press, 2001) 176; Gagarin, above n 343, 111-120; Hyde, above n 327, 319-362. 
359 An example of this was seen in Antiphon's writing: 
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evaluate the defendant’s conduct. Intentional homicide consisted of acts committed with full intent to kill the 
victim whilst unintentional homicide involved acts committed without intent.
360
  
 
While Athenian law did not feature a statute listing approved defences,
361
 decided cases
362
 showed that the 
accidental killing of an opponent in a boxing or wrestling bout was not culpable and nor was the accidental 
killing of an allied soldier in battle, the death of a doctor’s patient, or the killing of an exile found in Athenian 
territory. Killing in self-defence was also justified when the defendant killed to protect himself or his property, 
killed a thief caught in the night and killed an adulterer or fornicator caught in the act with the defendant’s wife, 
mother, sister or daughter. Other circumstances that justified the use of deadly force were against a person who 
tried to set up tyranny or attempted to overthrow democracy.
363 These additional defences also relied on 
objective standards.  
 
Demosthenes
364
 said that the above circumstances justified the use of lethal force. That is, a reasonable person 
under these circumstances would take the life of the victim therefore; a person accused of crime in these 
circumstances was acquitted.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(logos) against the charge of homicide. But because the boy ran under the trajectory of the javelin and placed his body in the path, one of them was prevented 
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above n 355, 229-231. See also; Antiphon and Andocides (Michael Gagarin & Douglas M MacDowell (trans.), University of Texas Press, 2010) 30-33. 
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Aristotle also used the same examples: 
If a man admits that he has killed someone but claims that he did it in accordance with the laws, such as having caught an adulterer, or in war not having 
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364 (384–322 BC), Greek statesman and orator of ancient Athens. See José Calvet de Magalhães, The Pure Concept of Diplomacy (Greenwood Publishing 
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If someone kills another unintentionally in athletic contests, or catching him lying in ambush on the highway, or in war not having recognised him as an ally, or 
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III ANTIPHON AND THE REASONABLE PERSON 
 
The use of a reasonable person standard in a case where unintentional homicide was charged can also be 
demonstrated in the Second Tetralogy
365
 of Antiphon (fifth century B.C.).
366
 Antiphon narrated an event 
whereby youths, under the guidance of a trainer,
367
 were practicing throwing the javelin. One of the youths had 
thrown his javelin at the same moment another ran onto the field to recover his own javelin. The victim was hit 
by the javelin and killed. The accused was prosecuted for unintentional homicide. The issue in this case 
revolved around whether the accused was responsible for killing the victim or whether the victim’s negligence 
exonerated the accused.
368
  
 
The accused’s father argued that his son was not responsible for the victim’s death because the victim was 
responsible. He argued that the accused had taken all the necessary precautions to ensure the safety of those 
around him and that the victim did not take reasonable care.
369
 He further argued that the defendant was 
following orders.
370
 The accused’s father used objective standards to demonstrate that the defendant was not 
guilty of premeditated murder. His father argued that the accused had acted as a reasonable person under the 
circumstances.
371
 The conduct of both the accused and the victim were central the accused’s argument.372  
 
The defendant’s position rested on a complex assessment of each person’s behaviour by comparing it with the 
behaviour of others in the same situation. The accused’s father argued that his son’s conduct was consistent with 
that of any youthful javelin thrower in similar circumstances. Thus, the accused’s father argued that his son 
acted as any reasonable person would under these circumstances. This argument used a reasonable person 
standard to avoid all liability. The defendant’s argument also used a reasonable person standard to show that the 
victim was blameworthy for his actions because he did not act in a reasonable manner. That is, the accused 
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argued that an ordinary bystander, or any reasonable person, would not have conducted himself in the same 
manner as the victim. Thus, the victim’s negligence caused his death.  
 
The court concluded, ‘the youth, while practicing… made a hit, but did not kill anyone in real truth.’373 The 
victim was at fault. Since the victim’s unreasonable conduct exonerated the accused of any charges, the court 
declared that the event was an accident.
374
  
 
Antiphon used a reasonable person standard to compare what these parties did with what a reasonable person 
would have done under those circumstances. The defendant’s father did not contend that his son did not kill the 
victim. Rather, he argued that his son should be exonerated from criminal liability because he was not 
blameworthy. The father’s argument was well received by the Athenian court and because the accused acted in a 
reasonable manner, he was absolved from criminal liability.   
 
From this example, it is evident that Athenian law used objective standards to assess cases of culpable and non-
culpable homicide.  
IV CONCLUSION 
We can thus conclude that objective standards were used in the Athenian judicial system to evaluate human 
behaviour and were considered important to adjudicate the criminality and the culpability of conduct. There 
were no other alternative ways of deciding homicide cases in Athenian law. Because they used objective 
standards in a variety of cases, it is evident that they considered them durable and useful. 
A reasonable person standard was used in Athenian homicide cases. This objective standard was used to assess 
whether the accused was justified in using lethal force under the circumstances. The use of deadly force was 
justified if a reasonable person in the same situation as the defendant would have acted in the same or a similar 
way.
375
  
Athenian law also used a reasonable person standard to acquit the accused in cases where homicide was found 
to be unintentional if the accused acted in a manner that was consistent with what a reasonable person would 
have done in the same circumstances.  
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The use of objective standards in Athenian law shown in this chapter was very similar to the way they were used 
in Jewish law in the previous chapter even though the two legal systems had many differences. 
The Athenian and Jewish legal systems were built around identifying conduct that was objectively reasonable.
376
 
According to Athenian thought, judging what is reasonable comes naturally to humans. This view was never 
rebutted and was the source of their concept of natural law. The prolonged use of objective standards in 
Athenian law demonstrates their universal acceptance because they were efficient, advantageous and accorded 
with their basic religious beliefs. The Greeks and Jews held that reason was universal to all men.
377
  
A sample analysis of both Athenian and Jewish law shows that both societies agreed that all men use reason to 
answer practical moral questions, including those engaged by the law. 
The following chapter will review Roman jurisprudence to identify whether Roman lawyers also used objective 
standards in the process of reasoning about the rightness or wrongness of human conduct.   
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
THE REASONABLE PERSON IN ROMAN JURISPRUDENCE  
I INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will examine the use of an objective standard, similar to English common law’s reasonable 
person test, that was present in Roman law at the time it was codified by Justinian (533 A.D.). By identifying a 
standard that functioned in a similar way to English common law’s reasonable person test, I will show that 
Roman law, like Jewish law and Athenian law, used objective standards. The continued use of objective 
standards and the lack of alternative approaches by which to judge human peers, suggests that each of these 
societies found it rational to use objective standards to assess the rightness or wrongness of conduct in their 
legal systems. 
This chapter shows that Roman law used a reasonable person standard to assess the standard of care that the 
defendant should have demonstrated. This standard was used in laws surrounding the sale of property
378
 and in 
the concept of fault in both civil and criminal law.
379
 The concept of a reasonable person manifested itself in 
Roman law in the form of the pater familias, also referred to as the bonus pater familias,
380
 and diligens pater 
familias, the homo diligens, and the homo constantissimus.
381
 This standard was used to objectively assess the 
conduct of the alleged wrongdoer and whether his actions were reasonable under the circumstances.  
 
This chapter begins by presenting the role of a reasonable person test in assessing culpa. Culpa, in the wide 
sense, is expressed to be fault and in the narrow sense, negligence.
382
 Literally translated, the Latin word culpa 
means guilt.
383
 The presence of the principle of culpa begins to demonstrate how objective standards were used 
in Roman criminal law. The Roman legal principle, culpa levis in abstract, referred to the failure to exhibit the 
degree of care expected of a bonus pater familias.
384
 Expanding upon this concept, William Warwick Buckland 
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and Arnold D McNair have stated that the failure to show the care which a bonus pater familias would show 
was the same standard that was required of a reasonable person in English common law.
385
 
 
After discussing the use of objective standards that applied in Roman tort and property law, I will then identify 
the use of objective standards in Roman criminal law. I have chosen the Roman legal concept of doli incapax
386
 
to show the universal use of objective standards. Doli incapax was the legal principle presuming that the alleged 
wrongdoer was incapable of committing crime due to his inability to form criminal intent. According to Roman 
law, children under the age of seven and those who were declared insane, otherwise known as lunatics, were not 
liable for crimes committed since they did not possess the cognitive ability to form malicious intent. This 
chapter explores how an objective standard was used to discern the culpability of a child and a lunatic.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, with respect to Jewish and Athenian law, an objective standard was used 
in Roman law to assess culpability. These three legal systems all held that an alleged wrongdoer must possess 
properly functioning cognitive faculties before he could be tried.  
This chapter will suggest, with examples from Roman law, that we can infer that other legal systems, beyond 
those discussed in this thesis, might also use objective standards to assess human behaviour. 
This Roman law chapter will show that the Romans used objective standards because of the way they thought 
about human reason. This contributes to the overall conclusion of the thesis about the universality of objective 
standards and the use of human reason to assess them. 
II THE ‘PATER FAMILIAS’ 
The pater familias can be traced back to the early archaic period (from the eighth century B.C. to the third 
century B.C.)
387
 of Roman law.
388
 During this period, the laws of the kings were primarily concerned with 
religious and family matters and inflicting punishment for violating sacral law. Some important laws pertaining 
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to the powers and duties of the pater familias were attributed to Romulus, Rome’s first king.
389
 Romulus 
founded the city in 753 B.C. upon the Palatine Hill.
390
 Over the centuries, the Roman pater familias served as a 
paradigm of patriarchal authority and social order.
391
 
For the purposes of convenience, I will be adopting the term pater familias in the same way that the Emperor 
Justinian used it in his Digest which was finalised in 533AD.
392
 I will be relying on Justinian’s version of 
Roman law as an example to show the pervasive use of objective standards.  
In the words of Richard P. Saller, the pater familias, defined as the 'head of the household,'
393
 ‘evoke[d] the 
patriarchal organisation characteristic of the Roman family and of the wider society.’
394
 The pater familias was 
also referred to as the bonus pater familias
395
 or diligens pater familias.
396
 The pater familias was used as an 
objective standard to assess negligence.
397
 Acting contrary to how the pater familias would act in any given 
situation furnished the basis for assessing culpability.
398
 One instrument of elaboration was to refer to what the 
pater familias customarily did.
399
 Roman law provided that ‘the habit of the pater familias ought to be 
                                                          
389 Jaclyn Neel, Legendary Rivals: Collegiality and Ambition in the Tales of Early Rome (BRILL, 2014) 11. See also; Alan Watson, Roman Law & 
Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press, 1991) 9; Alan Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (A&C Black, 1991) 111; Richard P Saller, Patriarchy, 
Property and Death in the Roman Family (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 102. 
390 Amanda Claridge,  Judith Toms and  Tony Cubberley, Rome: An Oxford Archaeological Guide (Oxford University Press, 1998) 119. See also; Thomas F X 
Noble,  Barry Strauss and  Duane Osheim, Western Civilization: Beyond Boundaries, Volume 1 to 1715 (Cengage Learning, 2012) 110; Jerome Jordan Pollitt, 
The Art of Rome C.753 BC-AD 337: Sources and Documents (Cambridge University Press, 1966) 3. 
391 Saller, above n 390, 102. 
392 Janusz Kochanowski, 'The Reasonable Man Standards in Continental Law' (1995) 1(4) The Journal of Legislative Studies 1. 
393 Paul du Plessis, Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 113. See also; Saller, above n 390, 155; Bruce W Frier and  Thomas 
A McGinn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) 11. 
394 Richard P Saller, 'Pater Familias, Mater Familias, and the Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household' (1999) 94(2) Classical Philology 182. See also; 
Saller, above n 390, 155. 
395 For the term bonus paterfamilias, see the following texts from the books of classical Roman jurists (lst and 2nd centuries AD) in Digest of Justinian (Eng. 
trans. In Samuel P Scott, The Civil Law (Central Trust Corporation, 1932) [hereinafter cited as DIG. JUST.]; DIG. JUST. 40.4.22(Africanus); DIG. JUST. 
18.1.35.4 (Gaius); DIG. JUST. 7.1.9.2 (Ulpianus); DIG. JUST.7.8.15.1 (Paulus). See Herbert Hausmaninger, 'Diligentia Quam In Suis: A Standard of 
Contractual Liability from Ancient Roman to Modern Soviet Law' (1985) 18(2) Cornell International Law Journal 180 fn. 1. 
396 Sources that frequently use the formula diligens paterfamiias (diligent housefather). Cf DIG. JUST. 35.1.111 (Pomponius); DIG. JUST.45.1.137.2 
(Venuleius); DIG. JUST. 13.7.22.4 (Ulpianus); DIG. JUST. 10.2.25.16 (Paulus). See also the combinations prudens et diligens pater familias (prudent and 
diligent housefather) in DIG. JUST. 19.1.54.pr. (Paulus), and vir bonus et diligens paterfamilias (good man and diligent housefather) in DIG. JUST. 38.1.20.1 
(Paulus). See Hausmaninger, above n 396, 180 fn. 1; Fritz Berolzheimer, The World's Legal Philosophies (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1929) 59. See also; 
Berger, above n 77, 377; Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1959) vol 2 95; Jane F Gardner and  Thomas Wiedemann, The Roman 
Household: A Sourcebook (Routledge, 2013) 155; Mousourakis, above n 81, 169. 
397 J Cezar S Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages (Goodwill Trading Company Incorpoation, 1994) vol 1 13. See also; Bernhard Erwin Grueber, 
The Roman Law of Damage to Property: Being a Commentary on the Title of the Digest Ad Legem Aquiliam (IX.2): With an Introduction to the Study of the 
Corpus Juris Civilis (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1886) 229; Deffains and Kirat, above n 398, 108; John Dunt, International Cargo Insurance (Taylor & 
Francis, 2013) 288; Subbarao, above n 81, 360. 
398 Mousourakis, above n 81, 169. See also; Berger, above n 77, 377; Stoquerus, above n 77, 59; Adolf Berger, Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society (American Philosophical Society, 1953) vol 43 377. 
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observed.’
400
 William Warwick Buckland and Arnold D. McNair said that one was liable in negligence if he did 
not show the care that a bonus pater familias would show.
401
 
The use of an objective standard in the form of the pater familias is comparable to English common law’s 
reasonable person. Both fictitious figures form the objective standard by which human behaviour was assessed 
to determine liability. In other words, the way a reasonable person or pater familias would act in any given 
situation dictated the standard of care that was expected by Roman citizens. If the human behaviour displayed 
failed to meet this standard, the alleged wrongdoer had committed a civil wrong.  
Bruno Deffains and Thierry Kirat claimed that the English common law concept of a reasonable person could be 
found in Roman law in the form of the bonus pater familias since he was the standard of human behaviour.
402
 
Christopher Chemiak stated that ‘the notion in ancient Roman law of diligens pater familias seems closely 
related to [English common law’s] reasonable man concept.’
403
 Chemiak agreed with Deffains and Kirat that 
there was a close relationship between the Roman concept of the pater familias and the English common law 
reasonable man concept. The most significant genealogical connection was that the objective standard worked in 
the same way. 
Indeed, the idea of the objective and diligens pater familias was so ubiquitous that a proverb was coined to 
explain it – ‘there was no defence for a guardian (tutor) who failed to do for his ward what a pater familias 
would do in estate management.’
404
 Fundamentally, Roman law expected all its citizens to act as a pater 
familias would. All were required to live up to the objective standard set for a pater familias and only those who 
lacked the ability to reason were exempt. This objective standard was non-negotiable unless the alleged 
wrongdoer was exempt due to his lack of reasoning abilities, as will be discussed further in this chapter.  
                                                          
400 Paulus, Digest 34.2.32.2. 
401 Buckland and McNair, above n 82, 261. 
402 Deffains and Kirat, above n 398, 108. 
403 Cherniak, above n 51, 145. See also; Greuber, above n 398, 222-233. 
As noted by Bruno Deffains and  Thierry Kirat, ‘[t]he 'reasonable person' concept goes back to Roman law, where the 'bonus pater familias' was the measure 
with which behavior was compared’. Cf Deffains and Kirat, above n 398, 108. See also; Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciano Floridi, The Responsibilities of 
Online Service Providers (Springer, 2017) 111. See Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 1009.  
Zimmermann argued that the diligens paterfamilias is the ‘Roman equivalent of the English reasonable man’. Cf Reinhard Zimmermann and D P Visser, 
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (Clarendon Press, 1996) 602; A P Herbert, Uncommon Law (Methuen, 1982) 4; Glasgow 
Corporation v. Muir (1943) AC 448, 457. 
404 Ulpian, Digest 26.7.10, cited in Saller, above n 395, 188. 
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The pater familias concept was present in the Digest of the Roman jurist, Julius Paulus Prudentissimus (c. 
second - third century CE).
405
 According to Paulus, Roman law stated that if a slave broke his leg before 
delivery to a buyer, the seller was liable if he had ordered the slave to do something dangerous which a prudens 
et diligens pater familias would not have ordered him to do.
406
 
Although the phrases bonus pater familias and diligens pater familias are used interchangeably to refer to the 
objective standard of the pater familias,
407
 I have separated these phrases into two sections depending on which 
phrase the sources in my footnotes referred to. There is no known reason why there were varying adjectives 
used to describe the pater familias. The bonus pater familias and diligens pater familias did not represent two 
different standards, nor were they used in different areas of law. The adjectives ‘bonus’ (good) and ‘diligens’ 
(diligent) were used to describe the one objective standard, the pater familias. Bonus pater familias literally 
meant ‘the good father of the family’ and diligens pater familias meant the ‘the diligent father of the family’.
408
  
This standard was explicitly construed in Justinian’s Digest. All men were expected to live to this standard. For 
example, in case 19, Paulus also affirmed this universal standard: 
If a tree trimmer threw down a branch from a tree and killed a passing slave... he is clearly liable if it falls on public 
land and he did not call out so that the accident to him could be avoided...for it is culpa not to have foreseen what a 
careful person (bonus pater familias) could have foreseen, or to have called out only when the danger could not be 
avoided.409 
This case demonstrates how the jurists used the pater familias to invoke liability due to carelessness. The onus 
was on the defendant to demonstrate that he acted in accordance with the objective pater familias standard of 
care to ensure that damage to another’s property would not occur.
410
 
 
                                                          
405 Jennifer Larson, Greek and Roman Sexualities: A Sourcebook (A&C Black, 2012) 262. See also; Matthew J Perry, Gender, Manumission, and the Roman 
Freedwoman (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 161. 
406 Paulus, Digest 19.1.54, cited in Saller, above n 395, 188. 
407 William Warwick Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1931) 301. See also; Berolzheimer, above n 397, 
214. 
408 C R Snyman, Criminal Law (Butterworths, 2002) 214. 
409 Paulus, Digest 9.2.31; Paul, ‘The Edict,’ in Bruce W Frier (eds) A Casebook on the Roman Law of Delict (Scholars Press, 1989) 44. 
This theme is also depicted in Ulpian, Digest 9.2.31: ‘culpam autem esse quod cum a diligente procideri poterir, non esse provisum.' [English translation: There 
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A THE ‘BONUS PATER FAMILIAS’ 
Roman law, codified by Emperor Justinian I in the sixth century,
411
 used objective standards in the form of the 
‘bonus pater familias’ (good standard of care).
412
 The bonus pater familias was:  
The average type of an honest, prudent, and industrious man (father of a family), whose behaviour in relation with 
other citizens is given as a pattern of an upright man and may be required from any one. Acting contrary to what a 
bonus pater familias would do in any given situation may serve as a basis for measuring his culpability and 
liability in a specific case.413 
The bonus pater familias was not ‘exceptionally gifted, careful or developed, neither understood nor someone 
who recklessly takes chance or who has no prudence.’
414
 That is, the bonus pater familias was an average 
citizen in the same way as Ellis Washington said the reasonable person in English common law was an average 
citizen.
415
 
According to Roman law, external circumstances such as time, place, climate, social status, education and 
professional ability were taken into consideration when assessing human behaviour.
416
 However, the 
defendant’s individual qualities did not exclusively determine the wrongness or rightness of his conduct.
417
 
Rather, Roman law held the supposed wrongdoer to the objective bonus pater familias standard.
418
 If the alleged 
                                                          
411 George Mousourakis, Roman Law and the Origins of the Civil Law Tradition (Springer, 2014) vii. See also; Charles Phineas Sherman, Roman Law in the 
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Busnelli, Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 46; Pierre Catala and Tony Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel 
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Advertising, Broadcasting, Journalism, and Public Relations (Routledge, 2013) 103; Ruth R Faden and Tom L Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed 
Consent (Oxford University Press, 1986) 46. 
416 Koziol and  Busnelli, above n 413, 32. See also; von Bar, above n 77, 587; Walter van Gerven, Verbintenissenrecht: Verbintenissen uit de wet (Leuven, 7th 
ed, 2000) vol 2 300; Magnus,  Martín-Casals and  van Boom, above n 32, 30. 
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wrongdoer failed to act in accordance with the objective bonus pater familias standard, he committed a civil 
wrong. 
The subjective element was associated with the tortious capacity of the wrongdoer
419
 whilst the objective 
element focused on unlawful behaviour.
420
 The subjective elements used took into consideration the capacity of 
the wrongdoer, but objective standards were used in Roman law to assess culpability. A Roman citizen was 
expected to act as pater familias no matter what. If he deviated from the objective pater familias standard, he 
committed a civil wrong and had no basis upon which to defend the charge if the fact was proven.  
Therefore, the concept of the bonus pater familias was not a purely objective nor subjective approach. It was a 
hybrid.
421
  
For example, Gaius proclaimed that borrowed goods should be treated with the same care as a pater familias 
would give to his own property. Exemption from liability was only given in circumstances of unavoidable 
damage. Gaius wrote that the ‘death of slaves in which the borrower had no hand’ as well as their deaths as a 
result of ‘bandit or enemy raids, ambush by pirates, [or] shipwreck, [or] fire and the flight of trusted slaves’ , 
were cases where a borrower was not responsible for lost goods. This is because even a pater familias could not 
have avoided these consequences.
422
  
Cees van Dam explained that the English common law concept of the reasonable person and the bonus pater 
familias functioned in a similar manner – ‘the courts make use of objective standards of reference, usually the 
reasonable person and the bonus pater familias.’
423
 Just as English common law compared the actions of the 
                                                          
419 Alf Ross, A Textbook of International Law: General Part (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2006) 256. See also; Magnus,  Martín-Casals and  van Boom, above 
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420 Magnus, Martín-Casals and van Boom, above n 32, 30. See also; Jaap Spier and Francesco Donato Busnelli, Unification of Tort Law: Liability for Damage 
Caused by Others (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 46; W Van Gerven, J Lever and P Larouche, Text, Cases and Materials on National Supranational and 
International Tort Law (Hart Publishing, 2000) 468, Aspinall,  Camenisch and Hansen, above n 419, 257; Anatoniolli and  Fiorentini, above n 419, 221-222. 
421 von Bar, above n 77, 221. See also; Basedow, above n 77, 253. 
422 Gaius, Digest 13.6.18 pr.:  
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Routledge, 2004) 19. 
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defendant to the standard of the reasonable person, Roman law determined the duty to exercise care as measured 
against the bonus pater familias criterion.
424
  
The presence of a reasonable person standard in Roman law confirms that Roman jurisprudence used objective 
standards to evaluate human conduct.  
B THE ‘DILIGENS PATER FAMILIAS’ 
The way the diligens pater familias managed his affairs was the model of caution and prudence.
425
 This 
objective standard was used to determine whether the wrongdoer had taken due care.
426
 To establish negligence, 
Roman law set a standard of conduct (that of the diligens pater familias) and then measured the defendant's 
conduct against it.
427
  
According to Roman law, liability depended upon culpa. Innes CJ in the case Skinner v Johannesburg Turf 
Club,
428
 proclaimed that culpa, as understood in Roman law, was the failure to observe the standard of care of a 
diligens pater familias. The diligentia of the pater familias was a pattern of behaviour that allowed for the 
assessment of culpa.
429
 The function of the pater familias shows the use of objective standards in Roman law. 
The standard of care was measured by a reasonable person of the defendant’s standing.
430
  
This thesis does not seek to identify a genealogical connection between the pater familias and English common 
law’s reasonable person. Rather, this thesis identifies the use of objective standards that functioned in a similar 
way to common law’s reasonable person. The application of objective standards that functioned like English 
common law’s reasonable person standard in Roman law is used to illustrate that objective standards are used in 
                                                          
424 J William Boone, International Insolvency: Jurisdictional Comparisons (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 60. See also; Maurits Barendrecht, PEL SC (European 
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426 Zimmermann and Visser, above n 404, 604. See also; Bernhard Grueber, above n 398, 55; Mousourakis, above n 81, 199; United States. Department of 
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1873) vol 4 262. 
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all the legal systems the author has assessed. The widespread use of objective standards demonstrates that the 
existence and application of objective standards for assessing human conduct resonates with human reason.  
III THE REASONABLE PERSON AND THE SALE OF PROPERTY 
According to Alfenus Varus, Roman law specified that the vendor of a house may be liable to the buyer if the 
house was burned down before the sale was completed. The vendor was required to exercise care, diligentia, to 
ensure the property was not damaged before it was settled on the purchaser.
431
 The degree of care required was 
uniformly omnis (or summa) diligentia, or, as it was often called, diligentia diligenits patrisfamilias.
432
 In other 
words, vendors selling their house were under the obligation to care for their property as any careful person 
would under the circumstances.
433
 If a vendor failed to do so, he could be held responsible for its damage or 
destruction.
434
 Similarly, Ulpian
435
 referred to the opinion of Quintus Mucius
436
 who proclaimed that the 
borrower of goods was liable for fault (culpa).
437
  
By the time of the Roman Jurist Gaius
438
 (130AD – 180AD),
439
 it could be said that a person holding the 
property of another might be liable only if he was guilty of deliberate wrongdoing. The Roman concept of 
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432 Sohm, above n 75, 286. See also; Rudolf Sohm and  Bernhard Erwin Grüber, The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law 
(Clarendon Press, 1926) 368; Burdick, above n 425, 415; Buckland, above n 81, 289; Lawson, above n 81, 124. 
433 Sohm, above n 75, 286–287.  
434 Ulpian, Digest 18.6.12. 
435 Roman Jurist (c. 170AD—228AD). Cf Rüdiger Wolfrum,  Maja Seršić and  Trpimir Šošić, Contemporary Developments in International Law: Essays in 
Honour of Budislav Vukas (BRILL, 2015) 852. See also; David N Stamos, Myth of Universal Human Rights: Its Origin, History, and Explanation, Along with a 
More Humane Way (Routledge, 2015) 122; Elias C Hill, The Mirage of Human Rights (iUniverse, 2012) 16; Kristian A Bendoraitis and Nijay K Gupta, 
Matthew and Mark Across Perspectives: Essays in Honour of Stephen C Barton and William R Telford (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016) 57; Shortall Michael, 
Human Rights and Moral Reasoning: A Comparative Investigation by Way of Three Theorists and Their Respective Traditions of Enquiry: John Finnis, Ronald 
Dworkin and Jürgen Habermas (Gregorian Biblical BookShop, 2009) 34. 
436 Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex (died 82 BC) was a Roman jurist. Cf Matthew Dillon and  Lynda Garland, Ancient Rome: Social and Historical 
Documents from the Early Republic to the Death of Augustus (Routledge, 2015) 450. See also; John Spencer Muirhead, An Outline of Roman Law (W Hodge, 
1947) 18; Elizabeth Goldring,  Jayne Elisabeth Archer and  Elizabeth Clarke, John Nichols's The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth: 1579 to 
1595 (OUP Oxford, 2013) vol III 648; Johann Gottfried Herder,  Ioannis D Evrigenis and  Daniel Pellerin, Another Philosophy of History and Selected Political 
Writings (Hackett Publishing, 2004) 153. 
437 Ulpian, Digest 13.6.5.3. 
438 C W Maris and  F C L M Jacobs, Law, Order and Freedom: A Historical Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Springer Science & Business Media, 2011) 78. 
See also; Borzu Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration: Principles and Practice (OUP Oxford, 2011) 14; Michael Grant, The 
Antonines: The Roman Empire in Transition (Routledge, 2016) 88; Garrett Barden and  Tim Murphy, Law and Justice in Community (OUP Oxford, 2010) 40; 
Monica-Elena Herghelegiu, Reservatio Papalis: A Study on the Application of a Legal Prescription According to the 1983 Code of Canon Law (LIT Verlag 
Münster, 2008) 21. 
439 Ibid (Herghelegiu) 21.  
 
 
86 
 
diligentia invoked an objective standard and placed the burden of guilt for deliberate wrongdoing upon any 
individual liable for fault. Fault was determined by assessing whether there had been a failure to meet the 
objective standard established for the pater familias. That is, fault occurred when the supposed wrongdoer acted 
contrary to how a pater familias would have acted under similar circumstances.
440
  
This principle shows that Roman law used objective standards
441
 to evaluate fault. Objective standards were 
also applied in Roman law to evaluate the defendant’s behaviour in abstracto.
442
 In abstracto was a term used to 
mean ‘hypothetically’ or ‘in the abstract.’
443
 The abstracto principle outlined an objective standard of care that 
allowed for no difference by within the chosen class.
444
 Fault was attached when a person failed to meet the 
standard of care of a bonus pater familias (in abstracto).
445
 External circumstances were also taken into 
consideration when determining fault.
446
 To determine the element of fault, the defendant’s conduct was 
compared with that of a bonus pater familias.
447
 
This principle is found in Gaius, Provincial Edict, Book 9:  
The standard of care to be adhered to in relation to things lent for use is that which any very careful head of a family 
(diligentissimus pater familias) keeps to in relation to his own affairs to the extent that the borrower is only not liable 
for those events which cannot be prevented, such as deaths of slaves occurring without fault on his part, attacks of 
robbers and enemies, surprises by pirates, shipwreck, fire, and escape of slaves not usually confined.448 
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Dadzie and Thomas J Sienkewicz, World Dictionary of Foreign Expressions: A Resource for Readers and Writers (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1999) 178; 
James T Bretzke, Consecrated Phrases: A Latin Theological Dictionary: Latin Expressions Commonly Found in Theological Writings (Liturgical Press, 1998) 
61. 
444 Richard A Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to Do Economics Right (John M Olin Program in Law and Economics Working 
Paper No. 445, 2008) 7. 
445 Peter Birks, The Roman Law of Obligations (OUP Oxford, 2014) 117. See also; Muirhead, above n 437, 137; G C Venkata Subbarao, Jurisprudence (Ch 
Ramakrishnarao, 1964) 242; M E Bayles and  Bruce Chapman, Justice, Rights, and Tort Law (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012) 139; J A C Thomas, 
Textbook of Roman Law (North-Holland, 1976) 250.  
446 Eric Descheemaeker, The Division of Wrongs: A Historical Comparative Study (OUP Oxford, 2009) 177. See also; Hussein Amer, La Responsabilité Civile 
Délictuelle Et Contractuelle (Cairo, 1956) 360-61; David Rivkin, 'Lex Mercatoria and Force Majeure' in Gaillard ed Transnational Rules in International 
Commercial Arbitration (ICC Publication, 1993) 194. 
447 Viney and Jourdain, above n 443, § 463, 375; § 471, 410. See also; Terre, above n 443, § 729, 701; Gerven, above n 443, 310. 
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An application of this principle in Roman tort law was provided in Justinian’s Digest:449 
 
Pomponius says that even though a person finds someone else's cattle on his land, he should show the same care in 
driving them off as if those he had found were his own; for if he has suffered any harm on their account, he has his 
own legal remedies. And, therefore, he who finds someone else's cattle in his field may not lawfully impound them, 
nor must he drive them out other than as we have just said above, that is, as though they were his own; but he must 
either remove them without hurting them or tell their owner, so that he can come and collect them.450 
 
This law shows the application of an objective standard in the form of a reasonable person. The above law held 
the defendant accountable for failing to care of another person’s cattle as if it was his own. That is because the 
defendant failed to meet the standard of care set for the pater familias. 
 
We see then that Roman law used the pater familias as an objective standard to assess culpa. In other words, the 
conduct of the pater familias was the objective standard of reasonableness. If the defendant failed to act in the 
same manner as the pater familias, he was liable for committing a civil wrong.  
The following section will discuss the presence of a reasonable standard in Roman law that assessed the charge 
of duress.  
IV DURESS AND THE HOMO CONSTANTISSIMUS  
Roman law conducted a four-stage approach to assess duress. Three of the four stages were purely objective,
451
 
with the second stage involving an objective standard that functioned like English common law’s reasonable 
person
452
 - the homo constantissimus. 
The homo constantissimus, translated as 'the most constant (or steadfast) man,'
453
 was an imaginary figure 
invented by the classical Roman jurists as a benchmark against which to measure degrees of coercion.
454
 
                                                          
449 9.2.39.1 (Pomponius). Pomponius. quamvis alienum pecus in agro suo quis deprehendit, sic illud expellere debet, quomodo si suum deprehendisset, 
quoniam si quid ex ea re damnum cepit, habet proprias actiones. itaque qui pecus alienum in agro suo deprehenderit, non iure id includit, nec agere illud aliter 
debet quam ut supra diximus quasi suum: sed vel abigere debet sine damno vel admonere dominum, ut suum recipiat. Cf Paul Vinogradoff, Essays in Legal 
History Read Before the International Congress of Historical Studies Held in London in 1913 (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1913) 75. See also; Peter Blaho and 
Jarmila Vanova, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Digesta (Eurokódex, 1939) vol 1 206; Bayles and Chapman, above n 446, 139. 
450 Watson, above n 410, 289. 
451 Roscoe Pound discussed these stages in more detail in his work. Cf Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Subject Matter of Law: Sources, Forms, Modes of 
Growth (West Publishing Company, 1959) 44; Roscoe Pound, Readings in Roman Law and the Civil Law and Modern Codes as Developments Thereof: An 
Introduction to Comparative Law (Harvard University Press, 1914) Part 1 31; Pound, above n 397, 43–45. 
452 Pound, above n 452, 43–45. See also; Roscoe Pound, 'Interests of Personality' (1915) 38(4) Harvard Law Review 343-365. 
453 Wim Decock, Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500-1650) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) 217. 
See also; Helen Scott, Unjust Enrichment in South African Law: Rethinking Enrichment by Transfer (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013) 85; Bernard Guenée, 
Between Church and State: The Lives of Four French Prelates in the Late Middle Ages (University of Chicago Press, 1991) 27. 
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Similarly assessed in English common law, coercion was also judged by the use of an objective reasonable 
person test as opposed to the subjective view of the defendant.
455
 If the victim found himself in circumstances 
that would coerce the homo constantissimus, Roman law held the defendant liable for coercion. Roman law 
applied this edict in certain situations that dealt with fear of personal harm, such as death,
456
 physical harm and 
loss of freedom,
457
 fear of economic harm
458
 and fear of harm to the family.
459
  
James A Brundage also identified the similarity between the homo constantissimus and English common law’s 
reasonable person in relation to their function in their respective legal systems. James A Brundage said that 
‘[t]he 'constant man' (homo constantissimus) b[ore] a close resemblance to his much younger cousin, the 
'reasonable man', who figure[d] so prominently as a benchmark in the English common law of torts.’
460
  
Roman law described the homo constantissimus as 'constant' in the sense that he was courageous, firm and 
unfaltering in character.
461
 The homo constantissimus was one who was not easily frightened and who was fully 
capable of standing up against idle threats. In short, the homo constantissimus stood for the kind of person that 
Roman patricians liked to think that they were, or at least that they ought to be.
462
 
Roman jurisprudence developed objective standards to assess human conduct because purely subjective 
adjudication was socially unacceptable due to perceived inconsistency. 
Returning to the four-stage process of assessing duress, the first stage asked the question whether there was any 
peril to life and limb. This standard objectively assessed whether the victim experienced any actual or threatened 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
454 Digest 4.2.6 (Gaius) cited in Hunt Janin, Medieval Justice: Cases and Laws in France, England and Germany, 500-1500 (McFarland, 2004) 34; James A 
Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (Routledge, 2014) 166. Cf Decock, above n 454, 237. See also; Lawrence Besserman, Sacred and Secular in Medieval and 
Early Modern Cultures: New Essays (Springer, 2006) 131; Richard H Helmholz, 'Natural Human Rights: The Perspective of the Ius Commune' (2003) 52 
Catholic University Law Review 308-309. 
455 Middleton v. Department of Defence, 185 F.3d 1374 (Fed Cir. 1999); Ragland v. IRS, 2 M.S.P.B. 167 (1980); Vandiver v. General Accounting Office, 3 
M.S.P.B. 158 (1980); Myslik v. VA, 2 M.S.P.B. 241 (1980); Morrow v. Department of Army, 4 M.S.P.B. 494 (1980); Spiegel v. Department of Army, 2 M.S.P.B. 
307 (1980) and 6 M.S.P.B. 40 (1980). See also; Paul H Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and the Utility of Desert (Oxford University Press, 2013) 357; Isidore 
Silver, Public Employee Discharge and Discipline (Aspen Publishers Online, 2001) 48; Bevans, above n 8, 72. See also; Peter W Low, Criminal Law 
(Thomson/West, 2002) 256; Paul H Robinson, Criminal Law Defences (West, 1984) vol 2 371. 
456 Cf Ulpian, Delict 4.2.3.1; Ulpian, Delict 4.2.7; Paul, Delict 4.2.8; Ulpian, Delict 4.6.3. 
457 For example, Paul, Delict 4.2.2 (fear of an attack which cannot be repelled); Paul, Delict 4.2.8.2 (fear of sexual assault); Paul, Delict 4.2.4 and Paul, Delict 
4.2.8.1 (fear of slavery); Ulpian, Delict 4.2.7; Paul, Delict 4.2.22 (fear of imprisonment); Ulpian, Delict 4.2.7.1; Ulpian, Delict 4.2.23.1 (fear of being brought in 
chains); Ulpian, Delict 4.2.23.2 (an athelete's fear of being confined, thus preventing him from entering into contests). 
458 John Dawson, ‘Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law’ (1937) (3) Tulane Law Review 347. 
459 Cf Paul, Delict 4.2.8.3. See Jacques E du Plessis, Compulsion and Restitution–A Historical and Comparative Study of the Treatment of Compulsion in 
Scottish Private Law with Particular Emphasis on its Relevance to the Law of Restitution or Unjustified Enrichment (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Aberdeen, 1997) 8. 
460 Brundage, above n 455, 166. On this odious character see William L Prosser, The Law of Torts (St Paul, 5th ed, 1984) 173–185. 
461 See Digestum Justiani 4.2.3.1; 4.2.7.1; 4.2.8.2 and 4.2.7. See also; Janin, above n 455, 34; Decock, above n 454, 217; Brundage, above n 455, 166. 
462 Brundage, above n 455, 166. See also; Janin, above n 455, 34.  
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bodily harm.
463
 In the second stage, the law questioned whether the pressure employed would have overcome a 
reasonable person in the victim’s position.
464
 The seriousness of the threat was assessed in the third stage.
465
  
Duress was primarily viewed as a tortious act and thus, for there to be duress, Roman law held that a threat had 
to be so serious as to affect a homo constantissimus.
466
 If a homo constantissimus would have succumbed to 
duress under the circumstances, the Roman courts held the defendant liable.  
The objective standard used in Roman law established for the homo constantissimus assessed the conduct of its 
citizens. Like Jewish law and Athenian law, Roman law used a reasonable person standard to define socially 
acceptable behaviour.  
The following section will analyse the relationship between a reasonable person standard in Roman law and the 
concept of culpa. This analysis will demonstrate the use of objective standards to assess the element of fault in 
Roman law, lending further support to the case for the universal application of objective standards for the 
evaluation of human behaviour. 
V CULPA AND THE REASONABLE PERSON 
Culpa in Roman law ‘was [the] failure to observe the standard of conduct which the law required’
467
 and it 
varied according to circumstance. Culpa in the wide sense was expressed as fault in criminal and civil law
468
 
and in the narrow sense, negligence.
469
 Culpa literally meant guilt.
470
 Guilt was assessed by measuring the 
defendant’s conduct against an objective pater familias standard. Culpa as negligence occurred ‘when a man 
failed to foresee what a careful [diligens] man would have foreseen.’
471
 Geoffrey MacCormack has argued that 
                                                          
463 Justinian Digest IV, 2, 2; IV, 2, 3. See also; Corpus Juris Civilis II, 4, I3. See also; Pound, above n 452, 31. 
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8th ed, 1911) vol 1 91.2a; Ferdinand Regelsberger, Pandekten (Duncker & Humblot, 1893) vol 1 144.8; Roscoe Pound, 'Interests of Personality' (1915) 38(4) 
Harvard Law Review 358. 
466 Cf Zweigert and Drobnig, above n 49,193. See also; Decock, above n 454, 217; Gaius, Digest 4.2.3; André Breton, La Notion De Violence en Tant Que Vice 
Du Consentement (Université de Caen, 1925) 18. 
467 William Warwick Buckland and Peter Stein, A Text-Book of Roman Law: From Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 556. See also; 
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468 Nils Jansen, The Development and Making of Legal Doctrine (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 195. 
469 MacCormack, above n 79, 13. See also; Smith, above n 79, 58; Glegg, above n 79, 19; Smith, above n 79, 283, 657; Walker, above n 79, 32, 47. 
470 Heuscher, above n 80, 92. See also; Descheemaeker, above n 447, 70; Joseph T Shipley, Dictionary of Early English (Rowman & Littlefield, 1955) 10. 
471 Justinian’s Digest 9.23.1 cited in Berger, above n 77, 419; Kehoe and McGrinn, above n 344, 50. 
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culpa does not just mean negligence. It also included simple carelessness and other issues less grave than the 
more serious idea of negligence that is familiar in English common law.
472
  
Examining other Roman digests and institutes, H D J Bodenstein noted that criminal culpa also comprised: 
[of the] lack of care in doing acts which might be injurious to others, e.g., not taking the required measures to 
prevent the injury (Institutes. 4.3.5 and 6), (Digest. 9.2.30, sec. 3, lex 31), undertaking anything dangerous, not being 
in possess of the required skill (Institutes 4.3.7 and 8, Digest 9.2.7, sec. 8, Digest 9.2.30, sec. 3), or the power 
(Institutes 4.3.8, Digest 9.2.8, sec. 1), to ensure harmlessness, doing dangerous acts under circumstances in which 
damage is like to ensure (Digest 9.2.11 pr., Institutes 4.3.4, Digest 9.2.30, sec. 3), or omitting to do what under the 
circumstances duty required (Digest 9.2.30, sec 3, lex 27, sec. 9, Digest 9.2.44 and 45 pr., Institutes 4.3.6).473 
Bruce W Frier and Thomas A McGinn explained that culpa was the ‘failure to observe the standards of a careful 
Roman.’
474
 Roman law asserted that ‘there [wa]s no culpa if everything was done that a very careful man 
[w]ould have done.’
475
 But Geoffrey MacCormack, in ‘Aquilian Culpa', accepted that culpa was negligence. It 
involved the failure to exercise the care of a bonus pater familias.
476
  
The hypothetical notion of what a careful Roman citizen (a pater familias, a homo constantissimus or a 
reasonable person) ‘would’ or ‘should’ have done was consistently used to evaluate human behaviour. The use 
of these objective standards demonstrates that the Romans considered that objective standards were foundational 
in a just legal system.  
The degree of culpa was represented in three ways.
477
 First, culpa levis in abstracto, where the failure to use 
diligentia maxima indicated someone was not performing to the standard expected of a bonus pater familias.
478
 
This failure constituted ordinary negligence.
479
 This degree of culpa inferred that one's conduct was examined 
                                                          
472 Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Aquilian Culpa’ in A Watson ed, Daube Noster: Essays in Legal History for David Daube (Scottish Academic Press, 1974) 201. 
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Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1953) 399; Sandars, above n 81, 467. 
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upon the basis of an abstract or objective standard.
480
 Thomas Collett Sandars explained – ‘[a] person 
responsible for culpa levis in abstracto ha[d] to show the diligence of a bonus pater familias’ to successfully 
defend himself.
481
  
Secondly, culpa lata (gross negligence or fault)
482
 meant to display less care than any bonus pater familias 
would show
483
 and was identified as gross negligence.
484
 Culpa lata was defined by Ulpian as ‘not 
understanding what everyone understands’
485
 and was assessed objectively.
486
 The amount of care that should 
have been demonstrated by the wrongdoer was to a degree of care that ‘everyone understood.’ The concept of 
‘understanding,’ as described by Ulpian, expressed the rationale that the alleged wrongdoer possessed the ability 
to reason and this capability was possessed by ‘everyone.’  
Roman jurists assessed degrees of culpability. The degrees themselves are not as significant for this thesis as the 
underlying objectivity that was used to judge human behaviour. Cultural issues and contemporary social 
concerns affected the chosen degrees of guilt. This objective standard was known by the defendant, as he too 
possessed the ability to reason and thus should also have recognised and weighed cultural and social issues 
before he decided to act as he did.  
Thirdly, culpa levis in concreto occurred when the tortfeasor failed to establish the same diligentia as he would 
in his own affairs.
487
 This criterion was fixed and individualised,
488
 and was purely subjective.
489
 Richard 
Zimmerman wrote - ‘Here, liability [wa]s not determined according to the abstract standard of the diligens pater 
                                                          
480 Digest of Justinian 44.7.1.4; Institutes of Justinian 3.14.2 and 3.24.5. See also; Mousourakis, above n 81, 199. 
481 Sandars, above n 81, 324. 
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Friedrich Julius Stahl and  Ruben Alvarado, Principles of Law (WordBridge Publishing, 2007) Book 2 67. 
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1900) vol 2 104; Jansen, above n 469, 119. 
487 Digest of Justinian 10. 2. 25. 16. See also; Buckland and Stein, above n 468, 556; Peter Birks and  Arianna Pretto, Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing, 2002) 
47; Buckland, above n 478, 339; Sandars, above n 81, 324. 
488 Fraser, above n 81, 298. 
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With Catena of Texts (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2008) 518. 
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familias, but according to a concrete, subjective criterion.’
490
 This type of culpa was found in Roman contracts 
concerning partnership.
491
  
Though Zimmermann says culpa levis in concreto was a purely subjective standard, it possessed objective and 
subjective elements. Objectivity remained in the concept of culpa levis in concreto because the underlying idea 
of culpa invoked the underlying objective pater familias standard was still embedded in the rule even though it 
was not as obvious. The reasonableness of the tortfeasor was stil the ultimate criterion of judgement in both tort 
cases.  
Contractors were similarly held to an objective standard. Ultimately, they had to act reasonably. Zimmerman is 
thus incorrect when he assert that the culpa levis in concreto  principle is an example of a purely subjective test. 
No matter how much subjectivity this standard is said to have included, it simply would not have worked 
without implicit objectivity.  
 
The foreseeability of damages was one of the measures used to determine culpa.
492
 As the Roman Jurist, Paulus 
commented, ‘[i]t [i]s culpa not to have foreseen what a careful person could have foreseen, or to have called out 
only when the danger could not be avoided.’
493
 
Culpa and foreseeability were tested by reference to the objective standard established for a diligens pater 
familias
494
 in the defendant’s position.
495
 Beyond the obligation of foreseeable damage, Roman law also took 
into consideration the defendant’s subjective capacity for knowledge.
496
 Ulpian wrote: 
Whether there is an action under the Lex Aquilia if a lunatic (furiosus) inflicts loss? Pegasus denied this; for what 
culpa can a person have who is not in his right mind? This view is exactly correct. Therefore, the Aquilian action 
will fail, just as it fails if a four-footed animal inflicts loss, or if a roof tile falls. But also, if a young child inflicts 
                                                          
490 Zimmermann, above n 404, 210. 
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loss, the same will be held. But if an older child does this, Labeo says that because he is liable for theft (furtum), he 
is also liable in the Aquilian action; I think this view correct if he is already capable of wrongful conduct. The 
consensus among the three jurists is indisputable. Culpa, understood as fault, cannot be committed by a person with 
a mental incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong. Similarly, the claim for liability fails for persons who are 
unable to appreciate the consequences of their actions.497 
 
Like Jewish law and Athenian law, Roman law held competent human beings to a high standard because they 
have the capacity to reason. Ulpian highlighted that if the defendant did not possess the capacity to reason, he 
was not liable for losses he had caused. In support of this position, Ulpian provided the rhetorical question 
raised by Pegasus whilst discussing the issue of loss inflicted by a lunatic. He asked – ‘for what culpa can a 
person have who is not in his right mind?’ There was none, for he did not possess a properly functioning 
cognitive faculty.  
 
Ulpian then compared the liability of a lunatic and a child with that of a four-footed animal and a fallen roof tile. 
This comparison was made to demonstrate that, like animals and tiles, lunatics and children did not possess the 
ability to reason. Just as animals and tiles do not contain the capacity to reason and thus, are not liable for loss, 
neither was an incapacitated person. However, if the defendant did possess such capacity, he was held 
accountable under the Lex Aquilia as argued by Ulpian.  
 
Ulpian concluded by citing three jurists, who held that ‘culpa cannot be committed by a person with a mental 
incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong. Similarly, the claim for liability fails for persons who are 
unable to appreciate the consequences of their actions.’
498
 Ulpian provided another example of objective 
reasonableness. An older child was liable for loss because he contained the capacity to reason. This ability 
enabled older children to commit a wrongful act.  
 
The following section highlights the use of objective standards and its association with the Roman legal concept 
of doli incapax.  
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VI DOLI INCAPAX 
 
According to Roman law, punishment applied if the accused was capable of forming malicious intent.
499
 The 
Roman legal concept of doli incapax, most commonly translated as being 'incapable of committing an offence 
(or crime),'
500
 accommodated circumstances where someone was incapable of forming guilty intentions.
501
 In 
those cases, the accused incurred no liability.
502
 This concept generally excluded minors and lunatics, as I will 
explain below.
503
 In other words, doli incapax applied to individuals who were incapable of criminality or 
criminal intent.
504
 This concept was also used in English common law.
505
 
Roman law mandated that fault should not be attributed to a lunatic or a person below the age of puberty 
because they were doli incapax. They had no capacity to understand the wrongful character of their actions.
506
 
Under Roman law,
507
 citizens under the age of seven were believed to be incapable of committing a crime.
508
 
Therefore, they were not liable for civil wrongdoing.
509
 In the words of Professor Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, ‘if 
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Law Responds to Youth Offending (Routledge, 2010) 43. 
503 Digest 9, 2, 5, ss2; Cf Lex Aquilia, fr. 5 ss 2 See also; Irving B Weiner and  Allen K Hess, The Handbook of Forensic Psychology (John Wiley & Sons, 
2006) 334; Goshasp N Satarawala Ruttonsha, Juvenile Delinquency and Destitution in Poona (S M Katre, 1947) 15; Goshasp N Satarawala Ruttonsha, Aspects 
of Child Welfare (Rochouse, 1965) 117; Mousourakis, above n 81, 253; Quen, above n 289, 39-40. 
504 Beryl Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (OUP Oxford, 2003) 138. See also; Irving B Weiner and  Allen K Hess, The Handbook of Forensic 
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the child was found to be doli incapax, there could be no liability since the presumption of the child's lack of 
capacity to form mens rea would not have been rebutted.’
510
 Doli capax was also assessed according to the 
gravity of the crime.
511
 Olivia F Robinson summarised intent in the Roman law of public delicts or crimes as 
follows: 
For the commission of a crime…guilty intention – dolus…was normally required. An accident did not impose 
criminal liability. Crimes such as pasturage at night on another’s land presume a guilty intention… [b]ut the intention 
was specifically relevant in cases of incendiarism and death…ignorance of the law, unlike ignorance of the facts, 
was culpable; it was the duty of the citizen to know the law.512  
Roman law determined that dolus, or the ability to form dolus, must be possessed by the defendant to attribute 
liability.
513
 Because infants and lunatics could not form guilty intent, they could not be guilty of crimes since 
they lacked some of the attributes of the bonus pater familias. Thus, they were exonerated from criminal 
liability associated with culpa.  
The appearance of this exemption in Roman law relies upon the presence of a reasonable person test. Roman 
citizens were liable for culpa if they did not meet the standard of care demonstrated by a reasonable person. A 
reasonable person possessed the ability to reason, enabling them to form malicious intent. Minors and lunatics 
did not possess this ability. Therefore, they were unable to meet the standard set for a reasonable person. Since 
they could not meet this standard, they were exempted from criminal liability.  
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Guardian and Ward, Master and Servant, and of the Powers of the Courts of Chancery: With an Essay on the Terms Heir, Heirs, Heirs of the Body (The 
Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1862) 383; Hallevy, above n 502, 108; VerLoren Van Themaat Centre for International Law, Suid-Afrikaanse Jaarboek Vir Volkereg 
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511 Anne Castaing, L'enfance délinquante à Lille au XVIIIe siècle (Lille, 1960). 
512 Olivia F Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome (Duckworth, 1995) 16 cited in Badar, above n 474, 19; Guyora Binder, Criminal Law (Oxford 
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VII CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown the use of objective standards in Roman law that operated like English 
common law’s reasonable person. The pater familias was the foundation and manifested itself in various ways, 
because it resonated with the way Roman society operated. The pater familias was used in Roman law as an 
objective standard to assess negligence. As in English common law, the pater familias was the person who 
managed his affairs as a model of caution and prudence. The basis for assessing culpability rested on a citizen 
acting contrary to how the pater familias would act in any given situation. The citizen was expected to conduct 
himself in the manner that was expected of a reasonable person. Failing to act reasonably rendered the citizen 
liable for damages that arose due to his negligent conduct. If an alleged wrongdoer failed to act in accordance 
with the standard set for the pater familias, he committed a civil wrong. 
Chapters two and three showed that objective standards were also found and used in Jewish and ancient 
Athenian law to determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. Roman law used hybrid tests in a 
manner very similar to Jewish and ancient Athenian law. In all three legal systems, the objective element was 
important to the sound functioning and social acceptability of their legal tests before liability could be imposed. 
Roman law held the vendor of real estate liable if he did not exercise care of his property to the same degree as 
any careful person would under the circumstances. If the seller failed to care for his property in this manner, he 
could be held responsible for its destruction or damage. Fault occurred when the supposed wrongdoer acted 
contrary to how a pater familias would have acted under similar circumstances. That is, how a Roman man 
would have cared for the property. This principle demonstrates that Roman law used an objective standard to 
evaluate fault.  
The pater familias standard was also used to assess a civil defendant’s conduct in abstracto, in other words, on a 
hypothetical basis. Fault was judged when a person failed to meet the standard of care that a pater familias 
would have observed (in abstracto). Because the defendant was expected to act reasonably, his behaviour was 
measured against the standard of a pater familias. Objective standards were also used in cases concerning 
duress. Like the pater familias, the homo constantissimus was the anthropomorphic epitome of right conduct 
against which the defendant was measured. For there to be duress, the threat had to be so serious as to affect a 
homo constantissimus. In other words, if a homo constantissimus would have experienced duress under the 
circumstances, the Roman courts held the defendant liable. 
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According to Ulpian, the standard of care expected of the defendant was one which ‘everyone understood’ 
through reason. Ulpian expressed the prevailing Roman view that the power to reason from objective standards 
was a characteristic of all competent human beings. Whilst this thesis does not argue that everyone through 
reason unanimously agrees specific actions or standards are reasonable, reason is the mechanism by which 
human beings conclude that objective standards are an important tool in the evaluation of human behaviour. It is 
difficult to escape that conclusion when one reflects on the laboured Roman insistence on the application of 
objective standards before lawful judgement. 
As in Jewish law and Athenian law, Roman law held competent human beings to a high standard because they 
have the capacity to reason. If a Roman citizen did not possess that ability to reason like a reasonable person, he 
was exempt from criminal liability. This concept was pervasive in Jewish law, Athenian law and Roman law 
and was also present in English common law.  
Like these legal systems, Roman law took the approach that incapacitated people were not criminally liable for 
crimes when they did not possess the ability to form malicious intent. Roman law also used an objective 
standard to assess cases of coercion. The homo constantissimus bore close resemblance to English common 
law’s reasonable person, though he was an imaginary figure invented by the classical Roman jurists as a 
benchmark against which to measure degrees of coercion. If a homo constantissimus would have been coerced 
in the circumstances, Roman law held the defendant criminally liable.  
Whilst authors such as Cees van Dam, Bruno Deffains, Thierry Kirat and Christopher Chemiak find 
genealogical connection between the pater familias and English common law’s reasonable person, the primary 
objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the appearance of an objective standard that functioned like English 
common law’s reasonable person in Roman law.  
The universal application of an objective standard which functioned like English common law’s reasonable 
person standard is used to illustrate that objective standards were applied throughout all the legal systems 
assessed. The use of objective standards in Jewish, Athenian and Roman law demonstrates the efficiency, 
practicality and reasonableness of objective standards in assessing human behaviour in law and society. 
Throughout my research, I have not been able to identify evidence of any other method to adjudicate conduct. 
Whilst the objective standards used were often infused with subjective elements, those subjective standards were 
never used in isolation without an objective core. Objective standards are ubiquitous.  
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The following chapter will review canon law to identify how canon lawyers use objective standards to assess 
human behaviour.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE REASONABLE PERSON IN CANON LAW 
I INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will examine the canon law legal system and assess whether it uses objective standards to judge 
human behaviour in the same manner as Jewish law, Athenian law and Roman law do. This chapter will focus 
on canon law issued before 1582 AD when Pope Gregory XIII revised and promulgated the Corpus Juris 
Canonici (the body of canon law).  
The primary focus of this chapter is to examine whether canon law used objective standards similar to that of the 
reasonable person standard of English common law. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether objective 
standards, such as the reasonable person standard, are universal in all jurisdictions observed. I have shown the 
universal use of objective standards in the Jewish, Athenian and Roman jurisdictions and the absence of an 
alternative approach.  
This chapter will begin by defining the terms ‘canon law’ and ‘ecclesiastical law’ along with a brief historical 
account of eclesiastical law’s influence on the English legal system. Within this chapter, the term ‘canon law’ 
will refer only to Catholic canon law, unless otherwise stated.     
This chapter will continue by showing that objective standards were used in the Didascalia Apostolorum, a 
‘handbook for the churches’ written around c 250 AD.514 Its authorship is usually attributed to Jesus’ apostles, 
but this authorship is contested.
515
 The Didascalia Apostolorum used a fictitious ‘wise man’ as an objective 
standard to judge human behaviour.  
Like Jewish and Athenian jurisprudence, objective standards were used in canon law to assess whether a person 
was guilty of voluntary or involuntary homicide. Canon law identified circumstances that reduced a person’s 
guilt from voluntary to involuntary homicide by inferring a person’s intent. If someone accused of voluntary 
                                                          
514 Matthew C Baldwin, Whose Acts of Peter?: Text and Historical Context of the Actus Vercellenses (Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 83. See also; Roy Zuck, Vital 
Church Issues: Examining Principles and Practices in Church Leadership (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006) 226; David Fienst, Prayed Alleged to Be Jewish: 
An Examintion of the Constitiones Apostolorum (California Scholars, 1980) 19-20; Erwin Fahlbusch and  Geoffrey William Bromiley, The Encyclopedia of 
Christianity (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 2003) vol 3 220; Eckhard J Schnabel, Early Christian Mission: Jesus and the Twelve (InterVarsity Press, 2004) 529. 
515 Craig A Evans and  James A Sanders, Early Christian Interpretation of the Scriptures of Israel: Investigations and Proposals (A&C Black, 1997) 121. See 
also; Bart D Ehrman, Forgery and Counter-forgery: The Use of Literary Deceit in Early Christian Polemics (OUP USA, 2013) 344; Virginia Burrus, Late 
Ancient Christianity (Fortress Press, 2005) vol 2 243; R Hugh Connolly, Didascalia Apostolorum: The Syriac Version Translated and Accompanied by the 
Verona Latin Fragments (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2010) xc. 
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homicide could defend himself by demonstrating that his actions were reasonable under the circumstances, his 
guilt was reduced because he had acted reasonably according to accepted objective standards.  
Canon law also used an objective standard which functioned like English common law’s reasonable person, the 
homo constantissimus. This objective standard was used to address duress and was use in the Decretum Gratian, 
Glossa Ordinaria, the decretals of Gregory IX and in Pope Alexander III’s second decretal, Veniens ad nos. 
Duress occurred if a homo constantissimus in the victim’s situation would have been moved by fear.  
This study of canon law contributes to my thesis by establishing that canon law used objective standards as part 
of its judicial procedures and judicial reasoning. I will demonstrate that canon law did not use subjective 
standards to assess human behaviour but rather, used objective standards to address this issue.  
II WHAT IS CATHOLIC CANON LAW? 
 
Catholic canon law is a system of laws and legal principles
516
 that are created and enforced by church 
hierarchical authorities, such as the Roman Pontiff,
517
 to regulate the church’s external organization and 
government and to implement order and discipline through its internal structures as rules and procedures.
518
  
Like the term 'ecclesiastical law', ‘canon law’ also carries an ambiguous meaning. The term ‘canon law’ is not 
an adequate synonym for ‘religious law’ because canon law does not refer to the law and polcy that governs all 
churches.  
Rather, ‘canon law’ is a term that is used only in connection with particular Christian churches, the Catholic and 
Anglican churches in particular.
519
 Even within this limited Christian understanding, the term is problematic.
520
 
                                                          
516 Nigel G Foster and  Satish Sule, German Legal System and Laws (Oxford University Press, 2010) 9. See also; Guenther H Haas, The Concept of Equity in 
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Law (Paulist Press, 2000) 4; Rhidian Jones, The Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England (A&C Black, 2nd ed, 2011) 24. 
517 John J Coughlin, Canon Law: A Comparative Study with Anglo-American Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2010) 177. See also; Libero Gerosa, 
Canon Law (LIT VerlagMünster, 2002) 15; Ladislas Orsy, 'Theology and Canon Law: An Inquiry into Their Relationship' (1990) 50 The Jurist 163; Stephan 
Kuttner, 'Natural Law and Canon Law' (1949) University of Notre Dame Natural Law Institute Proceedings 87; Richard H Helmholz, The Spirit of Classical 
Canon Law (University of Georgia Press, 2010) 311. 
518 Gerosa, above n 518, 23. See also; James A Coriden, An Introduction to Canon Law (Paulist Press, 2004) xi, 4; Catherine Innes-Parker and Naoe Kukita 
Yoshikawa, Anchoritism in the Middle Ages: Texts and Traditions (University of Wales Press, 2013) 25; Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) 174; John C Bush and Patrick R Cooney, Interchurch Families: Resources for Ecumenical Hope (Westminster John Knox Press, 2002) 
75. 
519 Sandberg, above n 519, chapter 9. 
520 Norman Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England (Clarendon Press, 1996) 12-13. 
 
 
101 
 
For example, some commentators interpret this term to refer to one source of law (the canons of the Church of 
England),
521
 while others use this term as a synonym for ecclesiastical law.
522
  
In a broad sense, ‘canons are intended to lead men and women to act justly in the world so that they may 
ultimately stand before God unashamed.’523 However, canon law was not completely established for spiritual 
guidance. Richard A. Hemholz has written: 
 [A] large part of [the canon law] has provided detailed rules for the governance of the church – regulations of 
conduct by the clergy, instructions for the performance of sacraments, and directions for decision-making within the 
church. By design, the Canons create conditions that promote harmony within the church and freedom from 
interference from without.524 
III WHAT IS ECCLESIASTICAL LAW? 
As Doe explained, the inconsistent use of the term 'ecclesiastical law' and the lack of an agreed definition have 
rendered its use 'extremely problematic'.
525
 'Ecclesiastical law' can refer to Catholic ecclesiastical law or 
Anglican ecclesiastical law.  
The term ‘canon law’ thus carries a Christian connotation, but the term’s usefulness has been undermined by the 
various uses of this term. The term 'ecclesiastical law' has been used to refer to religious law. But the term 
(‘ecclesiatical law’) has also been used to describe all of the laws created by the Catholic Church and for the 
‘Church by God’.526  
In contrast, in continental literature,
527
 this term (ecclesiastical law) is also used to refer to religious law - 
meaning all the law created by the state for the Church.
528
 However, the term ‘ecclesiastical law’ did not seem to 
include laws created by the State that affects the Church.
529
  
                                                          
521 Mark Hill, Ecclesiastical Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 2. 
522 Timothy Briden and Brian Hanson, Moore's Introduction to English Canon Law (Mowbrays, 3rd ed, 1992) 4. 
523 R H Helmholz, ‘Western Canon Law’ in John Witte, Jr and Frank S Alexander (eds), Christianity and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 
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524 Helmholz, above n 524, 71. 
525 Doe, above n 521, 12-15. 
526 Sandberg, above n 519, 7-8. See also; Georg May, 'Ecclesiastical Law' in K Rahner, Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (T & T 
Clark, 1981) 395. 
527 For example, see the essays in José Valle and Alexander Hollerbach (eds), The Teaching of Church-State Relations in European Universities (Peeters, 
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528 Jones, above n 517, 60. See also; Norman Doe, Canon Law in the Anglican Communion: A Worldwide Perspective (Clarendon Press, 1998) 21. 
 
 
102 
 
The distinction between ecclesiastical law and canon law depends upon the relationship of the Church and the 
secular government. As a general rule, ecclesiastical law relates to the Church but is made for the Church by the 
State, canon law is made for the Church by the Church itself.
530
 More accurately perhaps, ecclesiastical law may 
be taken to include both canon law, laws made by the Church which are not canon laws such as public law,
531
 
and laws made by the State for the Church.
532
 
Furthermore, in England, the term 'ecclesiastical law' has been used to refer to the laws 'of the Church of 
England to the exclusion of all other law applicable to other churches'.
533
 The term ‘ecclesiastical law’ has been 
used by both the judiciary
534
 and legislature,
535
 in this sense. 
Hil has stated that 'the term ecclesiastical law is used to denote the law of the Church of England, howsoever 
created'.
536
 
‘English ecclesiastical law’ is ‘the law relating to any matter concerning the Church of England administration 
and enforced in any court’, ecclesiastical or temporal, and ‘law administered by ecclesiastical courts and 
persons’.537 Ecclesiastical law forms part of the general law of England, it is not foreign law.538 Formal 
ecclesiastical laws include liturgical rubrics, decrees, resolutions, Acts of Parliament, ordinances, by-laws, rules 
and regulations.
539
 Alongside the formal ecclesiastical laws of both the Anglican and Catholic churches, there 
are less formal and sometimes unwritten sources of ecclesiastical law which include decisions of Church courts, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
529 Sandberg, above n 519, 7. 
530 Thomas Glyn Watkin, ‘Vestiges of Establishment: The Ecclesiastical and Canon Law of the Church in Wales’ (1990) 2 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 110. 
531 David Parrott, Your Church and the Law: A Simple Explanation and Guide (Hymns Ancient and Modern Ltd, 2011) 8. See also; Elisabeth Zoller, 
Introduction to Public Law: A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 16; Alberto De la Hera & Charles Munier, 'Le Droit Publique 
Ecclisiastique d Travers ses Definitions' (1964) 14 Revuew De Droir Canonique 32-63; Franco E Adami, Lefonti del Diritto Patrimonio in Italia' in J I Arrieta, 
Enti Ecclesiastici E Controll Dello Stato: Studi Sull'Istruzione Cei In Materia Amministrativa (Marcianum Press, 2007) 15-46. 
‘Examples of human public law are: norms relative to the institution and rights of patriarchal sees; certain rights contained in concordats; certain norms 
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Iuris Publici Ecclesiastici (Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1958) 10-11, citing Pope St Pius X, constitution Vacante Sede Ap, 25 Dec 1904. 
The public law derives from the long history of the interaction between the Catholic Church and various forms of government ranging from the Roman Empire 
to tribal societies to feudal fiefdoms to the modern nation state.[1] It also arises from the desire of the human person to be both a faithful member of the religious 
community and a loyal citizen of the state. In light of canon law's tradition, this article identifies three broad principles that underpin the ius publicum 
ecclesiasticum about the proper relation between church and state. These are: (i) the principle of separation; (2) the principle of cooperation; and (3) the 
principle of human dignity. (Cf John J Coughlin, 'Separation, Cooperation, and Human Dignity in Church-State Relations' (2013) 73 Jurist 539.) 
See Eugino Corecco, The Theology of Canon Law: A Methodological Question (Francesco Turvasi trans., Duquense University Press, 1992) 132-133. 
532 Noel Cox, 'Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in the Church of the Province of Aotearoa, New Zealand and Polynesia' (2001) 6(2) Deakin Law Review 266–267.  
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534 See, e.g., the dicta of Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal decision in Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank (2001) EQCA Civ 713. 
535 See Welsh Church Act 1914.  
536 Hill, above n 522, 1.02. 
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customs or traditions, and ‘principles of canon law’. 'Alongside laws properly so-called, churches are regulated 
by quasi-legislation, informal administrative rules designed to supplement the formal law':
540
 ‘directions’, 
‘guidelines’, ‘codes of practice’ or ‘policy documents’.541 
The ecclesiastical law of England is as much the law of the land as any other part of the law. It is grounded in both 
common and statute law, and is altered from time to time by statute or by Measure, a form of legislation initiated by 
the Church of England but requiring Parliamentary approval.542 
Both Catholic canon law and Catholic ecclesiastical law governed, and still govern, the constitution and life of 
the Roman Catholic Church that is united under the Pope as its visible head.
543
  
However, prior to the reformation, 'canon law was the law of the ecclesiastical courts and applied by [church 
officers].’544 The doctrines that derived from ecclesiastical courts made an impact on the development of 
English ecclesiastical law.
545
  
Citing Roman canon law in the English common law courts It was prohibited during the reign of Richard II (c. 
1377-1399 A.D.) to cite Roman canon law in the English common law courts.
546
 This command was given due 
to the hostility between England and Rome during the latter part of Richard's reign because of the Court of 
Rome's exactions. However, despite England’s split from Rome, canon law still influenced the development of 
English law. George Spence, in his Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, wrote: 
Many of the titles of the canon law, such as those of buying and selling, of leasing and letting, of mortgaging and 
pledging, of giving by deed of gift, of detecting, of collusion, of murder, of theft and receiving [from] thieves, and 
others (like usury, although they are known notoriously to belong to the cognizance of the common law of this 
day),547 yet with the matters whereof they treat, were anciently in practice and allowed in bishops' courts in this land 
amongst clerks... Whether any traditional remembrance of the Roman law, which was preserved in London and other 
commercial towns, contributed to this must be left to conjecture. When we come to the reign of Henry II, we find 
that many of the Roman doctrines above averted to, particularly...letting and hiring, and of pledge, were in operation 
in the King's Court, and without being noticed as of novel introduction, from thence they became with modifications 
                                                          
540 Norman Doe, The Law of the Church in Wales (University of Wales Press, 2002) 23. 
541 Norman Doe, ‘Non-Legal Rules and the Courts: Enforceability’ (1987) 9 Liverpool Law Review 173-88. See also; Cox, above n 533, 267. 
542 Tyler v UK (1994) European Commission on Human Rights, Determination 21283/93, text published in Hill, above n 522, 77. 
543 Rahner, above n 527, 395. See also; Jones, above n 517, 24; Coriden, above n 519, 3-4. 
544 Charles P Sherman, 'A Brief History of Medieval Roman Canon Law in England' (1920) 68(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 237. 
545 Ibid 240. 
546 George Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (V and R Stevens and G S Norton, 1846) vol 1 83. See also; Sherman, above n 412, 378. 
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incorporated in the common law... We can only look to the clerical members of the King's Court or ecclesiastical 
synods, for their introduction, for the clergy presided as judges in the King's -court under the Norman sovereigns.548 
Objective standards were used within Roman law and canon law. As will be discussed further in chapter seven, 
even though human beings follow precedents, they do not do so blindly. Instead, precedents are assessed 
whether they are efficient and work within that society. The retention of these precedents in new environments 
when innovation is possible is significant. That is particularly so after the Reformation. That was surely a time 
for change and change came, but objective standards and the use of precedents that worked well, remained. 
The adoption of these precedents express the continuous use of objective standards in the legal systems assessed 
so far in this thesis. They were adopted because they enabled the judicial evaluation of human behaviour. The 
adoption of these standards was not necessary; it was voluntary, indicating that objective standards were not 
adopted due to necessity but, rather, because they were an integral part of social justice. The common use of 
objective standards to assess the conduct of the wrongdoer in all of these legal systems suggests that they were 
justified by reason
549
 and were perceived as efficient in the delivery of social justice. The point of this chapter is 
not to focus on the reception of canon law into English common law, the concern of most of the historians who 
write in this area. The objective of this chapter is to show that canon law was full of objective standards and that 
these were in place because they contributed to the recognition and delivery of social justice. The following 
section will reveal the use of objective standards in canon law focusing on laws promulgated between the third 
century and the sixteenth century.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
548 Spence, above n 547, 82. 
Even after the Reformation, Henry VIII never got around to writing a separate English canon law. That waited till the last year of the reign of his daughter 
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IV OBJECTIVE STANDARDS IN HISTORICAL CANON LAW 
This chapter will not provide a comprehensive historical account of canon law. Rather, it will briefly outline 
canon law’s use of objective standards as far back as we can trace it. This historical review will provide 
evidence that objective standards were used in judicial reasoning by canon lawyers when applying the laws of a 
secular state and within the church.  
Canon law was not static, rather it gradually evolved and solutions were sought and found as new issues 
arose.
550
 Canon law derived from a wide arrange of sources, some of which are still used in the modern canon 
law of 1983. I will now briefly survey those sources. 
From the ‘Introduction’ of the Codex Iuris Canonici (Code of Canon Law) of 1983, we have this statement: 
Subsequent laws, especially those enacted by the Council of Trent during the time of the Catholic Reformation and 
those issued later by various dicasteries of the Roman Curia, were never digested into one collection. This was the 
reason why during the course of time, legislation outside the Corpus Iuris Canonici constituted ‘an immense pile of 
laws piled on top of other laws.’ The lack of a systematic arrangement of the laws and the lack of legal certainty 
along with the obsolescence of and lacunae in many laws led to a situation where church discipline was increasingly 
imperilled and jeopardised.551 
The codification of the canon law organised church law and resolved many of the issues that arose. The issues 
examined were resolved using a faithful person standard or similar objective standard. For the purposes of this 
chapter, I will use the term ‘faithful person’ because it focuses on the Christian context within which these laws 
were developed. However, the overriding point is that canonical jurisprudence always used objective standards 
to justly resolve issues.  
 
 
 
                                                          
550 Wilfried Hartmann and  Kenneth Pennington, The History of Courts and Procedure in Medieval Canon Law (CUA Press, 2016) 239. See also; Helmholz, 
above n 518, 1-6; Clarence Gallagher, Canon Law and the Christian Community: The Role of Law in the Church According to the Summa Aurea of Cardinal 
Hostiensis (Gregorian Biblical BookShop, 1978) 21; Martin Ferdinand Morris, An Introduction to the History of the Development of Law (F B Rothman, 1909) 
224; John L Stipp,  Charles Warren Hollister and  Allen Wendell Dirrim, The Rise and Development of Western Civilization: To 1660 (Wiley, 1967) 436; Arthur 
Kline Kuhn, A Comparative Study of the Law of Corporations: With Particular Reference to the Protection of Creditors and Shareholders (The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd, 2009) 292. 
551 Code of Canon Law (11 January 2017) Vatican <http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P1.HTM>. 
 
 
106 
 
A SOURCES OF CANON LAW UP TO 1140 AD (PRE-GRATIAN CANON) 
In the previous section, I provided a brief differentiation between canon law and ecclesiastical law whilst 
identifying the important aspects of both. In this section I will examine Catholic canon law between 250 and 
1140 AD to identify its use of objective standards in some of the most difficult cases that law is called to guide 
and resolve. This assessment will focus on identifying the use of objective standards in canon law from c 250 
AD up until 1140 AD  
Until the mid-twelfth century, canonical texts were collected successively and superimposed in countless 
canonical compilations known as the pre-Gratian canon.
552
 The pre-Gratian canon was compiled and circulated 
in the west for seven centuries before the 1100’s.553 The following section lists a few sources from which canon 
law derived its laws from the third century up until the twelfth century. This section will identify objective 
standards in these sources that functioned in a manner similar to English common law’s reasonable person test. I 
will refer to the canon law’s ‘reasonable man’ as the ‘wise man’ and the ‘faithful man’ to distinguish him from 
his English descendant.  
I DIDASCALIA APOSTOLORUM 
The Didascalia Apostolorum was a ‘handbook for the churches’ which is thought to have been written in Syria c 
250 AD
554
 Its authorship is usually attributed to Jesus’ apostles, but this authorship is contested.555  
The Didascalia Apostolorum used a fictitious individual as the objective standard, called a ‘wise man’. The 
Didascalia Apostolorum outlined the characteristics of a wise man in s I.7 [20].
556
 A wise man chose things that 
were good as found in the Holy Scriptures and the Gospel of God. These sources provided him with a solid 
theological foundation and equipped him to cast away evil in order that he 'may be found blameless in life 
everlasting with God.'
557
 In other words, a wise man would go to these sources to identify the good so that he 
                                                          
552 R N Swanson, The Routledge History of Medieval Christianity: 1050-1500 (Routledge, 2015) 78. See also; Szabolcs Anzelm Szuromi, Pre-Gratian 
Medieval Canonical Collections: Texts, Manuscripts, Concepts (Frank & Timme GmbH, 2014) 11; R H Helmholz and John Hamilton Baker, The Oxford 
History of the Laws of England: The Canon law and Ecclesiastical jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford University Press, 2003) 70. 
553 Swanson, above n 553, 78. 
554 Baldwin, above n 515, 83. See also; Zuck, above n 515, 226; Fienst, above n 515, 19-20; Fahlbusch and Bromiley, above n 515, 220; Schnabel, above n 
515, 529. 
555 Evans and  Sanders, above n 516, 121. See also; Ehrman, above n 516, 344; Burrus, above n 516, 243; Connolly, above n 516, xc. 
556 [20] And that we prolong not and extend the admonition of our teaching with many (words), (p 7) if we have left anything, do you as wise men choose for 
yourselves those things that are good from the holy Scriptures and from the Gospel of God, that you may be made firm, and may put away and cast from you all 
evil, and be found blameless in life everlasting with God. 
557 Didascalia Apostolorum i.7 [20].  
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would be able to cast away evil and be firmly established in right doctrine. The ultimate objective of canon law 
of course was that he might 'be found blameless in life everlasting with God.'  
The Didascalia Apostolorum decreed that if a person did not meet the standard established for a wise man, he 
was not blameless before God. By establishing particular characteristics of a wise man, the Didascalia used this 
fictitious character to establish socially acceptable behaviour. To assess whether a person had acted wisely, a 
person was measured against the standard established for a wise man. If the person in question did not choose 
things that were good as found in the Holy Scriptures and the Gospel of God, that person was judged as being 
unwise, for he failed to act like a wise man.  
The use of objective standards in the Didascalia Apostolorum shows that canon law viewed objective standards 
as an important component for judging human behaviour.  
The following section will outline other sources of canon law that used objective standards and were 
authoritative before the compilation and incorporation of the 1917 Code of Canon Law.  
II COUNCIL OF ANCYRA 
One of the most important councils to be held after the persecutions of Christians had ceased with the death of 
Emperor Maximinus II Daia in AD 313,
558
 was the Council of Ancyra (314 AD).
559
 Between twelve and 
eighteen bishops were present at the Council of Ancyra from the various regions of Syria and Asia Minor.
560
  
The decrees of this Council used objective standards for the purposes of judicial enquiry. 
The purpose of this Council was to address the diversity of disciplinary issues that were raised by those who 
faltered, either willingly or by force, during the persecutions. The Council was summoned to pass legislation 
pertaining to the kidnapping of virgins, bestiality, celibacy, adultery, the sale of church property, and voluntary 
                                                          
558 Krzysztof Stopka, Armenia Christiana: Armenian Religious Identity and the Churches of Constantinople and Rome: 4th–15th Century (Wydawnictwo UJ, 
2016) 29. See also; Everett Ferguson, Encyclopaedia of Early Christianity (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2013) 899; Thomas Hodgkin, The Dynasty of Theodosius 
(Oxford Clarendon Press, 1889) 26. 
559 Périclès‑ Pierre Joannou, Les Canons des Synodes Particuliers (Rome-Grottaferrata, 1963) vol 2 56-73. See also; Sara Parvis, ‘The Canons of Ancyra and 
Caesarea (314): Lebon’s Thesis Revisited’ (2001) 52(2) The Journal of Theological Studies 625–36; Karl Joseph von Hefele, A History of the Councils of the 
Church: To the close of the Council of Nicea, AD 325 (T & T Clark, 1871) 199; Andrew Skotnicki, Criminal Justice and the Catholic Church (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2008) 65. 
560 H Kaufhold, ‘Griechisch-syrische Väterlisten der frühen griechischen Synoden’ (1993) 77 OrChr 1–96. See also; Ecclesiae Occidentalis monumenta iuris 
antiquissima canonum et conciliorum interpretationes latine, ed C H Turner (Oxford, 1899–1907) 2.32, 50, 51; Hamilton Hess, The Early Development of 
Canon Law and the Council of Serdica (Oxford University Press, 2002) 45; Christian Cochini, Apostolic Origins of Priestly Celibacy (Ignatius Press, 1990) 169 
and Franz Xaver von Funk, Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum (Paderborn 1905, reprint Turin 1964) 17. 
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and involuntary homicide.
561
 For the purpose of consistency, this chapter will focus on the crime of homicide. 
This is because Jewish law and ancient Athenian law also used objective standards to assess the issue of 
homicide. As in Jewish law and Athenian law, canon law used objective standards to differentiate between 
voluntary and involuntary homicide.  
Nearly all of these canons were implemented to provide a uniform set of disciplinary measures that were clearly 
defined and rigorous. These canons were applied broadly to the regions of Syria and Asia Minor.
562
  
A COUNCIL OF ANCYRA AND HOMICIDE 
If the wrongdoer was convicted of voluntary homicide by a church court, he was admitted to communion only at 
the end of his life. However, if he was convicted of involuntary homicide, he was admitted to communion after 
he had served the shorter penance of five years.
563
  
Canon 22 of the Council of Ancyra 
Concerning wilful murderers let them remain prostrators, but at the end of life let them be indulged with full 
communion. 
Canon 23 of the Council of Ancyra  
Concerning involuntary homicides, a former decree directs that they be received to full communion after seven years 
[of penance], according to the prescribed degrees, but this second one, that they fulfil a term of five years.
564
 
The canons above do not identify the circumstances that place the guilt of voluntary or involuntary homicide on 
the accused wrongdoer. Rather, the canons specify the ecclesiastical punishment given upon conviction. 
However, the writings of authoritative individuals such as St Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa (394 CE),
565
 reveal 
                                                          
561 Wilfried Hartmann and  Kenneth Pennington, The History of Byzantine and Eastern Canon Law to 1500 (CUA Press, 2012) 18. See also; Eve Levin, Sex 
and Society in the World of the Orthodox Slavs: 900-1700 (Cornell University Press, 1995) 205; William Smith and  Samuel Cheetham, A Dictionary of 
Christian Antiquities: Comprising the History, Institutions and Antiquities of the Christian Church, from the Time of the Apostles to the Age of Charlemagne 
(Murray, 1875) vol 1 781; John A Allan, The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians Cambridge University Press, 1911) 97; Souad Abou el-Rousse Slim, 
The Greek Orthodox Waqf in Lebanon During the Ottoman Period (Ergon Verlag, 2007) 49. 
562 Hartmann and  Pennington, above n 562, 18. See also; Levin, above n 562, 205; Otto Friedrich August Meinardus, Two Thousand Years of Coptic 
Christianity (American University in Cairo Press, 2002) 47; Leo Donald Davis, The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology 
(Liturgical Press, 1983) 23. 
563 Hartmann and  Pennington, above n 562, 19. 
564 Translated by Henry Percival from Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: Socrates, 
Sozomenus (Christian Literature Publishing Co, 2nd ed, 1900) vol 14. 
565 Matthew Levering, On Prayer and Contemplation: Classic and Contemporary Texts (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 19. See also; Matthew Levering, On 
Marriage and Family: Classic and Contemporary Texts (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 37; Nicolas Laos, The Metaphysics of World Order: A Synthesis of 
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circumstances that differentiate between voluntary and involuntary homicide. Identifying these distinguishing 
circumstances highlights the concept of reasonableness and its presence in canonical jurisprudence. The 
Apostolic Canons, discussed in the next section, provide canons that dealt with the issue of homicide whilst 
incorporating the writings of St Gregory and St Basil (330 - 379 AD),
566
 the bishop of Caesarea Mazaca in 
Cappadocia, Asia Minor.
567
 The canons in the Apostolic Canons provide context as to the cultural perception of 
homicide and intent as derived from the circumstances. In other words, they demonstrate how the Apostolic 
Canons differentiated between voluntary and involuntary homicide, which assists in understanding Canons 22 
and 23 of the Council of Ancyra.  
The wilful use of deadly force under a specific set of circumstances may be reasonable, but it still constituted 
involuntary homicide if a life was lost in the process. However, if the act perpetuated by the accused was 
considered unreasonable under the circumstances, the person accused was convicted of voluntary homicide 
rather than involuntary homicide.  
Though a person was not acquitted of all guilt, objective standards were used to distinguish between voluntary 
and involuntary homicide and these standards were preserved in the Canones Ecclesiastici Apostolorum, 
otherwise translated as the Ecclesiastical Canons of the Apostles (the ‘Apostolic Canons’).568 In the following 
section, I use the writings of St Basil to explain why a person was still guilty of involuntary homicide even if the 
use of deadly force was justified and why he was still required to undergo obligatory penance.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Philosophy, Theology, and Politics (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2015) 20; Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian 
Doctrine (Baker Academic, 2011) 157; Phyllis G Jestice, Holy People of the World: A Cross-cultural Encyclopaedia (ABC-CLIO, 2004) 326. 
566 Matthew Bunson, A Dictionary of the Roman Empire (Oxford University Press, 1991) 51. See also; George Dion Dragas, Ecclesiasticus I: Introducing 
Eastern Orthodoxy (Orthodox Research Institute, 2004) 80. 
567 Palladius and  Dom Cuthbert Butler (eds), The Lausiac History of Palladius (Cambridge University Press, 2014) vol 1 118. See also; Henry Chadwick, The 
Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory the Great (OUP Oxford, 2001) 331. 
568 Lawrence J Johnson, Worship in the Early Church: An Anthology of Historical Sources (Liturgical Press, 2009) vol 1 266. See also; Cochini, above n 561, 
203. 
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III THE APOSTOLIC CANONS 
The text known as the Apostolic Canons (c. fourth - fifth century AD)
569
 was a collection of 85 ecclesiastical 
canons relating to the government and discipline of the Church.
570
  
The canons in this document were written as conciliar canons that reflected the decisions of the Council of 
Antioch (241 AD), Laodicea (late fourth century AD), Ancyra (314 AD), Nerocaesera (319 AD), and Nicaea 
(325 AD).
571
 
A THE APOSTOLIC CANONS AND HOMICIDE 
Canon 66 of the Apostolic Canon states: 
If any Clergyman strikes anyone in a fight, and kills by a single blow, let him be deposed for his insolence. But if he 
is a layman, let him be excommunicated.572  
Canon 66 relied upon Canon XCI of the 6th Ecumenical Synod, Canons XXI, XXII, XXIII of Ancyra, 
Athanasios in his Epistles, Canons II, VIII, XI, XIII, XXXIII, XLIII, LII, LIV, LVI, LVII of Basil and Canon V 
Gregory of Nyssa in its assessment of fault.
573
  
Canon 66 did not outline whether the use of deadly force constituted voluntary or involuntary homicide. 
However, Canon VIII of St Basil did, one of the sources from which this canon was derived.  
Canon VIII of St Basil the Great identified two circumstances that help identify the presence of malicious intent 
in the homicide under consideration. The first circumstance occurred when the wrongdoer wilfully and 
intentionally killed the victim, whilst the second circumstance occurred when a personal wilfully, although 
unintentionally, killed the victim. Thus, involuntary homicide was an act that was neither intentional nor wilful, 
such as throwing a stone at a tree but then consequently hitting a man and killing him.  
                                                          
569 Szuromi, above n 553, 15. See also; Richard Price and  Michael Gaddis, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon (Liverpool University Press, 2005) vol 1 94; 
Ken Parry, The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity (John Wiley & Sons, 2010) 80. 
570 Desiderius Erasmus, Controversies (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 132. See also; Alvin Boyd Kuhn, Who Is This King of Glory?: A Critical Study of 
the Christos-Messiah Tradition (Book Tree, 2007) 157; Dorothea McEwan, The Story of Däräsge Maryam (LIT Verlag Münster, 2013) 63; Joseph Wheless, 
Forgery in Christianity (Cosimo Inc, 2007) 241; Hess, above n 561, 49; Szuromi, above n 553, 15; Price and  Gaddis, above n 570, 94; Parry, above n 570, 80. 
571 Cochini, above n 561, 310. See also; F J E Boddens Hosang, Establishing Boundaries: Christian-Jewish Relations in Early Council Texts and the Writings 
of Church Fathers (BRILL, 2010) 119; Bruno Steimer, Vertex Traditionis: Die Gattung der altchristlichen Kirchenordnun-gen (De Gruyter, 1992) 88; Claudio 
Moreschini and Enrico Norelli, Early Christian Greek and Latin Literature: A Literary History. Volume One: From Paul to the Age of Constantine 
(Hendrickson Publishers, 2005) vol 2 196; Angelo Di Berardino, Patrology: The Easten Fathers from the Council of Chalcedon to John of Damascus (J Clarke, 
2006) 658. 
572 Apostolic Canon 66. 
573 Orthodox Christian Education Society, The Rudder (Pedalion, 8th ed, 2005) 205. 
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Canon VIII of St Basil reads: 
He that kills another with a sword, or hurls an axe at his own wife and kills her, is guilty of wilful homicide, not he 
who throws a stone at a dog, and undesignedly kills a man, or who corrects one with a rod, or scourge, in order to 
reform him, or who kills a man in his own defence, when he only designed to hurt him. But the man, or woman, is a 
[murderer if he or she] gives a philtrum,574 [and] the man that takes it dies …, so are they who take medicines to 
procure abortion, and so are they who kill on the highway. 
The element of the will, or intent, was an essential element for the wrongdoer to be guilty of voluntary 
homicide. St Gregory of Nyssa also subscribed to this view. St Gregory’s version may be seen in his canonical 
letter addressed to St Letoius, Bishop of Melitene written in c 390 AD
575
 He wrote '[t]here [is] a lot of depravity, 
fury and rage. The worst of all is the homicide, which is divided into wilful and unintentional.'
576
  
The defences outlined in Canon VIII relied on objective standards. St Basil said that no intention was imputed if 
a stone was thrown at a dog but accidentally killed a man, nor if a man was killed during the course of 
punishment for misconduct when it was only intended for the punishment to hurt the wrongdoer. Under these 
circumstances, a person was not guilty of voluntary homicide because it was inferred that he did not possess 
malicious intent.  
 
The objective standard is there because a faithful person who threw a stone at a dog would not expect that 
someone, let alone a specific person, would die in consequence. The accused was measured against an external 
standard to decide whether he manifested guilty intent or premeditation. Though the faithful person standard is 
not mentioned in this reasoning, the reasoning relied on an objective standard all the same.  
 
Objective standards identified by reason were used to identify intent which helped distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary homicide. Because it was not reasonable to treat all those who kill, intentionally and 
unintentionally, in the same way, canon law asked whether the faithful person would have killed in this case. If 
he would have, then there was either no crime or it attracted less moral turpitude.  
                                                          
574 Philtrum in ancient Latin was a love potion. 
575 Saint John of Damascus, The Fathers of the Church: St John of Damascus - Writings (Federic H Chase, Jr (trans), CUA Press, 2010) vol 37 136 fn 57. 
576 Borislav Grozdić and Ilija Kajtez, 'Attitude to Murder in the Canons of the Orthodox Church' (2013) 16(33) Defendologija 37. 
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Canons 22 and 23 of the Council of Ancyra and Canon 66 of the Apostolic Canon distinguished between 
voluntary and involuntary homicide based upon the intent of the alleged wrongdoer. The intent of the accused 
was inferred by the circumstances.  
St Basil and St Gregory agreed that intent was the decisive factor in determining the guilt of the accused 
wrongdoer. Both men acknowledged that circumstances help identify the existence, or non-existence, of 
malicious intent. Objective standards were used to determine the wrongdoer’s intent. St Basil assumed that if a 
faithful person threw a stone at a dog and consequently killed a man, a faithful person would not possess 
malicious intent. That is, a faithful person in those circumstances would not have intended to kill the victim. 
Therefore, neither did the alleged wrongdoer. If, under the circumstances, it was unlikely that a person 
possessed malicious intent, he was vindicated from the charge of voluntary homicide. However, he was still 
guilty of involuntary homicide.  
St Basil used four scenarios to determine whether intent to kill existed. If a person used similar force under these 
circumstances, he would not be guilty of voluntary homicide since a faithful person would not have possessed ill 
intent. The four circumstances are as follows. Firstly, if a person threw a stone at a dog and accidentally struck 
the victim, killing him; secondly, if he killed the victim in the course of chastisement; thirdly, when he killed 
another man in self-defence; and fourthly when he killed the victim during war.577  
According to St Basil's interpretation of the canon law at the end of the fourth century, taking the life of another 
human being in any of the four circumstances did not constitute voluntary homicide. However, the wrongdoer 
was guilty of involuntary homicide, even if he was acquitted of voluntary homicide and his actions were 
reasonable under the circumstances. The punishment for involuntary homicide was obligatory penance. As 
Belgian canonist
578
 Zeger Bernhard van Espen (1646 - 1728 AD)
579
 wrote:  
Of voluntary and involuntary homicides St Basil treats at length in his Canonical Epistle ad Amphilochium, canons 
viii, lvi and lvii, and fixes the time of penance at twenty years for voluntary and ten580 years for involuntary 
                                                          
577 Canon VIII of St Basil the Great. See Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Second Series - Volume XIV the Seven Ecumenical Councils (Cosimo 
Incorporation, 2007) vol 14 605. See also; Philip Schaff and  Henry Wace, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: 
Socrates, Sozomenus (Christian literature Company, 1900) 605; Semegnish Asfaw,  Guillermo Kerber and  Peter Weiderud, The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical 
and Theological Reflections (World Council of Churches, 2005) 38; David Churchman, Why We Fight: The Origins, Nature, and Management of Human 
Conflict (University Press of America, 2013) 188. 
578 Owen Chadwick, The Popes and European Revolution (Clarendon Press, 1980) 404. 
579 Samuel J Miller, Portugal and Rome C. 1748-1830: An Aspect of the Catholic Enlightenment (Gregorian Biblical BookShop, 1978) 5. 
580 However, in Canon XI of St Basil’s first canonical Epistle to Amphilochius, Bishop of Iconium (339-394 AD), Basil proclaimed that a man guilty of 
involuntary murder must perform 11 years for penance: 
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homicides. It is evident that the penance given for this crime varied in different churches, although it is clear from 
the great length of the penance, how enormous the crime was considered, no light or short penance being 
sufficient.581  
Possessing right intent and a proper disposition of love was not sufficient to remove the guilt of involuntary 
homicide because there was a spiritual danger of being involved in taking away human life, even if it was 
involuntary. Canon law not only required repentance for voluntary homicide that occurred during an 
altercation,
582
 but also for taking a life during a just war.
583
 Every human life had to be acknowledged and paid 
for. To require no penance was to diminish or extinguish the value of human life.  
A footnote commenting on Canon 66 of the Apostolic Canon, referenced above, provided the reason why 
penance must be performed even though deadly forced was used when killing a robber to defend property, in 
accordance with the command given by a Christian emperor:
584
  
But whosoever after being many times begged to do so goes forth and searches and finds a thief and puts him to 
death for the sake of the common interest of the public at large, he is to be deemed to deserve rewards. Nevertheless, 
for safety's sake, it has been found to be reasonable that he too should be penalised for three years.585 
St Gregory's canon also required the act of penance of those guilty of involuntary homicide ‘through failure to 
pay attention to the situation’.586 
Canon 66 of the Apostolic Canon outlined the objective standard that enforced objective reasonableness. If a 
person behaved reasonably under the circumstances, his guilt was reduced, but not extinguished. A life had still 
been lost, and a human life should never be lost.
587
 The notion of ‘reasonableness’ was determined by how a 
faithful person would act in those circumstances. For instance, if a faithful person would have used deadly force 
under specific circumstances, then a person’s guilt was reduced for acting in a similar manner. However, canon 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
He that is guilty of involuntary murder, shall do eleven years' penance--that is, if the murdered person, after he had here received the wound, do again go abroad, 
and yet afterward die of the wound. [Cf Schaff, above n 578, 605.] 
581 Cf ibid 74. 
582 See Canon 66 of the Apostolic Canons in Sts. Nicodemus and Agapius, The Rudder of the Orthodox Catholic Church (D Cummings trans, Luna Printing, 
1983) 113-117. 
583 See 'The Canons of St Basil the Great' in The Rudder of the Orthodox Catholic Church (D Cummings trans, Luna Printing, 1983) Canon 13 801-802. 
584 Hugo Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Taylor & Francis, 2000) 321. 
585 See 'The Canons of St. Basil the Great' in The Rudder of the Orthodox Catholic Church (D Cummings trans., Luna Printing, 1983) 116. 
586 'The Canons of St. Gregory of Nyssa' in The Rudder of the Orthodox Catholic Church (D Cummings trans., Luna Printing, 1983) Canon 5 874. 
587 The taint here analogous to the Mosaic rules that held people ritually unclean for seven day if they had come in contact with the dead. See Numbers 19:11, 
14 and Numbers 9:6. See also; Christine E Hayes, Gentile Impurities and Jewish Identities: Intermarriage and Conversion from the Bible to the Talmud (Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 38. 
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law held a person guilty of voluntary homicide if he deviated from this objective standard influenced by Judeo-
Christian doctrines.
588
  
As the Canons of St Basil formed part of the foundation of Canon 66 of the Apostolic Canon, and objective 
standards helped explain the difference between voluntary and involuntary homicide to lay people, that 
distinction and objective explanation were carried forward into the Apostolic Canons.  
Canon law recognised that there was less culpability if the wrongdoer used deadly force for the purposes of 
warfare, self-defence and in situations where the victim’s death was an unforeseen consequence of the 
wrongdoer’s actions. Therefore, canon law reduced guilt. Culpability was reduced under these circumstances 
when compared to situations when homicide was private and premeditated. Canon law inferred that a person did 
not possess malicious intent if he used deadly force in warfare, self-defence and where the victim’s death was an 
unforeseen consequence of the wrongdoer’s actions, since a faithful person in those circumstances would not act 
maliciously.    
IV CORPUS JURIS CANONICI (BODY OF CANON LAW) 
The second part of the Corpus Juris Canonici was composed of the decisions of Pope Gregory IX on matters 
that were referred to him from all parts of Europe. This document was called both the Decretals of Gregory IX 
and the Gratian Decretum because it was compiled by a Benedictine monk
589
 named Johannes Gratian. It is also 
collectively called the Liber Extra.
590
  
Around 1140 – 1150 AD,591 Gratian published his Concordia discordantium Canonim (known historically as the 
Decretum Gratiani) at the University of Bologna.
592
 The Decretum Gratiani was a collection of canon law.
593
 
                                                          
588 Decretales Gregorii IX, Book V Chapter III. See also; William M Gordon and T D Fergus, Legal History in the Making: Proceedings of the Ninth British 
Legal History Conference (A&C Black, 1991) 58; Institute of Jewish Law Staff, The Jewish Law Annual (Taylor & Francis, 1991) 44-45; John J McGrath, 
Comparative Study of Crime and Its Imputability in Ecclesiastical Criminal Law and American Criminal Law (Catholic University of American Press, 1957) 
61-64; Stanislaus Woywod, A Practical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law (JF Wagner, 1957) 603; David Urquhart, Effect on the World of the Restoration 
of the Canon Law: Being a Vindication of the Catholic Church Against a Priest (Diplomatic Review Office, 1869) 14. 
589 E Michael Gerli, Medieval Iberia: An Encyclopedia (Routledge, 2013) 467. See also; Frederik Pedersen, Marriage Disputes in Medieval England (A&C 
Black, 2000) 1; Herbermann, above n 378, 730. 
590 Edward Smedley,  Hugh James Rose and  Henry John Rose, Encyclopaedia Metropolitana (B Fellowes, 1845) 787. See also; John Godfrey, The Church In 
Anglo Saxon England (Cambridge University Press, 1962) 430; William of Ockham and Arthur Stephen McGrade, William of Ockham: A Short Discourse on 
Tyrannical Government (Cambridge University Press, 1992) xii; Brundage, above n 455, 196; John W Cairns, Creation of the Ius Commune: From Casus to 
Regula (Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 43; Walter A Shumaker and  George Foster Longsdorf, The Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law (Keefe-Davidson Law Co, 
1901) 262. 
591 Szabolcs Anzelm Szuromi, From a Reading Book to a Structuralized Canonical Collection: The Textual Development of the Ivonian Work (Frank & Timme 
GmbH, 2010) 59. See also; Rosamond McKitterick, The New Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 128; M V Dougherty, Moral 
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This version of the Corpus Juris Canonici was used by Canonists of the Roman Catholic Church until Pentecost 
of the 19
th
 May 1918.
594
 The Code of Canon Law (Codex Iuris Canonici) promulgated by Pope Benedict XV on 
27 May 1917 replaced the former Corpus Juris Canonici.
595
 
A DECRETUM GRATIANI  
The Decretum Gratiani forms the first part of the collection of five legal texts, which together became known as 
the Corpus Juris Canonici.
596
 This consolidated all previous papal legislation down to the year 1139.
597
 
However, Gratian’s Decretum was a private collection and was never officially enacted. Nonetheless, it quickly 
became one of the most authoritative legal compilations in the field of canon law.
598
  
I THE ‘HOMO CONSTANTISSIMUS’ 
An objective test, like English common law’s reasonable person test, was used599 in the Decretum Gratiani in 
the form of the homo constantissimus – the ‘most constant man’ or the homo diligens – the diligent (or constant) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 13; Natalie Gawdiak and Jolande Goldberg, Library of Congress 
Law Library: An Illustrated Guide (Government Printing Office, 2005) 41. 
592 Rebecca Rist, The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245 (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009) 122. See also; Elizabeth Goldring,  Jayne Elisabeth Archer 
and  Clarke, above n 437, 189; Robert Benedetto and  James O Duke, The New Westminster Dictionary of Church History: The Early, Medieval, and 
Reformation Eras (Westminster John Knox Press, 2008) 276.  
593 Gawdiak and Goldberg, above n 592, 43. See also; Gallagher, above n 551, 50; John Doran and  Damian J Smith, Pope Innocent II (1130-43): The World 
Vs. the City (Routledge, 2016) 276; Christopher Kleinhenz, Medieval Italy: An Encyclopedia (Routledge, 2004) 618. 
594 John Morris Jones, The World Book Encyclopaedia (Quarrie Corporation, 1947) vol 3 1216. See also;  Joseph Pope, One Hundred and Twenty-Five 
Manuscripts: Bergendal Collection Catalogue (Brabant Holdings, 1999) 51; Jill Kraye, Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997) vol 2 65; Gallagher, above n 551, 47; August Franzen, A Concise History of the Church (Burns & Oates, 1969) 216. 
595 Robert Louis Benson, Bishop-Elect: A Study in Medieval Ecclesiastical Office (Princeton University Press, 2015) 6. See also; John C Greider, The English 
Bible Translations and History (Xlibris Corporation, 2013) 189; Samuel Macauley Jackson,  Schaff-Herzog and  Lefferts Augustine Loetscher, The New Schaff-
Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (Baker Book House, 1984) 125; Ian Hill Nish and Charles James Dunn, European Studies on Japan (Paul 
Norbury Publications, 1979) 328; Benedetto and Duke, above n 593, 120. 
596 Kulwant Singh Boora, Baptism in the Name of Jesus (Acts 2: 38) from Jerusalem to Great Britain (Author House, 2011) 63. See also; Maria Eriksson, 
Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States Under International Law? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 41; Mauro Cappelletti,  John Henry Merryman 
and Joseph M Perillo, The Italian Legal System: An Introduction (Stanford University Press, 1967) 24; Suri Ratnapala, Jurisprudence (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 151; Julia Schwendinger and Herman Schwendinger, Rape and Inequelity (SAGE Publications Incorporated, 1983) 102. 
597 John Henry Wigmore,  Ernst Freund and  William Ephraim Mikell, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (Little and Brown, 1908) vol 2 258. See 
also; Sir William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Methuen, 7th ed, 1956) 582; Thomas N Bisson, Cultures of Power: Lordship, Status, and 
Process in Twelfth-Century Europe (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995) 173; Guy Carleton Lee, Historical Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the 
Systematic Study of the Development of Law (Macmillan, 1900) 333. 
598 Serge Dauchy et al, The Formation and Transmission of Western Legal Culture: 150 Books that Made the Law in the Age of Printing (Springer, 2016) 21. 
See also; R C Mortimer, Western Canon Law (University of California Press, 1954) 51; Matthew Bunson and  Margaret Bunson, Our Sunday Visitor's 
Encyclopedia of Catholic History (Our Sunday Visitor Pufblishing, 2004) 180; George Huntston Williams,  Rodney Lawrence Petersen and  Calvin Augustine 
Pater, The Contentious Triangle: Church, State, and University (Truman State Univ Press, 1999) 119 and Matthew Bunson, The Catholic Almanac's Guide to 
the Church (Our Sunday Visitor Publishing, 2001) 145. 
599 Some have argued that Roman law influenced canon law, therefore; the homo constantissimus was received into canon law. This thesis will not answer 
whether or not, or to what extent, Roman law influenced canon law. See James A Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (University of 
Chicago Press, 2009) 345. 
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man.
600
 The homo constantissimus was used in cases of duress to assess whether the victim was coerced.
601
 
Canon law took into consideration the age, gender, and status of the complainant.
602
 In order for duress to be 
inferred, the act must be one that would affect even the ‘most constant man’ (homo constantissimus).603 This 
hybrid standard was also used to assess the validity of a marriage.
604
 A marriage was invalid if a homo 
constantissimus, in the victim’s circumstances, would have consented to marry due to fear or irresistible 
force.
605
 
Whilst the homo constantissimus was not purely objective, it still possessed an objective element which enabled 
the evaluation of human behaviour. Again, objective standards allowed flexibility because they assessed what 
the objective man would do in different circumstances. The use of objective standards enabled the assessment of 
duress in marriage arrangements. If purely subjective standards were applied, citizens might have been bound by 
this sacrament.
606
. Because this person went through the act, he was bound despite his intent. Subjective 
standards were used to take into consideration the personal idiosyncrasies of the victim.  
A second decretal of Pope Alexander III (1159-1181 AD),
607
 Veniens ad nos, responded to the concern of 
marriage that occurred through duress.
608
 Veniens ad nos legislated the remedy for coerced marriages by 
declaring that marriages of this nature were invalid. If the court declared that the homo constantissimus, under 
the same circumstances, would have consented to marriage out of fear, the court would declare that this 
                                                          
600 Decock, above n 454, 187. See also; Hartmann and  Pennington, above n 551, 15; Luigi Romeo, Ecce Homo: A Lexicon of Man (John Benjamins 
Publishing, 1979) 28; Dubber and  Hörnle, above n 25, 206; Kenneth Pennington, ‘Moderamen Inculpatae Tutelae: The Jurisprudence of a Justifiable Defense’ 
(2013) 24 Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune 35. 
601 Liber Extra X 1.40.4 and 4.1.28. See also; Mia Korpiola, Nordic Perspectives on Medieval Canon Law (Matthias Calonius Society, 1999) 140; Charles 
Donahue Jr, Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages: Arguments about Marriage in Five Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 22; 
Helmholz, above n 455, 309. 
602 Brundage, above n 455, 167. See also; Charles J Reid, Power Over the Body, Equality in the Family: Rights and Domestic Relations in Medieval Canon 
Law (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 2004) 68. 
603 Metum autem (D 4.2.6). See also; Gratian, Decretum C.15 q.6 cc.1; Alexander III in X. 4.1.15; Decock, above n 454, 187 ; Gratian and James Gordley 
(eds), The Treatise on Laws (Decretum DD. 1-20) with the Ordinary Gloss (CUA Press, 1993) vol 2 18; Alberto Ferreiro and Jeffrey Burton Russell, The Devil, 
Heresy and Witchcraft in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Jefferey B Russell (BRILL, 1998) 138. Some scholars have suggested that the criterion of the 
‘most constant man’ (homo constantissimus) is a reflection of the Roman attitude towards the central virtue of constancy (constantia) See; Zimmermann, above 
n 404, 653. 
604 Reid, above n 603, 76. See also; Eve Salisbury,  Georgiana Donavin and  Merrall Llewelyn Price, Domestic Violence in Medieval Texts (University Press of 
Florida, 2002) 62; Helmholz and  Baker, above n 553, 544; Helmholz, above n 518, 253; R H Helmholz, Canon Law and the Law of England (Hambledon 
Press, 1987) vol 1 152. 
605 Reid, above n 603, 76. See also; Judith M Bennett and  Ruth Mazo Karras, The Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender in Medieval Europe (OUP Oxford, 
2013) 167; Franklin, above n 84, 63; John Thomas Noonan Jr, Bribes (University of California Press, 1987) 197; Brundage, above n 455, 166. 
606 In a Christian context. 
607 Joseph F O'Callaghan,  Donald J Kagay and  Theresa M Vann, On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F O'Callaghan 
(BRILL, 1998) 17. See also; Edward J Olszewski, Cardinal Pietro Ottoboni (1667-1740) and the Vatican Tomb of Pope Alexander VIII (American 
Philosophical Society, 2004) vol 252 118; Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 5th ed, 
2001) 115; Beal,  Coriden and Green, above n 517, 1361.  
608 Papal Decretal of Alexander II X 9.1.15. 
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matrimonial arrangement was invalid. These are cases where the lack of consent was hidden because of external 
factors not observable at the ceremony.  
John Noonan
609
 stated that 'a ‘steady man’ [homo constantissimus] was a fictional man of average fortitude who 
served in fear cases much as a ‘prudent man’. [This man, also referred to as the] reasonable person, is used to 
measure negligence in modern tort law.'
610
 The hypothetical homo constantissimus was taken to be the ideal 
legal agent, a reasonable person who would not be moved by frolicsome concerns.
611
  
The concept of the homo constantissimus was also found in the canon law document Glossa Ordinaria (twelfth 
century AD)
612
 to determine the validity of a marriage.
613
  
The Glossa Ordinaria was a collection of biblical commentary which was the foundation of canon law.
614
 Cino 
da Pistoia (1270 – 1336 CE),615 Italian jurist,616 described the Glossa Ordinaria as 'the idol of the law.'617 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
609 Senior United States federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Ohio. Secretary of State, Official Roster, Federal, State, 
County Officers and Departmental Information (The Secretary, 1989) 17. See also; Kamla J King, Kamla King Hedges and Judith A Miller, BNA's Directory of 
State and Federal Courts, Judges, and Clerks (Bureau of National Affairs, 1992) 4. 
610 John T Noonan Jr, ‘The Steady Man: Process and Policy in the Courts of the Roman Curia’ (1970) 58 California Law Review 654 (emphasis mine). The 
'steady man' test was extended explicitly to women in Honorius Ill's Decretal Consultatitmi Tulle X 4.1.28. See also; Reid, above n 603, 76. 
611 Salisbury,  Donavin and  Price, above n 605, 62. 
612 Albrecht Classen, Handbook of Medieval Studies: Terms, Methods and Trends (Walter de Gruyter, 2011) 138. See also; Franklin Harkins and Aaron Canty, 
A Companion to Job in the Middle Ages (BRILL, 2016) 101; Nancy Van Deusen, The Cultural Context of Medieval Music (ABC-CLIO, 2011) 41; R Ward 
Holder, A Companion to Paul in the Reformation (BRILL, 2009) 24. 
613 X 4.1.14–15 and 29. The Latin phrase is ‘metus qui cadere potest in constantem virum’ (the fear that can fall upon a constant man). See also; Pedersen, 
above n 590, 3; Richard H Helmholz, 'Baptism in the Medieval Canon Law' (2013) 21 Rechtsgeschichte 120; David Sereno, Whether the Norm Expressed in 
Canon 1103 is of Natural Law or of Positive Church Law (Gregorian Biblical BookShop, 1997) 65; Thomas Sanchez, De Matriminio 1.4.D.13; Patrick 
McKinley Brennan, The Vocation of the Child (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 2008) 259. 
614 Allan Fitzgerald and  John C Cavadini, Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopaedia (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing, 1999) 383. See also; Kleinhenz, 
above n 594, 434; David A Solomon, An Introduction to the 'Glossa Ordinaria' as Medieval Hypertext (University of Wales Press, 2012) 11; James A 
Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians, and Courts (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 119. 
615 Christian Emden,  Catherine Keen and  David R Midgley, Imagining the City (Peter Lang, 2006) vol 2 80. See also; Decock, above n 454, 277; Brundage, 
above n 600, 444. 
616 Trevor Dean and  Chris Wickham, City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Essays Presented to Philip Jones (A&C Black, 1990) 22. 
See also; Peter Brand and  Lino Pertile, The Cambridge History of Italian Literature (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 25; Joseph Reese Strayer, Dictionary of 
the Middle Ages (Scribner, 1989) vol 3 397; Richard K Emmerson, Key Figures in Medieval Europe: An Encyclopaedia (Routledge, 2013) 142. 
617 Baldus, Consiliorum Sive Responorum 5.169 vol 5 at 45va. See also; Cino da Pistoia, Commentaria de Codicem 4.10.1; Petrus Lenauderius, De Privilegiis 
Doctorum 4.42.64 at 13rb, Woldemar Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt de Recbtskultur in Italien (Leipzig, 1938) 189-204; Brundage, above n 615, 119. 
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V CONCLUSION 
This chapter has identified canon law’s use of objective standards in judicial reason in cases of homicide and 
marriage, to differentiate intentional human behaviour from that which was unintentional.  
The Didascalia Apostolorum used objective standards to govern church organisation, finance and church 
discipline. The wise man standard outlined in the Didascalia, established socially acceptable conduct. Canon 
law assessed whether a person acted wisely if they acted like a wise man in his position.  
The decrees of the Council of Ancyra used objective standards for the purposes of judicial enquiry. This Council 
was summoned to pass legislation condemning the kidnapping of virgins, bestiality, celibacy, sorcery and 
divinization marriage, adultery, the sale of church property, and voluntary and involuntary homicide. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I focused on the decrees given for homicide in Canons 22 and 23 of the Council. Laws 
relating to homicide were also found in Canon 66 of the Apostolic Canon. These laws used objective standards 
because they copied St Basil’s eighth canon. 
Although these canons did not identify the circumstances that place the conviction of voluntary homicide or 
involuntary homicide upon the alleged wrongdoer, the writings of St Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa and St Basil the 
Great, did.  
An assessment of these writings provided the conclusion that, Canons 22 and 23 of the Council of Ancyra 
distinguished between voluntary and involuntary homicide based upon the will of the wrongdoer. Circumstances 
were the deciding factor in allowing canon law jurists to assess the element of intent. St Basil provided 
numerous examples.  
The homo constantissimus – the ‘most constant man,’ was used in Decretum Gratiani and functioned like 
English common law’s reasonable person. The homo constantissimus was used to assess whether the person in 
question was a victim of duress. This standard was also used to assess the validity of a marriage. This objective 
standard also used in the twelfth century in Pope Alexander III’s second decretal, Veniens ad nos, in the Glossa 
Ordinaria and in the Decretals of Gregory IX. This study of canon law contributes to this thesis by showing that 
canon law used objective standards as part of its judicial procedures and judicial reasoning. As in Jewish law, 
Athenian law and Roman law, canon law used objective standards to judge human behaviour because objective 
standards resonated with human reason. 
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The following chapter will review the English common law legal system to identify the way in which English 
common law jurists used objective standards as the basis for their assessment of human conduct. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
THE REASONABLE PERSON IN ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I will explain how English common law used objective standards to determine liability and guilt 
in civil and criminal cases. By identifying the use of objective standards in English common law, I will have 
shown that objective standards were used in English common law, Jewish law, Athenian law, Roman law and 
canon law. The continued and universal use of objective standards and the lack of alternative approaches to 
examine human behaviour suggests that human reason needs to use objective standards to judge human conduct 
to perpetuate the idea that a given legal system is just. 
 
English common law’s reasonable person test will be used to demonstrate that the legal philosophy of this 
particular legal system used objective standards. The defendant was required to meet the objective standards 
established for the reasonable person to negate all criminal culpability. My purpose in examining the philosophy 
of various civilizations for such standards is to establish whether objective standards like the reasonable person 
are universal.  
 
The expression, ‘common law,’ is used in various senses. It is used to distinguish itself from statute law, the law 
of equity and from civil law.
618
 I use the term ‘common law’ to distinguish itself from civil law. I will focus 
primarily upon English common law; however, I will provide various examples of the reasonable person test in 
other common law jurisdictions. I will not inquire how English common law came to be introduced and adopted. 
I am only going to trace the development of the reasonable man idea after 1700 A.D. However, I will also 
provide examples where objective standards were used prior to the eighteenth century to demonstrate that 
objective standards did not just appear fully developed after 1700 A.D.  
 
This chapter will begin by explaining what this common law is. I will then provide examples of objective 
standards being used before the eighteenth century in English law’s earliest creeds, the laws of Ethelbert (600 
                                                          
618 Theodore F T Plucknett and Roscoe Pound, Readings on the History and System of the Common Law (Lawyers Co-operative Publication Corporation, 3rd 
ed, 1927) 44. 
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A.D.), the laws of Ine (c. 690 A.D.) and the laws of Alfred (892 – 893 A.D.). However, I will concentrate on 
assessing the use of objective standards post 1700 A.D. for convenience sake.   
Following this section is a brief historic overview of the origin of the reasonable person in English civil law and 
criminal law. In this discussion, I identify that ‘the reasonable man ... is a person having the power of self-
control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the [defendant], but in other respects sharing 
such of the [defendant’s] characteristics.’619 This man was used as the objective standard by which the 
defendant’s conduct was examined.  
 
However, the reasonable person was not always used as a hybrid test. Until the landmark House of Lords 
decision in DPP v Camplin (1978),
620
 the reasonable person test under English law was purely objective with 
none of the defendant’s personal characteristics taken into consideration.621 However, the reasonable person test 
then transitioned into what Professor Victoria Nourse
622
 described as a ‘hybrid standard.’623 Nourse wrote, 
‘[t]his reflec[ed] common sense; taken to extremes, no one really want[ed] a standard that [wa]s completely 
subjective or completely objective.’624  
 
English common law courts rejected the use of purely subjective standards. This was demonstrated in English 
common law’s rejection of the Robin Hood defence.625 Whilst purely objective tests had been met with much 
criticism,
626
 objective elements were still required in all judicial standards to avoid any perception of injustice. 
The reasonable person test as an illustrates the ontological underpinnings of particular objective standards. It 
demonstrates that human beings will look to some form of objectivity to assess what is right or wrong. 
                                                          
619 DPP v Camplin (1978) A.C. 705, 708 (Lord Diplock). 
620 A.C. 705. 
621 Yeo, above n 24, 616. See also; Sayers, above n 24, 1.1; Storey and Lidbury, above n 24, 6; Zedner and Roberts, above n 24, 117. 
‘In Bedder v DPP [(1954) 1 W.LR. 1119] the House of Lords held that the reasonable man was an ordinary normal adult person; thus a purely objective test was 
imposed. So, if the defendant was a juvenile, he was disadvantaged, as the self-control of an adult person would be expected of him.’ [Cf. Parsons, above n 24, 
141.] 
622 Professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center. Cf. Fletcher and Christopher, above n 25, xiii. See also; Dubber and Hörnle, above n 25, xx. 
623 Nourse, above n 26. See, e.g., State v. Bellino, 625 A.2d 1381, 1384 (Conn. App. 1993) (‘It is settled that a jury’s evaluation of a claim of self-defence has 
both subjective and objective elements’). As Holly Maguigan notes, appellate courts sometimes obscure this dualism by using misleading terms for their own 
standards, using the term ‘subjective,’ for example, to describe a standard that is both subjective and objective, or using the term ‘objective’ to describe a similar 
standard. See Maguigan, above n 26, 410 (explaining that a majority of states use a combined standard). 
624 Nourse, above n 26.  
625 Walker v Stones (2000) 4 All ER 412, 414 (Slade CJ). See also; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, 114–117 (Lord Millett) and 27-43 (Lord 
Hutton); Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (1995) 2 AC 378, 106 (Lord Nicholls). 
626 ‘…a purely objective standard is unduly harsh because it ignores the characteristics which inevitably and justifiably shape the defender’s perspective, thus 
holding him (or her) to a standard he simply cannot meet.’ Cf. Estrich, above n 30, 1430, 1434. See also; Shute and Simester, above n 30, 85-87; Williams, 
above n 30, 898; M D G, above n 30, 1021. 
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I then demonstrate English common law’s use of the reasonable person standard in two areas of jurisprudence. 
Firstly, in the volenti non fit iniuria maxim and secondly, in assessing the validity of the defence of irresistible 
impulse which relied upon the defendant suffering from an irresistible impulse.  
 
The following section provides a discussion that synthesises the findings of this chapter.  
 
If I can show that some of the most successful human societies used objective standards to judge human conduct 
fairly, then I believe I can show that objective, fixed and even absolute standards were perceived as necessary in 
any judicial system. This study of English common law will thus contribute to my thesis by revealing that 
English common law constantly uses objective standards as a part of judicial processes.  
 
II ENGLISH COMMON LAW UNDER EXAMINATION 
 
This chapter will focus on objective standards used in English civil and criminal la between the eighteenth and 
twenty first century. I have chosen to focus on this period because from the eighteenth century, objective 
standards in the form of the reasonable person test were more clearly defined and were used all over English 
common law. Objective standards did not just appear fully developed after 1700 A.D. As I will demonstrate, 
objective standards were also used at the origin of English law in the seventh and ninth century.   
In the following section, I will show that objective standards were used from the earliest days of English law.  
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III HOW ENGLISH COMMON LAW USED OBJECTIVE STANDARDS IN BOTH ITS CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL LAW DEPARTMENTS 
A OBJECTIVE STANDARDS PRE-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
The renowned English jurist, Sir Frederick Pollock (1845 – 1937 A. D.),627 noted that English common law did 
not evolve until after the Norman Conquest [1066 A.D.].
628
 Pollock said: 
 
The earliest things which modern lawyers are strictly bound to know must be allowed to date only from the 
thirteenth century, and from the latter half of it rather than the former. Nevertheless, a student who does not look 
farther back will be puzzled by relics of archaic law which were not formally discarded until quite modern times…In 
rare but important cases, it may be needful for advocates and judges to transcend the ordinary limits of the search for 
authority, and trace a rule or doctrine to its earliest known form in this country.629  
 
As noted by Pollock, we cannot understand current law without understanding where it came from. This section 
will identify objective standards even in English law’s earliest code of laws,630 the laws of Ethelbert. The laws 
of Ethelbert were promulgated around 600 A. D. and were compiled by the King of Kent.
631
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
627 George Santayana and ‎William G Holzberger,‎The Letters of George Santayana: 1941-1947 (MIT Press, 2001) 7:28. See also; Paul F Mattheisen and 
 Michael Millgate, Transatlantic Dialogue: Selected American Correspondence of Edmund Gosse (University of Texas Press, 2012) 211 fn. 3; Daniel B 
Schwartz, The First Modern Jew: Spinoza and the History of an Image (Princeton University Press, 2012) 79. 
628 Kathryn L Reyerson and  Faye Powe, The Medieval Castle: Romance and Reality (University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 79. See also; Agnes Strickland and 
 Elizabeth Strickland, Lives of the Queens of England from the Norman Conquest (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 573. 
629 Sir Frederick Pollock, 'English Law Before the Norman Conquest' (1898) 14 Law Quarterly Review 291 (emphasis mine). 
630 Burdick, above n 425, 62. See also; Chronological Tables of the History of the Middle Ages (D A Talboys, 1838) 4; Melville Watson Patterson, A History of 
the Church of England (Longmans, Green and Company, 1912) 11; Aline Bernstein Louchheim and Aline Bernstein Saarinen, 5000 Years of Art in Western 
Civilization (Howell, Soskin, 1946) 39. 
631 Burdick, above n 425, 62. See also; David Douglas (ed), English Historical Documents (London, 1973) vol 1 no. 151, 664; Harold J Berman, Law and 
Revolution, the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University Press, 2009) 54. 
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I THE LAWS OF ETHELBERT (600 A.D.) 
 
The code of Ethelbert,
632
 originally written in the Anglo-Saxon language, fixed penalties for various wrongs.
633
 
Penalties were applied to individuals who breached the objective standards set by the King. This legislation was 
an example of the imposition of objective standards because individuals were held to this standard that 
adjudicated the right conduct and penalised those who did not act according to this standard.  
 
The use of objective standards can be found in laws governing the social and sexual protection of widows as set 
out in Chapters 74 and 75 of the code of Ethelbert. Both chapters dealt with the protection of widows, who 
occupied a subordinate position under the guardianship or protection of members of their kin.
634
 Women were 
protected from exploitation because women were viewed as socially inferior
635
 and the primary concern was 
protecting widows from sexual
636
 and physical
637
 assault. Since women in medieval society were under the 
protection of men,
638
 women in many cases were not legally responsible for their own affairs, save for sorcery, 
homicide, incest or adultery.
639
 
 
Widows were subject, in some way, to the guardianship of a member or members of her kin. Lorraine Lancaster, 
for instance, wrote - ‘[w]e may assume also that she [the widow] was the direct responsibility of some members 
of her maego [kin]. This is the significance of the early laws of Ethelbert penalising breaches of the 
guardianship of widows.’640 
 
Chapters 74 and 75 of the code of Ethelbert attempted to protect widows from harm and outlined the 
punishment for violating this law: 
                                                          
632 An Old English translation can be found in Felix Liebermann (eds), Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen (Halle, 1903–1916) vol 1 3–8; Lisi Oliver, Beginnings of 
English Law (University of Toronto Press, 2002) 60-81. 
633 Benjamin Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes of England (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1840) 1. See also; Burdick, above n 425, 62; Mousourakis, above n 
412, 272 fn. 81; H P R Finberg and  Joan Thirsk, The Agrarian History of England and Wales: 1500-1640 (Cambridge University Press, 1967) 434. 
634 Carole Hough, 'The Widow's Mund in Æthelberht 75 and 76' (1999) 98(1) The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 1. See also; Carole Hough, ‘An 
Ald Reht’: Essays on Anglo-Saxon Law (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014) 111. 
635 Theodore John Rivers, 'Widows' Rights in Anglo-Saxon Law' (1978) 19(3) The American Journal of Legal History 208, 209. See also; D Kelly Weisberg, 
Women and the Law: Property, Family, and the Legal Profession (Schenkman, 1982) 36; Judith M Gappa and  Barbara Staner Uehling, Women in Academe: 
Steps to Greater Equality (American Association for Higher Education, 1979) 5. 
This thesis does does agree that women are inferior. This was the historical view in seventh century England.  
636 Rivers, above n 636, 210. See also; Hector Munro Chadwick, Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1905) 76-102. 
637 Sharon Turner, The History of the Anglo-Saxons: From the Earliest Period to the Norman Conquest (Baudry, 1840) vol 3 43. 
638 Rivers, above n 636, 208. See also; Hough, above n 635, 113; Weisberg, above n 636, 3. 
639 Rivers, above n 636, 208. 
640 Lorraine Lancaster, 'Kinship in Anglo-Saxon Society: I' (1958) 9(4) British Journal of Sociology 241. 
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74. [For violation of] protection of the foremost widow of noble rank, let him pay 50 shillings. 
74.1. [For a widow] of the second [rank], 20 shillings. 
74.2. [For a widow] of the third [rank], 12 shillings. 
74.3. [For a widow] of the fourth [rank], 6 shillings. 
75. If a person takes a widow who does not belong (unagen – ‘unowned’) to him, the [payment for violation of] 
protection shall be 2[-fold] as compensation.641 
 
A man who removed a widow from the protection of her kin
642
 without an appropriate contract was required to 
pay compensation
643
 that was given to the widow’s guardian, not to the widow,644 because it was the value of 
guardianship.
645
  
 
Widows were divided into four ranks. Each ranking identified whose protection the widow was under.
646
 A 
freeman protected a widow of the lowest rank, a nobleman protected the widow of the next rank, and the king 
himself protects the widows of the two higher ranks.
647
 Doris Stenton stated that this legislation ‘attempt[ed] [to 
categorise] widows, and set out the sums due for violating the right of protecting her dependants enjoyed by a 
widow of noble birth, and by widows said to be of the second, the third, and the fourth class.’648 
 
The term unagen, translated as 'unowned', in Chapter 75 referred to a widow who had no kin to protect her.
649
 
Because she was vulnerable, the recompense for a violation of her protection was twice what it would be 
                                                          
641 Laws of Ethelbert 74–75. See also; Oliver, above n 633, 75.  
642 Whether kin by law or blood. 
643 Christine Fell, Cecily Clark and Elizabeth Williams, Women in Anglo-Saxon England and the Impact of 1066 (British Museum, 1984) 61. See also; Hough, 
above n 635, 2. 
644 Frederick Attenborough (eds), The Laws of the Earliest English Kings (Cambridge, 1922) 178. See also; Hough, above n 644, 2; Rivers, above n 636, 210.  
645 Attenborough (eds), above n 645, 178. See also; Hough, above n 635, 2.  
646 Oliver, above n 633, 75–76. See also; Daniela Fruscione, 'Gender, Social and Marital Status in the Seventh Century the Legal Framework' (2017) 1(2) 
Medioevo Europeo 58; Rivers, above n 636, 208-215 and Fell, Clark and Williams, above n 644, 61. 
647 Oliver, above n 633, 75–76. See also; Fruscione, above n 647, 58.  
Questions surrounding who and how these men were ordained is outside the scope of this thesis.   
648 Doris Mary Stenton, The English Woman in History (Allen and Unwin, 1957) 9. 
649 Toller defines unagen as ‘not one's own, not in a person's possession or under his control…a widow of whom he is not the guardian.’ Cf. Thomas Northcote 
Toller (eds), An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary Based on the Manuscript Collections of the Late Joseph Bosworth (Oxford University Press, 1898) 108. Liebermann, 
Attenborough and Whitelock all agree with Toller's definition. See Liebermann, above n 633, 7; Attenborough, above n 645, 15; Whitelock, above n 632, 393. 
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otherwise.
650
 The special status of widows was shown by the large compensation that was paid for if their right 
to protect was violated.
651
   
 
Violating a widow’s protection imposed a penalty that varied in compensation depending on her status. This 
violation breached the objective standard set for a reasonable person. A reasonable person acting in the capacity 
of the defendant would not have violated a widow’s protection and would have recognised her vulnerability 
given her social status. This is particularly evident since the compensation required was twofold if the victim 
had no kin to protect her. Not only was the victim a woman, but she also lacked the protection of a kin, 
increasing her vulnerability. Therefore, breaching this code imposed liability.  
 
The laws of Ethelbert governed the protection of a widow and forbade violating her protection. However, in the 
event that this law was violated, compensatory damages were mandated to be paid by the defendant. English 
common law in the seventh century used objective standards to uphold the protection of widows to perpetuate a 
just legal system.  
II THE LAWS OF INE (c. 690 A.D.) 
 
The laws of Ine were promulgated in c. 690 A.D.
652
 by Ine, King of Wessex (died 728 A.D.)
653
 and were the 
earliest laws of the kingdom of Wessex.
654
 
 
Although the laws of Ine prohibited killing another human being,
655
 they recognised exceptional circumstances. 
Anglo-Saxon law, as promulgated in the laws of Ine, outlined certain circumstances that justified the reasonable 
use of deadly force. If an accused used deadly force under approved circumstances, he was not criminally liable 
because he acted reasonably according to accepted objective standards. An example that demonstrated the use of 
                                                          
650 Oliver, above n 633, 75–76. See also; Fell, Clark and Williams, above n 644, 61. 
651 Fruscione, above n 647, 58.  
652 Arthur West Haddan and William Stubbs, Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents Relating to Great Britain and Ireland (Clarendon Press, 1871) vol 3 214. 
See also; Fernanda Pirie and Judith Scheele,‎Legalism: Community and Justice (OUP Oxford, 2014) 105; Frederic William Maitland, ‎Dareaah‎ hralth‎HteerKwt‎
reG‎‎ James Fairbanks Colby, A Sketch of English Legal History (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1998) 7. 
653 Frederick Thomas Jones, The History of England in Chronological Form (The World, 1887) 57. See also; Marie-Françoise Alamichel, Widows in Anglo-
Saxon and Medieval Britain (Peter Lang, 2008) 75; John McKinnell, Meeting the Other in Norse Myth and Legend (DS Brewer, 2005) 53. 
654 Attenborough, above n 645, 34. See also; John Hostettler, A History of Criminal Justice in England and Wales (Waterside Press, 2009) 27. 
655 Laws of Ine s 76–In Case a Man Slay Another’s Godson or His Godfather. See Thorpe, above n 634, 65; Smith and Cheetham, above n 562, 781. 
 
 
127 
 
objective standards was used in the legislations governing theft. The Anglo Saxons viewed theft as a serious 
crime,
656
 a disgraceful act.
657
  
 
12. If a thief is captured [in the act of thieving], let him suffer death or redeem his life through payment of his 
wergeld 
20. If a man from afar, or a stranger, goes through the woods off the highway and neither calls out nor blows a horn, 
he may be considered a thief, to be slain or to be redeemed [by paying his wergeld].658 
 
These laws demonstrate its practical aspect in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence since they were created to warn 
civilians against the approach of anyone who might prove to be a thief, thus acting as deterrence.
659
  
 
The above extract set out reasonable circumstances under which Anglo Saxon citizens were prohibited in using 
deadly force. As such, it was unreasonable for the defendant to kill the victim if the victim had surrendered. This 
exceptional circumstance revealed the Anglo Saxon view of how the Anglo Saxons considered how a reasonable 
person would act.  
 
Anglo-Saxon law allowed for the use of lethal force against a thief who was captured or was suspected of being 
a thief. Five forms of punishment were instituted by the laws of Ine for the crime of theft; compensation,
660
 
being placed into slavery,
661
 the loss of a hand or foot,
662
 the death penalty, or the payment of his wergeld.
663
 
The Anglo-Saxons introduced a system called wergeld that set a compensatory amount that had to be paid to the 
relatives of the victim by the slayer.
664
 One's wergeld depended on social rank.
665
  
  
                                                          
656 Tom Lambert, 'Theft, Homicide and Crime in Late Anglo-Saxon Law' (2012) 214 Past & Present 8-9. 
657 Francis Palgrave, The Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth: Anglo-Saxon Period - Part 1 (Murray, 1832) 205. See also; James Silk 
Buckingham et al., The Athenaeum - Issues 219-270 (British Periodicals Limited, 1832) 169. 
658 Laws of Ine s 12, 20–21 cited from Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham, Sources of English Constitutional History: A selection of Documents 
from AD 600 to the Interregnum (Harper & Row, 1972) 7–8. 
659 Wilfrid Bonser, 'Anglo-Saxon Laws and Charms Relating to Theft' (1946) 57(1) Folklore 7. 
660 Laws of Ine s 7, 10 and 14.  
661 Laws of Ine s 7.1. 
662 Laws of Ine s 18, 37. 
663 Laws of Ine s 12, 15. See Alyxandra Mattison, The Executions and Burial of Criminals in Early Medieval England c. 850-1150 (PhD Thesis, University of 
Sheffield, 2016) 17; Andrew Reynolds, Anglo-Saxon Deviant Burial Customs (Oxford University Press, 2009) 251. 
664 Thorpe, above n 634, 187–191. See also; William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Methuen, 3rd ed, 1923) 43–46; George Keeton, The Norman 
Conquest and the Common Law (Benn, 1966) 16; Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, The History of English Law (The University Press, 2nd ed, 1898) 48. 
665 Jan N Bremmer and Lourens Van Den Bosch, Between Poverty and the Pyre (Routledge, 1995) 60, 84. 
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According to Anglo-Saxon law, a reasonable person would not remain passive in a situation where a thief was 
identified. Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence believed that a reasonable person within these circumstances would use 
deadly force and thus, Anglo-Saxon citizens were justified in killing a thief. Thus, using lethal force against a 
thief was considered a reasonable response under Anglo Saxon law.  
 
This thesis does not affirm or deny that physical retaliation, lethal or otherwise, is a reasonable response. 
Instead, this thesis outlines that according to the context and social influences surrounding Anglo-Saxon law, 
physical retaliation was a reasonable response. Given this understanding, a reasonable person would exert lethal 
force against a thief, thereby exonerating the defendant from criminal liability for he acted in accord with 
objective reasonableness. This exception demonstrates the use of objective standards to assess human behaviour. 
 
III THE LAWS OF ALFRED (892 – 893 A.D.) 
 
The law code of King Alfred the Great (849 - 899 A. D.)
666
 included the laws of Ine
667
 and a copy of the peace 
treaty between Alfred and King Guthrum
668
 made in the year 878 A.D.
669
 These laws were promulgated in 892-
893 A.D.
670
 An extract from the laws of Alfred demonstrates the use of objective standards in the ninth century 
of English law:   
 
If he [the foe] be willing to surrender, and to deliver up his weapons, and anyone after that attack him, let him 
[attacker] pay as well wer [money value of a man's life]671 as wound, as he may do, and wite [fine, punishment, 
penalty, contribution to the king], and let him have forfeited his maegship [kinship].672 
 
                                                          
666 Marcel Danesi and  Paul Perron, Analyzing Cultures: An Introduction and Handbook (Indiana University Press, 1999) 36. See also; Bruce A Kimball, The 
Liberal Arts Tradition: A Documentary History (University Press of America, 2010) 89; August Bequai, Organized Crime: The Fifth Estate (Lexington Books, 
1979) 206. 
667 Julius J Marke (eds), A Catalogue of the Law Collection at New York University: With Selected Annotations (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1953) 4. See 
also; Milton Turk, The Legal Code of Alfred the Great (Ginn and Company, 1893) 4; Robert D Fulk and  Christopher M Cain, A History of Old English 
Literature (John Wiley & Sons, 2013) 153. 
668 King of the Danish Vikings in the Danelaw, died in 890AD. Attenborough, above n 645, 96. See also; Thomas Baines, Yorkshire, Past and Present 
(Mackenzie, 1870) vol 3 26; D P Kirby, The Earliest English Kings (Psychology Press, 2000) 176. 
669 John Allen Giles, The Whole Works of King Alfred the Great (Bosworth and Harrison, 1858) vol 2 119. 
670 David Anthony Edgell Pelteret, Slavery in Early Mediaeval England: From the Reign of Alfred until the Twelfth Century (Boydell & Brewer, 2001) 81. See 
also; Attenborough, above n 645, 35, 69; Frederick Read, 'The Legal Position of the Child of Unmarried Parents' (1931) 9(9) The Canadian Bar Review 611. 
671 Oliver J Thatcher (eds), The Library of Original Sources (Milwaukee: University Research Extension Corporation, 1901) vol 4 211-239. See also; Jerome S 
Arkenberg, Medieval Sourcebook: Glossaries 1 & 2 (1998) History Class <http://www.historyclass.org/2PM/readings/glossaries.htm>. 
672 Laws of Alfred no. 42. Cf. Plucknett and Pound, above n 619, 48–49. See also; B F Brody, 'Anglo-Saxon Contract Law: A Social Analysis' 19(2) DePaul 
Law Review 274; Thorpe, above n 634, 91; Thatcher, above n 672, 211-239. 
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However, if a surrendered foe was attacked, the attacker was ordered to pay monetary damages to both the 
victim and the king. The attacker also lost his kinship. This legislation enforced retributive justice. Whilst the 
laws of Ine recognised exceptional circumstances that allowed for the use of lethal force, the law referenced 
above recognised circumstances that disallowed such force. The objective standard set out above forbade 
attacking a victim who surrendered and was willing to disarm himself.  
  
This law revealed the legal philosophy of jurists in the ninth
 
century Anglo-Saxon England. It was unreasonable 
to attack an enemy after he had surrendered. Acting contrary to this idea of reasonableness held the attacker 
accountable for his actions. Because a reasonable person in England in the ninth century A.D. would not attack 
in this situation, the actions of any person who used similar force against his attacker came to be held criminally 
liable. Thus, we see that objective standards were used to judge the reasonableness of the conduct of someone 
accused of assault in ancient England in the ninth century. 
 
We also declare, that with his lord a man may fight without risk of legal consequences, if anyone attack the lord; thus 
may the lord fight for his man. After the same wise, a man may fight with his born kinsman, if a man attack[s] him 
wrongfully, except against his lord. That we do not allow. And a man may fight without legal consequences, if he 
find[s] another with his lawful wife, within closed doors, or under one covering, or with his lawfully born daughter, 
or with his lawfully born sister, or with his mother, who was given to his father as his lawful wife.673 
 
English common law in the ninth century outlined the circumstances that justified the use of force, fatal or 
otherwise. English law proclaimed that fighting with, or on behalf of, one’s lord justified his actions, thus 
removing culpability for using physical force. A reasonable person would choose to use physical force in 
circumstances where he was provided with the option to fight with, or on behalf of, his lord. Since a reasonable 
person would act in this manner, the defendant was exonerated from criminal culpability if he used physical 
force, lethal or otherwise, under these circumstances for he acted in accord with objective standards.   
 
The above extract also set out other reasonable circumstances under which Anglo Saxon citizens could use 
deadly force. It was reasonable for the defendant to kill the victim if the victim was an adulterer or fornicator 
caught in the act with the defendant’s wife, mother, sister or daughter.  
                                                          
673 Laws of Alfred no. 42. Cf. Plucknett and Pound, above n 619, 48–49. See also; Brody, above n 674, 274; Thorpe, above n 634, 91; Thatcher, above n 672, 
211-239. 
 
 
130 
 
 
These exemptive circumstances absolved the defendant from liability because Anglo Saxons considered that a 
reasonable person would use deadly force under these circumstances. Therefore, we see that Anglo Saxon 
jurisprudence used a reasonable person standard to assess human behaviour. If the accused acted as a reasonable 
person, he was not criminally liable. 
 
The above statute created conditions that had to be fulfilled before revenge could be lawfully taken, and failure 
to comply with the standard brought a penalty. This exemption demonstrated that objective standards were used 
from the earliest period of English law’s development.  
 
The following section will provide a brief overview of the reasonable person in English common law.  
 
IV THE REASONABLE PERSON 
 
By the nineteenth century, tort law had developed a universal standard for liability based on fault.
674
 To govern 
the law of negligence, the English common law courts established a standard of care based on the notion of the 
reasonable man, against which defendants would be judged.
675
 
 
Commenting on English common law’s reasonable person test, Chief Justice Robert French AC explained that 
the law engaged the services of that leading light in the judge's small band of imaginary friends— the reasonable 
person.
676
 Other members of that band include the 'right-thinking person,'
677
 the ordinary prudent man of 
business, the officious bystander, the reasonable juror properly directed and the fair minded and informed 
observer.
678
 
                                                          
674 Dan B Dobbs, The Law of Torts (West Group, 2000) 112-113. See also; McKnite, above n 19, 1379. 
675 Dobbs, above n 675, 117, 277. Professor Dobbs notes that courts have used different language to express the same idea: ‘The standard is often described as 
the standard of ordinary care, due care, or reasonable care. It may also be referred to as the reasonable person or prudent person standard.’ e.g., Vaughan v. 
Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (P.C.) 492; 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 472 (‘[T]here were no means of estimating the defendant’s negligence, except by taking as a 
standard, the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence’). 
676 Gardner, above n 45, 563. 
677 Derbyshire v Police [1967] NZLR 391. See also; Ibrahim v Swansea University [2012] EWHC 290 (QB); George P Fletcher and  Steve Sheppard, American 
Law in a Global Context: The Basics (Oxford University Press, 2005) 596; Ram Lal Anand, L Subrahmanya Sastri and Challa Kameswara Rao, Anand & 
Sastri's: The Law of Torts (Law Book Company, 1967) 474; Mulheron, above n 28, 778; Gabriel R Ricci, The Tempo of Modernity (Transaction Publishers, 
2012) 153. 
678 Chief Justice Robert French AC, 'The Fine Art of Giving and Taking Offence' (Speech delivered at the Birkenhead Lecture, Gray's Inn, London, 18 
November 2015) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj18Nov2015.pdf>.  
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All lawmakers, including the three ancient English law makers outlined in the previous section, used French’s 
imaginary friend to figure out a law that everyone will agree is just. They cannot reason to that level of 
consensus using only subjective ideas. English lawmakers have to consider others by appealing to objective 
standards. This is done to convince others that their ideas are fair to everyone that can then lead to agreements 
and peace treaties. 
 
Chief Justice French’s imaginary friend – the reasonable person – acted in accord with the objective standard 
established for him. What he would do represented socially acceptable behaviour that the defendant was 
expected to mirror. Professor John Gardner further expressed this point in his work, ‘The Many Faces of the 
Reasonable Person’:679 
 
All of these colourful characters, and many others besides,680 provide important standard-setting services to the law. 
But none more so than the village's most venerable resident, that is to say the reasonable person.
681
 
 
The reasonable person test was introduced into English common law in the area of tort law in 1837 following 
the case of Vaughan v Menlove.
682
   
 
In this case, the respondent, Menlove, had assembled a hayrick close to his neighbour's property, despite notices 
that it was prone to catch fire.
683
 The defendant had been warned several times over a period of five weeks that 
the structure of his haystack was dangerous, but he said, ‘he would chance it.’684 When the structure ignited and 
destroyed his neighbour’s cottages as predicted, Menlove was charged with gross negligence. 
 
                                                          
679 Ibid.  
680 For news of a recent arrival from the EU (‘the reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderer’) see Healthcare at Home Ltd v The Common 
Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49. 
681 Gardner, above n 45, 563. 
682 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490. 
683 ‘Hay that is damp when put in the mow, or not completely cured by a hay-drying system in the mow, is likely to heat and may catch fire. A few hundred 
pounds of damp hay may ignite spontaneously even though the average moisture of all the hay in the mow is at a safe level.’ - Harry L Garver and Edward G 
Molander, 'Fire-Resistant Construction on the Farm' [1962] (2070) Farmers' Bulletin 22. 
684 Allen Linden, Lewis Klar and Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law Cases: Notes & Materials (LexisNexis, 14th ed, 2014) 185. 
 
 
132 
 
Menlove’s legal counsellor conceded his client’s ‘misfortune of not possessing the highest order of intelligence,’ 
but argued that the jury should only find against his client if he had not acted with ‘bona fide [and] to the best of 
his [own] judgment.’685 
 
The Court held that Menlove's intention should not to be taken into consideration. Such a standard would be 
excessively subjective. The Court favoured objective standards. Tindal C. J. expressed the rule as follows: 
 
Whether the defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own judgment . . . would leave so vague 
a line as to afford no rule at all...[Because the judgments of individuals are...] as variable as the length of the foot 
of each...we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of 
ordinary prudence would observe.686 
 
The decision in Vaughan discussed whether subjective or objective tests should be used to judge human 
conduct. Menlove argued that he should be judged by a subjective test because he did not possess the highest 
order of intelligence and, thus, should only be judged by a standard that demanded that he act ‘bona fide to the 
best of his judgment.’687 This test would consequently enable Menlove to be judged by a subjective test as 
opposed to the set of objective values enshrined in the law.
688
  
 
The court rejected Menlove’s proposition. The court held that subjective standards are insufficient to judge 
human conduct and such standards would undermine a just legal system. Chief Justice Tindal stated that 
allowing liability to be ‘co-extensive with the judgment of each individual’ would import unacceptable variation 
into the legal standard that would end up ‘as variable as the length of the foot of each individual.’689 Menlove’s 
proposed standard of adjudication undermined the objectivity of the law’s values. Thus, Vaughan can be read as 
insisting that the law, not the individual in question, sets the objective standard.
690
  
 
                                                          
685 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490 (CP), 492. 
686 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490 (CP), 474–475. 
687 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490 (CP), 492. 
688 Moran, above n 32, 1239. 
689 Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (CJ Tindal).  
690 Moran, above n 32, 1239. See also; Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, 1995) 183 n 22. 
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The court’s rejection of Menlove’s subjective standard in favour of objective standards demonstrates that the 
judges recognised that subjective standards are insufficient to judge human conduct. The judges recognised that 
objective standards are necessary if legal cases are to be adjudicated in a manner that society can accept is just.  
 
Fault was objectively assessed by comparing the conduct of the defendant to that of the reasonable person in the 
same circumstances.
691
  
If the defendant failed to act in the manner that a reasonable person would, he was liable for fault.
692
 Therefore, 
objective fault under English common law involved a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe under given circumstances.
693
  
Although the case Vaughan v Menlove introduced the reasonable person test to tort law, Professor Simon 
Stern
694
 argued that the origin of this idea in English common law can be traced to the 1703 case of R v Jones.
695
 
 
R. v Jones addressed the question of criminal liability for fraud. Unlike later civil law cases, this criminal law 
case personified the standard to expose the difference between civil and criminal harms.
696
 The bench refused to 
convict the defendant, ruling that the deceit would be criminal only if the defendant was ‘such a cheat as a 
person of an ordinary capacity can’t discover.’ In the court’s disdainful summation, ‘this [wa]s an indictment to 
punish one man because another is a fool.’
697
  
 
In English civil law, the reasonable person has been defined as the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus,’698 the 
‘reasonable man of ordinary intelligence and experience.’699 The reasonable person has neighbours as diverse as 
                                                          
691 Annemieke van Verseveld, Mistake of Law: Excusing Perpetrators of International Crimes (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012) 23. 
692 Lily Xiao Hong Lee and  David H Rosenbloom, A Reasonable Public Servant: Constitutional Foundations of Administrative Conduct in the United States  
(Routledge, 2015) 24. See also; Baudouin and Linden, above n 32, 106; T T Arvind and  Jenny Steele, Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and 
the Dynamics of Legal Change (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012) 386; Henry Saint Dahl, Diccionario Jurídico Inglés-español (McGraw Hill Professional, 2003) 
59; Monaghan, above n 325, 75. 
693 Mann and Roberts, above n 32, 105. See also; Mann and Roberts, above n 32, 108. 
694 Associate Professor & Co-Director, Centre for Innovation Law & Policy at The University of Toronto. See Markus D Dubber, Foundational Texts in 
Modern Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) ix. 
695 R. v Jones (1703) 6 Mod. 105, 87 Eng. Rep. 464. See also; Simon Stern, 'R. v. Jones (1703): The Origins of the Reasonable Person' in Philip Handler, Henry 
Mares, & Ian Williams (eds) Landmark Cases in Criminal Law (Hart Publication, 2016) 1. 
696 Ian Williams, Phil Handler, and Henry Mares, R. v. Jones (1703): The Origins of the 'Reasonable Person’ in Landmark Cases in Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed, 2016) 2. 
697 R. v Jones (1703) 6 Mod. 105, 87 Eng. Rep. 464. 
698 McQuire v Western Morning News Co Ltd [1903] 2KB 100, 109. 
699 Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448, 457. 
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the ordinary prudent man of business,
700
 the officious bystander,
701
 the fair-minded and informed observer,
702
 
and ‘the reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderer.’ 703 In discussing the nature of the reasonable 
person, Henry T. Terry
704
 stated that ‘a [reasonably prudent man] does not mean an ideal or perfect man, but an 
ordinary member of the community. He is usually spoken of as an ordinarily reasonable, careful, and prudent 
man.’705 
 
Although English common law has not provided a dogmatic list of characteristics possessed by the reasonable 
person, save for the ability to reason,
706
 English common law still regards objective standards as a significant 
tool to test the element of culpability and wrongdoing. As Roy Baker articulated, ‘when dissected, so that it is 
read as 'reason-able', the word suggests no more than an ability to reason.’707 The reasonable person was 
expected to exercise ordinary care, not extraordinary care.
708
  
 
The judgement made by the House of Lords in R v. Smith (2000)
709
 stated that the idea of reasonableness was 
developed in R v. Welsh (1869)
710
 by Keating J. Keating applied this concept to provocation, inciting the 
question ‘not merely whether there was passion, but whether there was reasonable provocation.’711  
The introduction of the reasonable person appeared in his conclusion where Keating J referred to the probability 
of attributing the defendant's act to the violence of passion naturally arising from the provocation ‘and likely to 
be aroused thereby in the breast of the reasonable man.’712 He later said:713 
The law contemplates the case of a reasonable man, and requires that the provocation shall be such as that such a 
man might naturally be induced, in the anger of the moment, to commit the act.714 
                                                          
700 Speight v Gaunt (1883) LR 9 App Cas 1, 19-20 (per Lord Blackburn). 
701 Shirlaw v Southern Foundries [1939] 2 KB 206, 227 (per MacKinnon LJ). 
702 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 52 (per Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
703 Healthcare at Home Ltd v The Common Services Agency [2014] UKSC 49. 
704 Professor of Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo and Yale University law professor. Edward R Beauchamp and  Akira Iriye, Foreign Employees in 
Nineteenth-Century Japan (Westview Press, 1990) 25. See also; Albert Kocourek, Celebration Legal Essays (Northwestern University Press, 1919) 170. 
705 Henry T Terry, 'Negligence' (1915) 29 Harvard Law Review 47. 
706 Adams, above n 20, 266. See also; Tinus, above n 20, 24; Naffine, above n 20, 64; Nussbaum, above n 20, 326, 327; Cassel et al., above n 20, 1235. 
707 Baker, above n 21, 41. 
708 Terry, above n 18, 47. See also; McKnite, above n 19, 1379. 
709 3 WLR 654. 
710 11 Cox 336. 
711 R. v. Welsh (1869) 11 Cox 336, 337. 
712 R. v. Welsh (1869) 11 Cox 336, 537. 
713 Regina v. Smith (2000) 3 WLR 654. Judgment cited in Hungerford Welch Staff, Sourcebook Criminal Law (Cavendish Publishing, 2001) 682–683; The 
Law Reports: House of Lords, and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and Peerage Cases, Parts 1-6 (Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England 
and Wales, 2001) 175. 
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The reasonable person test did not take into consideration the personal characterstics of the accused up until the 
landmark House of Lords decision in DPP v Camplin (1978).
715
  
Camplin held that age and sex were relevant in assessing the conduct in question and the degree of self-control 
expected of the reasonable person. A similar decision followed in Australia
716
 and the once purely objective 
reasonable person test was gradually abandoned in favour of a developing hybrid test in which a reasonable 
person ‘in the position of the defendant’ was endowed with the actual personal characteristics of the defendant 
in question.
717
  
The temporal use of purely objective standards in English common law does not undermine this thesis because I 
do not claim that a particular type of objective standard is universally applied. Instead, I propose that objectivity 
plays an important role in evaluating human behaviour. Therefore, as long as the standard used in the legal 
systems assessed used objective elements, wholly or partially, it furthers my thesis that objective standards are 
necessary if the legal evaluation of human behaviour is to remain acceptable to the relevant society.  
Lord Clyde in R v. Smith identified the issue of using purely objective standards to evaluate human behaviour: 
 
When what is at issue is the scale of punishment which should be awarded for his conduct it seems to me unjust that 
the determination should be governed not by the actual facts relating to the particular defendant but by the blind 
application of an objective standard of good conduct. Even those who are sympathetic with what may be described 
as an objective approach have to recognise that at its extreme it is unacceptable.718 
 
Lord Clyde continued by advocating the inclusion of subjective elements, demonstrating that although a purely 
objective standard was rejected by English common law, objective elements remained important in the 
assessment of right and wrong conduct:  
 
So a concession is made for considerations of the age and sex of the defendant...It seems to me that the standard of 
reasonableness in this context should refer to a person exercising the ordinary power of self-control over his passions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
714 R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336; the prisoner was found guilty and sentenced to death.  
715 A.C. 705. Yeo, above n 24, 616. See also; Sayers, above n 24, 1.1; Storey and Lidbury, above n 24, 6; Zedner and Roberts, above n 24, 117. 
‘In Bedder v DPP [(1954) 1 W.LR. 1119] the House of Lords held that the reasonable man was an ordinary normal adult person; thus, a purely objective test 
was imposed. So, if the defendant was a juvenile, he was disadvantaged, as the self-control of an adult person would be expected of him’ Cf. Parsons, above n 
24, 141. 
716 See, for example, R v Dincer (1983) 1 VR 460; R v Croft (1981) 1 NSWLR 126; R v O'Neill (1982) VR 150. 
717 Michael Coper and George Williams, Justice Lionel Murphy: Influential or Merely Prescient? (Federation Press, 1997) 81. 
718 Regina v. Smith (2000) 3 WLR 654, cited in Hungerford Welch Staff, above n 714, 683. See also; Molan, above n 34, 170. 
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which someone in his position is able to exercise and is expected by society to exercise. By position I mean to 
include all the characteristics which the particular individual possesses and which may in the circumstances bear on 
his power of control other than those influences which have been self-induced.719 
 
This rationale was also echoed in Lord Simon’s speech in R. v. Camplin720 where he said:  
 
The jury would, as ever, use their collective common sense to determine whether the provocation was sufficient to 
make a person of reasonable self-control in the totality of the circumstances (including personal characteristics) act 
as the defendant did.721 
 
In R v. McGregor (1962)
722
 North J noted that the assessment of culpability required a fusion of objective and 
subjective elements. The subjective element took into consideration the characteristics of the defendant but 
objective elements were still used to assess culpability. The characteristics must be such ‘that it can fairly be 
said that the offender is thereby marked off or distinguished from the ordinary man of the community.’ He 
further argued that there must be ‘a real connection between the nature of the provocation and the particular 
characteristic of the offender.’723 
 
Jurists in the mid-nineteenth century began to critique the unjust application of purely objective standards,
724
 
concluding that a purely objective test did not take into account any of the personal characteristics of the 
defendant.
725
 In support of this view, the Law Commission Report stated that the personal characteristics of a 
defendant were most important.
726
  
                                                          
719 Regina v. Smith (2000) 3 WLR 654, cited in Hungerford Welch Staff, above n 714, 683, See also; Molan, above n 34, 170. 
720 [1978] A.C. 705. 
721 DPP v. Camplin [1978] A.C. 705, 727. 
722 N.Z.L.R 1069. 
723 R v. McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069, 1081. Judgment cited in R v Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008, 1018. 
724 Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages (J S Voorhies, 1847) 455–56. (‘In the case of the compos mentis . . . the act punished is that of 
a party competent to foresee and guard against the consequences of his conduct, and inevitable accident has always been held an excuse. In the case of the 
lunatic, it may be urged, both that no good policy requires the interposition of the law, and that the act belongs to the class of cases which may well be termed 
inevitable accidents.’), quoted in Patrick Kelley, 'Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the Law of Torts' (2003) 48(1) American Journal of Jurisprudence 184; see 
also Francis H Bohlen, ‘Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons’ (1925) 23 Michigan Law Review 18 n.15 (calling the objective mental disability standard 
‘a curious recurrence to the early objective attitude of the law which looked to the objective wrongfulness of the act rather than the subjective culpability of the 
actor’). 
725 Hungerford Welch Staff, above n 714, 513. 
726 The Law Commission, Criminal Law Report on Defences of General Application, Report No 83 (1977) 2.28.  
‘We think that there should be an objective element in the requirements of the defence so that in the final event it will be for the jury to determine whether the 
threat was one which the defendant in question could not reasonably have been expected to resist. This will allow the jury to take into account the nature of the 
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Roger Henderson argued that a purely objective standard was unworkable because real life situations dealt with 
a standard that varied from individual to individual, while a purely subjective standard would place the court at 
the mercy of the party or parties.
727
  
 
I am not proposing that a hybrid test is necessary for justice, nor am I arguing that wholly objective standards 
are insufficent. Instead, I am demonstrating that standards used by courts to adjudicate fault always include 
objective elements. The other legal systems studied in this thesis also came to a similar conclusion. Jewish law, 
Roman law, Athenian law and canon law all used objective elements to adjudicate human behaviour. 
 
To demonstrate English common law’s reliance on objective standards in judicial reasoning, English common 
law rejected the alternative method of using purely subjective standards.  
 
If purely subjective standards were used to judge human behaviour, this standard would rely on the perspective 
of the wrongdoer to assess culpability.
728 
Attempts to use defences that relied on subjective standards to remove 
culpability have been rejected by common law jurists. This is evident by English common law’s rejection of the 
‘Robin Hood’729 defence – that is, if the defendant genuinely believed that his conduct was not dishonest then he 
should be acquitted, regardless of what wider society thought.
730
 
 
English common law courts have explicitly rejected purely subjective standards to judge human behaviour. The 
Court of Appeal in R v Ghosh (1982)
731
 rejected a purely subjective test but approved a slightly modified 
subjective test that included objective elements, stating:  
 
There remains the objection that to adopt a subjective test is to abandon all standards but that of the accused himself, 
and to bring about a state of affairs in which ‘Robin Hood would be no robber’. This objection misunderstands the 
nature of the subjective test. It is no defence for a man to say ‘I knew that what I was doing is generally regarded as 
dishonest; but I do not regard it as dishonest myself. Therefore I am not guilty’. What he is however entitled to say is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
offence committed, its relationship to the threats which the defendant believed to exist, the threats themselves and the circumstances in which they were made, 
and the personal characteristics of the defendant. The last consideration is, we feel, a most important one. Threats directed against a weak, immature or disabled 
person may well be much more compelling than the same threats directed against a normal healthy person.’ 
727 Henderson, above n 97, 14. 
728 Steve Friedland, Friedland's Sum and Substance Quick Review on Criminal Law (West Academic, 5th ed, 2008) 44. 
729 John Cyril Smith et al., Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 945. 
730 Matt Hall and Tom Smith, 'The Disappearing Ghosh Test' (2017) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 753. 
731 [1982] QB 1053. 
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‘I did not know that anyone would regard what I was doing as ‘dishonest’… [I]f he is believed, or raises a real doubt 
about the matter, the jury cannot be sure that he was dishonest’.732 
 
Having rejected both a purely objective test and a purely subjective test, the Court of Appeal in Ghosh created a 
hybrid test as a proposed compromise:  
 
In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all 
decide whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If 
it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by 
those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was 
doing was by those standards dishonest.733 
 
Lord Lane CJ in R v Ghosh commented that a purely subjective test involved the abandonment of ‘all standards 
but that of the defendant himself, and to bring about a state of affairs in which ‘Robin Hood would be no 
robber’.’734  
 
However, the second limb of the Ghosh test immediately attracted a barrage of criticism
735
 from Britain’s 
foremost criminal law scholars.
736
 It was argued that the second limb of the Ghosh test was problematic for 
various reasons that will not be discussed here, for it falls outside the scope of this thesis.
737
  
                                                          
732 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, 1057-1064 (Lord Lane CJ). 
733 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, 1064 (Lord Lane CJ). 
734 R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, 1064 (Lord Lane CJ). 
735 Most criminal case no longer apply the second limb as it is unnecessary and misleading or confusing to the juries. It has also been rejected in English civil 
cases see Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 379 (Lord Nicholls): 
Whatever may be the position in some criminal or other contexts (see, for instance, Reg v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053), in the context of the accessory liability 
principle acting dishonestly … means simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances. This is an objective s tandard. At first sight this may 
seem surprising. Honesty has a connotation of subjectivity, as distinct from the objectivity of negligence. Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element 
in that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would 
have known or appreciated. Further, honesty and its counterpart dishonesty are mostly concerned with advertent conduct, not inadvertent conduct. Carelessness 
is not dishonesty. Thus for the most part dishonesty is to be equated with conscious impropriety. However, these subjective characteristics of honesty do not 
mean that individuals are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not 
subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. If a person knowingly appropriates 
another’s property, he will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour.  
For a further discussion on the rejection of this test in English civil cases see, David Lusty, 'The Meaning of Dishonesty in Australia' (2012) 36 Criminal Law 
Journal 288–289.  
736 For example: 
(i) Professor Spencer stated that it was flawed and confusing. See J R Spencer, 'Dishonesty: What the Jury Thinks the Defendant Thought the Jury Would have 
Thought' [1982] The Cambridge Law Review 224; 
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However, in response to criticism, the Court of Appeal in R v Roberts
738
 stated that it was unnecessary to inform 
a jury to take into consideration the second limb of the Ghosh test. A jury was only informed of this second limb 
if the defendant argued that he did not realise that his conduct was dishonest according to the standards of 
reasonable and honest people. This decision has been followed on many occasions
739
 and approved by the Privy 
Council.
740
 
 
The Ghost test closely resembled the ‘Feely test’ that was created in R v Feely [1973].741 The Feely test 
possessed two key features – it was objective and it included subjective elements. It was subjective because it 
focused on the actual ‘state of mind’ of the defendant. However, objectively, the Court assessed whether he 
acted dishonestly according to ‘the current standards of ordinary decent people’,742 rather than his own standards 
or personal belief.
743
 If purely subjective standards were used to judge human behaviour then if a defendant 
believed his actions were justified, all culpability would be removed.
744 
 
 
The Robin Hood defence was also rejected in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan.
745
 Lord Nicholls held that ‘he [the 
defendant] will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour’.746 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(ii) Professor Elliot described it as ‘curious’, ‘complicated’ and conducive to ‘arbitrary and inconsistent verdicts’. See D W Elliott, ‘Dishonesty in Theft: A 
Dispensable Concept’ [1982] Criminal Law Review 397-399; and 
 
(iii) Professor Edward Griew listed 15 separate objections to the Ghosh test, describing it as ‘inept’, confusing, erroneous, having ‘few uncritical friends’ and 
likely to ‘complicate and lengthen contested cases’. See Edward Griew, 'Dishonesty: The Objections to Feely and Ghosh' [1985] Criminal Law Review 341-353. 
 
For more objections see, Lusty, above n 736, 286. 
737 For a list of reasons please see, Lusty, above n 736, 286–287.  
738 (1987) 84 Cr App R 117. The Court of Appeal concluded that ‘in most cases where dishonesty is alleged’ to inform the jury of the second limb would be 
‘not only unnecessary but also misleading’ (see R v Price (1990) 90 Cr App R 409, 411; Atkinson v The Queen [2003] EWCA Crim 3031, [23] and ‘more likely 
than not to confuse than help’ (see R v Irdem [1999] EWCA Crim 1102. See also; R v Razoq [2012] EWCA 674, [81].  
739 See, for example, R v Mendez [1990] Crim LR 397; R v Hancock [1990] 2 QB 242; R v Brennan [1990] Crim LR 118; R v Price (1990) 90 Cr App R 409; R 
v O’Connell (1992) 94 Cr APP R 39; R v Egan [1998] 1 Cr App R 121. 
740 Gangar v General Medical Council [2003] HRLR 24, 22. See Lusty, above n 736, 287. 
741 QB 530. 
742 R v Feely [1973] QB 530, 537-538: 
[T]he word ‘dishonestly’ can only relate to the state of mind of the person who does the act which amounts to appropriation. Whether an accused person has a 
particular state of mind is a question of fact which has to be decided by the jury when there is a trial on indictment, and by magistrates when there are summary 
proceedings … We do not agree that judges should define what ‘dishonestly’ means. This word is in common use … Jurors, when deciding whether an 
appropriation was dishonest can be reasonably expected to, and should, apply the current standards of ordinary decent people. In their own lives they have to 
decide what is and what is not dishonest. We can see no reason why, when in a jury box, they should require the help of a judge to tell them what amounts to 
dishonesty. 
743 Lusty, above n 736, 284-285. 
744 Hindson and Caner, above n 98, 419. 
745 (1995) 2 AC 378. See also; Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1476. 
746 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (1995) 2 AC 378, 386. 
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Sir Christopher Slade in Walker v Stones
747
 also rejected the Robin Hood defence.
748
 Slade stated that an 
individual may act dishonestly even though he genuinely believed that his actions were morally justified.
749
 In 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley,
750
 Lord Hutton argued that the defendant should have acted in a way that was in 
accordance to the ordinary standards of a reasonable and honest person.
751
  
 
The above cases manifest English common law’s disdain for the use of purely subjective standards to assess 
human behaviour. The concerns underlying the use of subjective standards in judicial reasoning are two-fold. 
Firstly, it would absolve every defendant who believed that his conduct was justified
752
 and secondly, as 
outlined by Lord Lane CJ in R v Ghosh,
753
 culpability would rely upon the defendant’s self-rationalised belief.754  
 
Purely subjective standards do not provide a foundation for assessing human behaviour that is generally 
accepted in any of the societies discussed in this thesis. It is thus not surprising that common law jurists have 
rejected them. This rejection also shows that English jurists have not found an alternative method for judging 
human behaviour that is more acceptable than the use of objective standards. Though subjective elements are 
taken into consideration, they are not relied on to measure culpability. Objective standards remain as the most 
popular tool in the hands of English judges  for differentiating between right and wrong.  
 
Tindal CJ denied that fault could be fairly assessed through a purely subjective assessment. Instead, he favoured 
objective standards that took into consideration the subjective elements of the defendant.
755
 He thus built 
subjective elements into his objective standard, but he relied on an objective standard when making his final 
decision.
756
 
 
                                                          
747 (2001) QB 902. 
748 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (Routledge, 2016) 495. See also; Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (Cavendish Publishing, 2014) 350. 
749 Walker v Stones (2001) QB 902, 939. 
750 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12. 
751 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, 27. See also; Margaret Wilkie, Rosalind Malcolm and Peter Luxton, Q & A Revision Guide: Equity and Trusts 
2012 and 2013 (OUP Oxford, 2012) 140. 
752 Monaghan, above n 325, 253. 
753 [1982] QB 1053. 
754 Charlotte Walsh, Edward Phillips and Paul Dobson, Law Relating To Theft (Routledge, 2001) 26. 
755 Farahany, above n 28, 229. See also; Elies van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (OUP Oxford, 2012) 219; Mandy Burton, 
Legal Responses to Domestic Violence (Routledge, 2008) 77; J Stanley Edwards, Tort Law (Cengage Learning, 2014) 105; Alan Reed and  Michael Bohlander, 
Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Routledge, 2016) 295; Zweigert and Drobnig, above n 
49, 194; Ramadan, above n 33, 47; Mike Molan, Criminal Law 2014 and 2015 (Oxford University Press, 2014) 152. 
756 Cynthia Lee, ‘Race and Self-Defence: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness’ (1996) 81 Minnesota Law Review 387. 
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By introducing a subjective element into the reasonable person test, the courts allow for the consideration of the 
defendant’s particular characteristics.
757 
Therefore, the introduction of subjective elements into the objective 
reasonable man test allowed tort law to accommodate minorities without forcing them to conform to majority 
conduct in unnecessary ways.  
  
When discussing this hybrid approach, Nicola Lacey argued that an entirely objective standard failed to 
investigate who the reasonable person was whereas a hybrid standard used a standard that was objective and 
neutral.
758
 She said that taking into account individual characteristics promoted a fair approach to justice 
because it allowed the defendant to be measured against objective standards he was able to meet. However, 
English common law did not take into consideration subjective intent, with some exceptions, but rather 
objective intent.
759
 That is, the idiosyncrasies of the defendant did not prejudice objectivity that formed part of 
the reasonable man test. They merely adjust and qualify it so that the law does not extinguish all personality as 
the price of legal consistency. Even when a subjective test was used, objective standards were implemented to 
infer the intent of the defendant despite the defendant’s subjective intent.760   
Commenting on the subjective test of civil responsibility, Professor Eric Colvin
761
 argued that guilt should only 
be punished when an individual had freely chosen to engage in the relevant conduct, having valued the 
consequences or risks of that decision, and, therefore, having made a personal decision which can be convicted 
and treated as justification for the punishment given.762  
 
Colvin acknowledged the alternative objective approach as assessing the conduct of the defendant against that of 
some ‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ person, placed in the defendant’s circumstances. Colvin argued that this 
                                                          
757 See Reed and  Bohlander, above n 756 for a list of sources. 
758 Lacey, Wells and Quick, above n 63, 56. 
759 Martin Davies and  David V Snyder, International Transactions in Goods: Global Sales in Comparative Context (Oxford University Press, 2014) 162. 
760 International Monetary Fund, Iceland: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes - FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (International Monetary Fund, 2007) 5. See also; Samuel J Arena, The Manifest Intent Handbook (American Bar 
Association, 2002) 30; Richard G Singer, Criminal Procedure II: From Bail to Jail (Aspen Publishers Online, 2008) 45; Eugene R Anderson,  Jordan S Stanzler 
and Lorelie S Masters, Insurance Coverage Litigation (Aspen Publishers Online, 1999) 30; Daniel E Hall, Criminal Law and Procedure (Cengage Learning, 
2014) 74; Jeremy Gans, Modern Criminal Law of Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 205. 
761 Professor of Law at The University of the South Pacific. See The University of South Pacific, Staff Profiles: Eric Colvin (1 January 2011) The University of 
South Pacific < http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=13035>.  
762 Eric Colvin, ‘Ordinary and Reasonable People: The Design of Objective Tests of Criminal Responsibility’ (2001) 27(2) Monash University Law Review 
197. 
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approach was objective because it did not depend on any discovery that the defendant’s state of mind was 
blameworthy in itself.763  
 
Subjective elements in the reasonable man test introduced a way to measure and balance individual intent 
against the objective reasonable person standard. Subjective tests were used to assess the mens rea of the 
defendant, whilst an objective test was used to test the reasonableness of this belief.764 As stated by Staff, ‘the 
defendant could hold a subjective, honest belief but that belief [was]s subject to an objective test of 
reasonableness.’765  
 
This illustrates that subjective elements were not overlooked. However, objective standards took precedence. 
The principles of self-defence in English common law were set out in Palmer v R:
766
  
 
It is both good law and good sense that a man who [wa]s attacked may defend himself. It [wa]s both good law and 
good sense that he may do, but only do, what [wa]s reasonably necessary.767 
When assessing whether reasonable force was used under a set of circumstances, it was important to keep in 
mind the words of Lord Morris in Palmer:  
If there has been an attack so that self-defence is reasonably necessary, it will be recognised that a person defending 
himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action. If the jury thought that in a moment of 
unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought necessary, that 
would be the most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken.768  
A reasonable person standard was used to assess the aspect of reasonableness.
769
 
In the Court of Appeal judgement in R v Whyte (1987),
770
 Lord Lane CJ explained the 'reasonable force' element 
further:  
                                                          
763 Ibid. 
764 Reeve v Aqualast Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 679. See also; McKinnon v Secretary of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423. 
765 Hungerford Welch Staff, above n 714, 900. See also; Molan, above n 34, 281. 
766 (1971) AC 814. See also; R v McInnes (1971) 1 WLR 1600. 
767 Palmer v The Queen [1971] A.C. 814, 832 per Lord Morris. 
768 Ibid, cited in Freminot v. R [2015] SCCA 14, 7 per J. Msoffe (J.A). 
769 R v Gladstone Williams (1987) 3 ALL ER 411. See also; Attorney-General for Northern Ireland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1977] AC 105; Russell Heaton 
and  Claire de Than, Criminal Law (OUP Oxford, 2011) 273; Allen, above n 6, 206-207; Monaghan, above n 325, 381; Burrows, above n 43, 147; Fletcher and 
Sheppard, above n 678, 65. 
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A man who is attacked may defend himself, but may only do what is reasonably necessary to affect such a defence. 
Simple avoiding action may be enough if circumstances permit. What is reasonable will depend on the nature of the 
attack. If there is a relatively minor attack, it is not reasonable to use a degree of force which is wholly out of 
proportion to the demands of the situation. But if the moment is one of crisis for someone who is in imminent 
danger, it may be necessary to take instant action to avert that danger.771 
The English common law approach, as articulated in Palmer and Whyte, was picked up in s 3 of the Criminal 
Law Act (UK) 1967:  
A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or 
assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.772 
English common law used objective standards to determine whether the defendant acted reasonably under the 
circumstances.
773
 English common law allowed for the use of deadly force if a reasonable person would act in 
the same way.
774
 
To determine whether killing the victim in the course of self-defence was justified, a reasonable person test was 
used.
775
 The Law Commission of Great Britain stated: 
The basis of the present common law of self-defence is that [the defendant] has a complete defence to a charge of 
assault (of whatever seriousness, including murder) if two requirements are met... The second is that the steps that he 
takes are reasonable in the circumstances as [the defendant] believes them to be. Thus, [the defendant] is to be 
judged on the facts as he or she perceives them to be.776 The question of whether the force used was reasonable in 
those circumstances is, however, an objective one … the tests were succinctly described in [R v] Owino777 as ‘a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
770 3 ALL ER 416. 
771 R v Whyte (1987) 3 ALL ER 416, 285. 
772 Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK) s 3. 
773 R v Gladstone Williams (1987) 3 ALL ER 411. See also; Attorney-General for Northern Ireland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1977] AC 105; Heaton and  de 
Than, above n 770, 273; Allen, above n 6, 206-207; Monaghan, above n 325, 381; Burrows, above n 43, 147; Fletcher and Sheppard, above n 678, 65. 
774 John J Pitney Jr and John-Clark Levin, Private Anti-Piracy Navies: How Warships for Hire are Changing Maritime Security (Lexington Books, 2013) 93. 
See also; David Ormerod and  Karl Laird, Text, Cases, and Materials on Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 11.6.2.1; Monaghan, above n 325, 382; 
Anna Carline and Patricia Easteal, Shades of Grey - Domestic and Sexual Violence Against Women: Law Reform and Society (Routledge, 2014) 132; Alan Reed 
and  Ben Fitzpatrick, Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 216.  
775 Pitney Jr and Levin, above n 775 93. See also; Ormerod and  Laird, above n 775, 11.6.2.1; Monaghan, above n 325, 382; Carline and‎Easteal, above n 775.‎
132; Alan Reed,  Matthew Alan Reed and  Ben Fitzpatrick, Criminal Law (Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 216. 
776 R v Williams (Gladstone)[1987] 3 AII ER 411 where it was held that if a defendant was labouring under a mistake of fact as to the circumstances when he 
committed an alleged offence, he was to be judged according to his mistaken view of the facts regardless of whether his mistake was reasonable or 
unreasonable. The reasonableness or otherwise of the defendant’s belief was only material to the question of whether the belief was in fact held by the defendant 
at all. See also The Queen v Beckford (1988) AC 130. 
777 (1996) 2 Cr App R 128. 
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person may use such force as is [objectively] reasonable in the circumstances as he [subjectively] believes them to 
be.778 
English common law held that if a reasonable person would use deadly force under the defendant’s 
circumstances, the defendant was vindicated of all criminal liability.
779
 This reasoning was also present in 
Palmer v R,
780
 R v McKay,
781
 R v Howe
782
 and Viro v R.
783
  
English common law used circumstances surrounding the event of a crime to assess whether the actions 
performed by the defendant were reasonable in that set of circumstances. 
Briefly outlining the use of objective standards in other common law jurisdictions demonstrates the ubiquitous 
use of objective standards to judge human behaviour. The universal presence of objective standards once again 
confirms that judges believe they must use them consistently if the legal system is to be perceived as just.   
It is through reason that judicial integrity is upheld by an objective test, although it is not entirely objective. 
Using their reason, judges perceive that a purely subjective standard will not qualitatively assess the rightness or 
the wrongness of criminal and civil behaviour that has been called into question. 
The next section will discuss the presence of objective standards in assessing the valid application of the English 
common law maxim volenti non fit iniuria as a full defence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
778 R v Owino (1996) 2 Cr App R 128. See also; DPP v Armstrong-Braun [1999] Crim LR 416. See also; Law Commission of Great Britain, Partial Defences 
to Murder: Report on a Reference Under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (The Stationery Office, 2004) 73. 
779 Lanham, Wood, Bartal and Evans, above n 26, 81. See also; Mary Maynard and  June Purvis, Hetero Sexual Politics (Taylor & Francis, 2003) 195; Fiona 
Leverick, Killing in Self-defence (Oxford University Press, 2006) 1-3; Robert de Herbale (1203), noted in B Brown, 'Self Defence in Homicide from Strict 
Liability to Complete Exculpation' (1958) Criminal Law Review 584; TA Green, 'The Jury and the English Law of Homicide 1200-1600' (1976) 74(3) Michigan 
Law Review 414-499; Naomi D Hurnarf, The King's Pardon for Homicide before AD 1307 (Oxford University Press, 1969). 
780 (1971) AC 814. 
781 (1957) VR 560. 
782 (1958) 100 CLR 488. 
783 (1978) 141 CLR 88. 
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V EXAMPLES 
A VOLENTI NON FIT INIURIA 
 
The English common law maxim, volenti non fit iniuria when translated literally is rendered 'to one who 
volunteers, no harm is done.'
784
 This maxim expressed that if a person willingly placed himself in circumstances 
knowing that harm might result, he was unable to pursue legal proceedings against the other party in tort or 
delict.
785
 As explained by Lord Herschell in Smith v. Charles Baker and Sons,
786
 ‘one who has invited or 
assented to an act being done towards him cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong.’787 
 
This maxim also appeared in Roman law
788
 and canon law.
789
 According to Percy Winfield and John Jolowicz 
‘(i)n English law, Henry de Bracton, in his De Legibus Angliae (c. A.D. 1250-1258) use[d] the maxim, though 
not with the technicality that attached to it later,
790
 and in a Year Book case of 1305, it appears worded exactly 
as it is now.’791 
To use volenti non fit iniuria as a full defence,
792
 two elements must be proven. Firstly, the plaintiff was aware 
of the nature and extent of the risk involved or he should have known of the risk.
793
 This was called an obvious 
                                                          
784 Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack, Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict (Routledge, 2016) 292. See also; Ewan MacIntyre, Business Law 
(Longman, 2001) 357. 
785 Tushar Kanti Saha, Textbook on Legal Methods, Legal Systems & Research (Universal Law Publishing, 2010) 173. See also; Allan Beever, Rediscovering 
the Law of Negligence (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007) 371; Samuel Pufendorf and Jean Barbeyrac, Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books (The 
Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1729) 88; Diana Kloss, Occupational Health Law (John Wiley & Sons, 2013) 7.11; Burrows, above n 43, 182-183. 
786 [1891] AC 325. 
787 Smith v. Charles Baker and Sons [1891] AC 325, 360 (Lord Herschell). See also; Courtney Stanhope Kenny, A Selection of Cases Illustrative of the English 
Law of Tort (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 154; Lee Roach, Card and James' Business Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 457; John Murphy, Street on 
Torts (Oxford University Press, 2007) 190. 
788 Percy Henry Winfield and John Anthony Jolowicz, Tort (Sweet and Maxwell, 11th ed, 1979) 656. 
789 Winfield and Jolowicz, above n 789, 656. 
790 Henricus de Bracton and George Edward Woodbine, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae [1569 ](Yale University Press, 1942) vol 4 286. 
791 33-35 Edw. 1, Rolls Series, 9, Hunt arguendo, ‘volenti non fit iniuria.’ See also; Suryia Kumar Parmanand, 'Volenti non fit Iniuria in Roman Law' (1985) 
10(1) Journal for Juridical Science 34. 
792 Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 29th ed, 2004) 61-62. See also; Robert M Merkin and  Jeremy Stuart-Smith, The Law of Motor 
Insurance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) 251; Barbara Harvey and John Marston, Cases and Commentary on Tort (Oxford University Press, 2009) 264; Chris 
Turner, Unlocking Torts (Routledge, 2013) 106; Jon Rush and  Michael Ottley, Business Law (Cengage Learning, 2006) 155; Lee Roach, Card and James' 
Business Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 477.  
793 Smith v Austin Lifts Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 100. 
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risk that was identified by using objective standards.
794
 An obvious risk was defined as ‘a risk that, in the 
circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person.’795  
 
If the plaintiff failed to foresee a risk that a reasonable person would have foreseen, he could not sue for 
damages inflicted. This was because the plaintiff was taken to know the risk.  
 
The second element concerned the issue of consent. If the plaintiff expressly (by statement) or implicitly (by 
actions) consented to relinquish all claims for reparation, then the defendant was able to use this maxim as a full 
defence.
796
 
 
If the defendant was able to prove these two elements, the plaintiff was said to have acted negligently. In the 
words of the eminent English common law judge, Baron Alderson: 
 
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which 
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man 
would not do … provided, of course, that the party whose conduct is in question is already in a situation that brings 
him under the duty of taking care.797  
 
This was the essential qualification made by Pollock.
798
  
 
The volenti maxim only applied to risks that a reasonable person would have understood that the circumstances 
possessed an obvious risk.
799 For example, a boxer consents to being hit and the injuries that arise from being 
hit, but does not consent to his opponent hitting him with a blunt object. In this example, a reasonable person 
                                                          
794 Arvind and  Steele, above n 693, 47. See also; Mandy Shircore, 'Drinking, Driving and Causing Injury: The Position of the Passenger of an Intoxicated 
Driver’ (2007) 7(2) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 375; Tracey L Carver, 'Obviously Obvious: Obvious Risks, Policy and 
Claimant' (2007) 14(1) Inadvertence eLaw Journal 66-99; Natasha Schot, 'Negligent Liability in Sport' (2005) Sports Law eJournal 5. 
795 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 13(1). See also; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5F (1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 36(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) 
s 15 (1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 53(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5F(1). 
796 Vera Bermingham and Carol Brennan, Tort Law Directions (Oxford University Press, 2016) 174. See also; Imbree v McNeilly [2008] HCA 40, 81; Sharon 
Erbacher, Negligence and Illegality (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017) 225; Oonagh Corrigan, The Limits of Consent: A Socio-ethical Approach to Human Subject 
Research in Medicine (OUP Oxford, 2009) 43; Suryia Kumar Parmanand, Sports Injuries in the Civil Law: Volenti Non Fit Iniuria and Delictual Liability for 
Injuries in Sport (Lex Patria, 1987) 169; Mark Lunney and  Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (OUP Oxford, 2013) 280. 
797 Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co., I I Exch. 784 (1856). 
798 Francis Marion Burdick, Cases on Torts Selected and Arranged for the Use of Law Students in Connection with Pollock on Torts  (Banks & Brothers, 1891) 
357, citation from Charles Warren, 'Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence' (1895) 8(8) Harvard Law Review 457. 
799 Saha, above n 786, 173. 
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fighting a boxer understands the obvious risk of being hit and the possible injuries that pertain from these 
injuries. Therefore, a boxer cannot complain about the injuries he suffered in the ordinary course of boxing. The 
volenti non fit iniuria maxim would apply in this scenario. However, a reasonable person fighting as a boxer 
would not expect to be hit with a blunt object. For this reason, a boxer would be able to complain against the 
injuries sustained from being hit with this object.   
 
We see, then, that the English common law maxim, volenti non fit iniuria used objective standards to assess 
human behaviour. It was one more example of the universal presence of objective standards used to determine 
reasonableness.  
 
The following section will show the use of objective standards to assess a defendant’s behaviour when that 
defendant acted out of irresistible impulse.  
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B DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE 
In English law, the concept of ‘irresistible impulse’ was developed in the 1960 case R v. Byrne800 and was used 
as a partial defence.
801
 Irresistible impulse was pleaded only under the defence of diminished responsibility,
802
 
not under the defence of insanity.
803
 If diminished responsibility was established, the defendant was held to a 
diminished degree of moral responsibility if an ordinary man would not be able to resist the impulse experienced 
by the defendant.
804
  
Acquittal of criminal responsibility was allowed if the defendant’s mental disorder caused an805 ‘irresistible and 
uncontrollable impulse to commit the offence, even if he remained able to understand the nature of the offence 
and its wrongfulness.’806  
The Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Byrne held that the defendant was not guilty of murder by reason of 
diminished responsibility. Instead, the Court reduced his conviction to manslaughter.
807
 It was alleged that 
Byrne had uncontrollable violent and sexual desires that caused him to strangle and then mutilate a young 
                                                          
800 (1960) 2 QB 396. See Henry Benedict Tam, A Philosophical Study of the Criteria for Responsibility Ascriptions: Responsibility and Personal Interactions 
(E Mellen Press, 1990) 73. See also; J E Hall Williams, 'Irresistible Impulse and Diminished Responsibility' (1961) 24(1) The Modern Law Review 164; Keith 
Bishop, 'Duress and Mental Abnormality' (Paper presented at The Jamaica Bar Association Seminar, Renaissance, Jamaica Centre, 2-3 March 2002) 81; Philip 
Handler,  Henry Mares and  Ian Williams, Landmark Cases in Criminal Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017) 137. 
801 Lee Peng Kok,  Molly Cheang and  Kuan Tsee Chee, Diminished Responsibility: With Special Reference to Singapore (NUS Press, 1990) 261. See also; 
Great Britain: Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales?: A Consultation Paper (The Stationery Office, 2006) 6.8-6.12; Steven 
Yannoulidis, Mental State Defences in Criminal Law (Routledge, 2016) 196; Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University 
Press, 2016) 311; Great Britain: Parliament - Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Coroners and Justice Bill, Eighth Report of Session 2008-
09, Report, Together with Formal Minutes and Written Evidence (The Stationery Office, 2009) 24. 
802 Diminished responsibility is defined in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) s 52 which amended section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (UK). Cf. Great 
Britain, Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales: Vol 1-4 (Butterworths, 1985) 153. See also; Reed and  Bohlander, above n 756, 184; Mischa Allen, 
Concentrate Questions and Answers Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 33; Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in the Criminal 
Law (OUP Oxford, 2012) 235; Claire de Than and  Russell Heaton, Criminal Law (OUP Oxford, 2013) 220. 
803 Storey and Lidbury, above n 24, 252. See also; Martin and  Storey, above n 326, 279; Lawrie Reznek, Evil Or Ill?: Justifying the Insanity Defence 
(Psychology Press, 1997) 268-269; Richard Langton Gregory, The Oxford Companion to the Mind (Oxford University Press, 2004) 255; Reed and Bohlander, 
above n 756, 185; Christopher Berry Gray, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction (Routledge, 2012) 190.  
804 J C Smith and Brian Hogan Smith, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Butterworths Law, 7th ed, 1999) 214. See also; R Sparks, 'Diminished 
Responsibility in Theory and Practice' (1964) 27 Modern Law Review 16; Nigel Walker, Crime and Insanity in England and Wales: The Historical Perspective 
(Edinburgh University Press, 1968) vol 1 162; Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry (Cambridge University Press, 1984) 355–356. 
805 Narriman C Shahrokh et al., The Language of Mental Health: A Glossary of Psychiatric Terms (American Psychiatric Publications, 2011) 312. See also; 
Christopher D Webster and  Margaret A Jackson, Impulsivity: Theory, Assessment, and Treatment (Guilford Press, 1997) 73. 
806 George Dix, 'Criminal Responsibility and Mental Impairment in American Criminal Law: Response to the Hinckley Acquittal in Historical Perspective’ in 
David Weisstub (eds), Law and Mental Health: International Perspective (Pergamon Press, 1984) vol 1 7. 
807 Storey and  Lidbury,‎retat‎e‎24,‎102. See also; Jay Robert Nash, World Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Murder (Rowman & Littlefield, 1992) 100 and Eve 
C Johnstone et al., Companion to Psychiatric Studies (Churchill Livingstone, 2004) 753-754. 
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woman.
808
 Lord Parker C.J. broadened the definition of ‘abnormality of mind’ to include those lacking ‘the 
ability to exercise will-power to control acts in accordance with [their] rational judgment.’809 
An abnormality of mind '[was] a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the 
reasonable man, [earlier defined as ‘a man with a normal mind’],810 would term it abnormal.’811 An impulse was 
irresistible if the impulse as too strong to be resisted by a reasonable person.
812
 
Lord Parker used objective standards to establish the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct to determine 
whether he experienced an ‘abnormality of the mind.’ Thus, if it was demonstrated that the impulse experienced 
by the defendant was such that a reasonable person ‘would have been unable to resist it, then the plea may [have 
been] admitted in defence and in mitigation.’813  
The reasonable person test was also used to acquit or convict the person in question. In cases assessing the 
occurrence of an irresistible impulse, if the defendant acted like a reasonable person, that is if a reasonable 
person was unable to resist the impulse experienced; the defendant was acquitted of criminal liability for he 
acted reasonably.  
Although this chapter has used the reasonable person standard to convict the defendant, this same standard was 
used to exonerate the defendant if he acted like a reasonable person.  
As observed by Lord Keating in R v Welsh,
814
 English common law used objective standards to assess the 
conduct of the defendant when the defence of diminished responsibility was raised. If a reasonable person in the 
                                                          
808 Kok,  Cheang and  Chee, above n 802, 18. See also; Fiona Raitt and Suzanne Zeedyk, The Implicit Relation of Psychology and Law: Women and Syndrome 
Evidence (Routledge, 2002) 68; Nigel Morland, The Criminologist (Library Press, 1971) 260; David Canter, Criminal Psychology: Topics in Applied 
Psychology (Routledge, 2014) 65; Michael Craft, Psychopathic Disorders and Their Assessment (Elsevier, 2013) 45. 
809 R v Byrne (1960) 2 QB 396, 403. See also; Allen, above n 6, 152; Monaghan, above n 325, 125; Molan, above n 34, 147; David Ormerod and ‎Jwheace 
Hooper, Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2012 (OUP Oxford, 2011) 184. 
810 Emphasis by Michael John Craft in Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Baillière Tindall, 1984) 96. Also cited in Bassant Puri and  Ian Treasaden, Psychiatry: An 
Evidence-Based Text (CRC Press, 2009) 1164; Basant Puri, ‎ tetae‎eatue‎reG‎Heather McKeem, Mental Health Law 2E A Practical Guide (CRC Press, 2012) 
83. 
811 R v Byrne (1960) 2 QB 396, 403. See also; Allen, above n 6, 152; Brenda Mothersole and Ann Ridley, A-level Law in Action (Cengage Learning EMEA, 
1999) 223; Hungerford Welch Staff, above n 714, 671; Eve C Johnstone, ‎yraaG‎ weeaeKhre‎nuteh‎reGStephen M Lawrie, Companion to Psychiatric Studies 
(Elsevier Health Sciences, 2010) 754; Lee Peng Kok,  Molly Cheang and  Kuan Tsee Che, Mental Disorders and the Law (NUS Press, 1994) 83. 
812 John Deigh and David Dolinko, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law (OUP USA, 2011) 307. See also; J W C Turner and A LL Armitage, 
Cases on Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 1964) 260; unknown, American Law Reports (ALR 3D): Cases and Annotations (Lawyers Co-
Operative, 1977) vol 77 321; Reznek, above n 804, 165.  
813 Alexander Ross Kerr Mitchell, Psychological Medicine in Family Practice (Baillière Tindall, 1971) 170. 
814 R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336. 
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same circumstance as the defendant would have lost control of their abilities, then the defendant was able to use 
diminished responsibility as a defence.
815
 Lord Keating observed that:  
When the law says that it allows for the infirmity of human nature, it does not say that if a man, without sufficient 
provocation, gives way to angry passion, and does not use his reason to control it - the law does not say that an act of 
homicide, intentionally committed under the influence of that passion, is excused or reduced to manslaughter. The 
law contemplates the case of a reasonable man, and requires that the provocation be such … that ... a [reasonable] 
man might naturally be induced, in the anger of the moment, to commit the act.816  
It was established in Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Camplin [1978]
817
 that the objective reasonable 
man test took into consideration the defendant’s age, sex and other characteristics relevant to the gravity of the 
provocation.
818 Lord Diplock asserted the objective test in the strictest possible way,819 ‘[t]he provocation was 
sufficient to make a reasonable man in like circumstances act as the defendant did….it is an objective test.’820  
 
In this case, the defendant, Camplin, who was 15 years old, hit the victim over the head with a chapati pan after 
the victim raped and taunted the defendant, causing him to lose control. The victim consequently died from the 
blow. The question under examination was whether the defendant should be held to a reasonable person 
standard that referred to a ‘reasonable adult’ or a ‘reasonable boy of 15.’821  
 
The test in this case was ‘whether the provocation was enough to have made a reasonable person of the same 
age as the defendant in the same circumstances do as he did.’822  
 
Lord Simon was of the view that ‘in determining whether a person of reasonable self-control would lose it in the 
circumstances, the entire factual situation, which includes the characteristics of the defendant, must be 
considered.’823  
 
                                                          
815 Reed and Bohlander, above n 756, 109. 
816 R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336, 338. 
817 UKHL 2. 
818 Janet Loveless, Complete Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2016) 275. 
819 Graeme Coss, 'God is a Righteous Judge, Strong and Patient and God is Provoked Every Day: A Brief History of the Doctrine of Provocation in England' 
(1991) 13(4) Sydney Law Review 592. 
820 DPP v Camplin [1978] AC 705, as quoted by Lord Diplock. 
821 Molan, above n 34, 211. 
822 DPP v Camplin [1978] 1 QB 254, 262 (Bridge LJ). 
823 DPP v Camplin [1978] 1 QB 254, 727. 
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Whilst the reasonable person test took into consideration the subjective elements of the defendant, an objective 
test was used to assess the issue of accountability. The question of assessing misconduct was an objective 
standard; the question of attribution was subjective.
824
 In this case, the two elements together were used to 
assess culpability. But once again, subjective standards were only allowed as part of the adjudication process 
because there was a perception of overall objectivity.  
 
In this section, I have shown that objective standards were used in assessing the validity of using irresistible 
impulse as a partial defence and the reasonable person’s relationship in assessing the issue of provocation.  
 
VI DISCUSSION 
Whilst objective standards did not clearly present itself in the form of the reasonable person test until the 1703 
case of R v Jones, the use of objective standards can be traced to the origin of English law in the code of 
Ethelbert (600 A.D.). 
There is much debate surrounding the use of purely objective standards
825
 as opposed to using objective-
subjective standards.
826
 Despite this controversy, one theme remains; in either perspective, objective standards 
were used in judicial reasoning to judge human behaviour. English common law did not use an alternative 
method.   
The consistent use of objective standards to evaluate human beaviour demonstrates its reliability and cardinal 
importance for the perception of a just legal system. 
 
 
 
                                                          
824 George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1978) 506. See also; Dolores A Donovan & Stephanie M Wildman, 'Is the 
Reasonable Man Obsolete: A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation' 14(3) Loyola Law Review 459. 
825 John Kaplan et al., Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Little, Brown and Corporation, 3rd ed, 1996) 630-648. See also; Sanford H Kadish et al., Criminal 
Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials (Little, Brown and Corporation, 6th ed, 1995) 801– 826; Nourse, above n 26, 34; Andrew Hemming, 'Reasserting 
the Place of Objective Tests in Criminal Responsibility: Ending the Supremacy of Subjective Tests' (2011) 13(1) University of Notre Dame Australia Law 
Review 69-112. 
826 As argued by Heather R Skinas in 'Not Just a Conjured Afterthought: Using Duress as a Defense for Battered Women Who Fail to Protect' (1997) 85(4) 
California Law Review 993-1042. See also; Tasmania Law Reform Institute, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, Report No 7 (2006) 104-112; Nourse, 
above n 26, 33; Catherine Crosby, Subjectivism and Objectivism in the Criminal Law: An Examination of the Limits of Recklessness and Negligence (PhD 
Thesis, Teesside University, 2014). 
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VII CONCLUSION 
Although this chapter focused on objective standards used in English common law from the year 1700 A.D. 
onwards, objective standards were used in English common law before then. In the seventh century, English 
jurists used objective standards as presented in the laws of Ethelbert and the laws of Ine. English also used 
objective standards in the ninth century as displayed in the laws of Alfred. Although the use of objective 
standards can be traced back to the earliest formation of English law, for the purpose of convenience, this 
chapter focused on the use of objective standards in English law post 1700 A.D.  
 
In English civil law, the reasonable person was defined as, the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus,’827 or the 
‘reasonable man of ordinary intelligence and experience.’828 Although English common law did not possess a 
list that featured all the characteristics of the reasonable person, it did proclaim that the reasonable person 
possessed the ability to reason.
829
  
 
The reasonable person was used as the objective standard against which individual conduct was measured. The 
origin of this idea in English common law can be traced to the 1703 case of R v Jones.
830
 However, the case of 
Vaughan v Menlove introduced the reasonable person test to tort law in 1837. This does not mean that objective 
standards were not used before 1703. Rather, it says that objective standards, and particularly the idea of the 
reasonable person, were more fully developed after 1700 A.D. Today, the reasonable person test is partially 
codified in England and Wales by s 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK).  
 
The reasonable person test was purely objective up until the Camplin case of 1978. Following this case, the 
courts used the objective standard of a reasonable person holding the subjective knowledge of the actual person 
involved,
831
 including his state of belief of the facts, even if mistaken.
832
  
                                                          
827 McQuire v Western Morning News Co Ltd [1903] 2KB 100, 109. 
828 Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448, 457. 
829 Adams, above n 20, 266. See also; Tinus, above n 20, 24; Naffine, above n 20, 64; Nussbaum, above n 20, 326 327; Cassel et al., above n 20, 1235. 
830 R. v Jones (1703) 6 Mod. 105, 87 Eng. Rep. 464. See also; Stern, above n 696, 1. 
831 Ramadan, above n 33, 66; Larry Alexander, 'The Morality of The Criminal Law: A Symposium in Honour of Professor Sandy Kadish: Insufficient Concern: 
A Unified Conception of Criminal Liability' (2000) 88 California Law Review 936; State v Ford 473 So. 2d 931 (La. C. App. 3d Cir.); In Re Winship 397 U.S. 
358 (1970); Mullaney v Wilbur 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and Patterson v New York 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
832 Joshua Getzler, 'Use of Force in Protecting Property' (2006) 7(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 154. See, e.g., Wootton v. Dawkins, 140 Eng. Rep. 477 (C.P. 
1857). 
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English common law rejected a purely objective standard because of the unjust application of this standard 
because real life situations use a standard that varies from individual to individual. However, English common 
law courts also rejected a purely subjective standard 
833
 because it placed the court at the mercy of the party or 
parties involved.   
 
English common law relied on objectivity and objective standards to judge wisely. The presence of some 
subjectivity does not undermine this conclusion. In fact, it strengthens the operation of objective standards by 
allowing the personal idiosyncrasies of the defendant to be taken into consideration whilst simultaneously 
adjudicating human conduct by using objective standards. Whether objective standards were used in isolation or 
synergistically with subjective elements, objective standards were always present in judicial reasoning.  
 
This suggests that common law recognised the importance of objective standards for the perception of a just 
legal system whilst simultaneously acknowledging the inability of subjective standards to ground the concept of 
right and wrong.  
 
The reasonable person appeared in the English common law maxim, volenti non fit iniuria. The doctrine 
underlying this maxim held that if a person willingly placed himself in circumstances knowing that harm might 
result, he was unable to pursue legal proceedings against the other party in tort or delict.
834
 If the plaintiff was 
aware of an obvious risk, he was unable to sue the defendant. If the plaintiff failed to foresee a risk that a 
reasonable person would have foreseen, he was unable to sue for damages inflicted. This was because the 
plaintiff possessed enough reasoning capacity to understand socially acceptable behaviour.  
 
The reasonable person was also used in assessing the legal defence of irresistible impulse. The concept of 
irresistible impulse provided that a person was not criminally responsible if, as a consequence of an abnormality 
                                                          
833 Watt, above n 37, 485. See also; Burling and Lazarus, above n 37, 14, Davies, Virgo and Burn, above n 37, 886; Clements and Abass, above n 37, 497, 
Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords, Great Britain. Privy Council. Judicial Committee, Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales, 
above n 37, 172; Clarke and Yates, above n 37, 100–101. 
834 Saha, above n 786, 173. See also; Beever, above n 786, 371; Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, above n 786, 88; Kloss, above n 786, 7.11; Burrows, above n 43, 
182-183. 
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of the mind, the defendant experienced an irresistible impulse that caused him to lose the ability to control his 
actions.
835
  
This test was also used to assess whether the impulse experienced by the defendant was in fact irresistible.
836
  
Under English common law, a man was justified in defending himself if a reasonable person under those 
circumstances would have acted in the same manner. If the circumstances required a reasonable person to 
defend himself, the defendant was exonerated from the criminal culpability. However, using physical force in 
circumstances where a reasonable person would not have used similar force placed culpability on the defendant. 
The following chapter will defend this thesis against the argument from tradition that briefly states that objective 
standards are universal because they were blindly adopted from prior legal systems and philosophies. This 
chapter argues that legal precepts are not blindly adopted but rather, are assessed to see whether they are 
befitting to society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
835 Donald Hermann, Hermann's Mental Health and Disability Law in a Nutshell (West Academic, 2008) 261. See also; Jon E Grant and Marc N Potenza, The 
Oxford Handbook of Impulse Control Disorders (Oxford University Press, USA, 2011) 548, Lyn K Slater and  Kara R Finck, Social Work Practice and the Law 
(Springer Publishing Company, 2011) 258; Harlow M Huckabee, Lawyers, Psychiatrists, and Criminal Law: Cooperation or Chaos? (C C Thomas, 1980) 10. 
836 As per Allen v State (1982), ‘the law require[d] that the irresistible impulse of passion be caused by a serious and highly provoking injury, or attempted 
injury, sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.’  Because a reasonable person would be unable to endure the impulse experienced by the 
defendant due to an abnormality of the mind, the defendant was justified for he acted according to objective reasonableness. This does not mean that a 
reasonable person suffers from an abnormality of the mind but rather, the impulse, if experienced by a reasonable person, was irresistible. 
 
Allen v. State, 98 Nev. 354, 356, 647 P.2d 389, 390-91 (1982). See also; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 218 (1862); Marsha L. Levick and Elizabeth-Ann 
Tierney, 'The United States Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J D B v. North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody Analysis: 
Can a More Reasoned Justice' (2012) 47 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 521. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
 AN ARGUMENT FROM TRADITION 
I INTRODUCTION 
All five legal systems – Jewish law, Athenian law, Roman law, canon law and English common law, used 
objective standards to evaluate human behaviour. Jurists of these systems concluded that objective standards 
applied using reason, resonated with all men.
837
 The universal presence of objective standards in these legal 
systems that all human beings reason using objective standards to qualitatively assess the rightness or the 
wrongness of criminal and civil behaviour.  
Before addressimg the practical implications of this finding as discussed in the following chapter, it is important 
to acknowledge and refute one possible objection to this thesis.  
This objection is that tradition rather than human reason could have influenced the choice of objective standards 
in adjudication in each of these legal systems. In other words, it is not innate in human reason to believe that 
objective standards are important; rather, tradition has moulded or influenced this impression. The argument 
continues that an individual would not independently conclude that objective standards are important when 
assessing whether conduct is right or wrong. These legal systems chose objective standards because they had 
adopted another legal system and its underlying philosophy. Objective standards had simply been copied from 
earlier philosophies where they were laced into the legal system. In not so, subjective standards might suffice.   
This argument misconstrues the role of tradition within a legal framework. It assumes that a legal system, or its 
philosophy, is adopted without taking into consideration whether it fits into society or whether it conforms to 
human logic and reason. I call this argument ‘an argument from tradition’. Although there are varying 
definitions and roles that tradition plays, legal tradition works quite differently and should be analysed in that 
manner. When this chapter talks about legal tradition, it is not talking about precedents in case law but rather, 
the manner in which a country adopts the legal system or philosophy of another.   
                                                          
837 Lakoff and Johnson, above n 378, 423. See also; Michael Ridgwell Austin, Explorations in Art, Theology and Imagination (Routledge, 2016) 54; Scott R 
Stroud, Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric (Penn State Press, 2014) 192; James DiCenso, Kant, Religion, and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 47; 
Nicholas E Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (CUA Press, 2 011) 97; Tobias Hoffmann, Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present (CUA 
Press, 2008) vol 49 165. 
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This chapter does not assert that all forms of tradition should be rejected. For example, in Judaism, rabbinic 
tradition is viewed as a binding authority as the necessary complement to Scripture.
838
 Although Jewish 
traditions are binding and, thus, commanded to be followed, is this understanding of tradition similar to legal 
tradition? That is, just as Jewish tradition is binding and authoritative, is legal tradition binding and 
authoritative? No.
839
  
This argument assumes that legal tradition necessarily invokes legal transplantation. Although legal 
transplantation comes in many forms,
840
 briefly defined, legal transplantation is a concept and process that 
involves ‘the transplantation of a doctrine from one jurisdiction to another.’841  
                                                          
838 Mark S Kinzer and Jennifer Rosner, Israel's Messiah and the People of God: A Vision for Messianic Jewish Covenant Fidelity (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 
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Legal transplantation does not take into account the social perspective.
842
 Therefore, all the legal principles and 
philosophies from a former legal system are adopted into another legal system without taking into consideration 
social conformity and compatibility. However, this thesis argues laws are adopted into another legal framework 
using ‘legal transposition,’ not legal transplantation.843 Legal transposition involves the adoption of a legal 
system’s philosophy, however, such adoption takes into consideration the culture of that particular society. It 
also considers whether the legal precepts and philosophy are beneficial to that society.
844
    
Legal transposition consists of adopting laws whilst altering them to conform to social culture:
845
  
It is difficult to point to one country that has a pure legal tradition without influence from other systems. For 
historical reasons, as well as political and economic influences, the legal systems of countries are often an 
amalgamation of various legal systems, incorporating elements of different legal traditions.846 
The argument from tradition defines tradition as the presence of re-occurring conduct that continues because of 
habit even though there is no justifiable reason for it.
847
 However, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr (1841-1935 
A.D.),
848
 United States State Supreme Court judge,
849 
disagreed. Holmes argued: 
For the rational study of the law, the blackletter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the 
man of statistics and the master of economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
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was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
850
 
To elaborate, Holmes suggested that tradition had a foundation in reason and practicality. The application of 
traditional thought was appropriate in so far as this traditional perspective was critically analysed and assessed 
in light of modern application. Holmes implied that society should reconsider the merits of the rule that had 
come before; explore the extent to which its initial justification remained valid and ‘recognise their duty of 
weighing considerations of social advantage’ that attach to the rule.851  
Holmes applied reason before he accepted or disregarded tradition. If reason said the tradition had utility, he 
retained it. If not, he disregarded or amended it. The point Holmes was illustrating was that he did not simply 
accept a particular law or philosophy because it stemmed from tradition. He said in effect, that tradition in and 
of itself, had no value. When contested, each tradition must reassert itself to endure. 
Holmes emphasised that there were no laws that are immune to reconsideration, ‘[o]ur law is open to 
reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind. No concrete proposition is self-evident,
852
 
no matter how ready we may be to accept it.’853 
When legal precepts or legal philosophies are considered for adoption, reason is used to assess whether it is 
applicable to that society. If it is not, it is either rejected or amended to suit social standards. This shows that 
objective standards were not simply viewed as important due to tradition. Holmes presented that even if law, or 
philosophical thought, was derived from tradition, it must be reconsidered.  
Even if the idea that objective standards are necessary for judicial reasoning was derived from tradition, this 
tradition would be analysed and reconsidered by the authorised individuals to examine whether this standard 
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was suitable for a just legal system. The fact that objective tests were present in various jurisdictions, from an 
array of geographical locations, from different cultural beliefs, within a wide spread of time in history, illustrates 
that this philosophy has undergone extensive consideration. This philosophy had been accepted, adopted and 
applied to Jewish law, Athenian law, Roman law, canon law and English common law, and has thus stood the 
test of time.  
Holmes further argued that rights were willed by the dominant forces of an age and community.
854
 Whatever 
prevailed was right,
855
 and therefore all political developments were good until they were no longer in 
ascendancy, and every regime was worthy until it was overthrown or crumbled.
856
 
Objective standards met this criterion since it was adopted in all legal systems assessed. We can therefore 
conclude that objective tests were not adopted due to habit but rather, had undergone examination to test 
whether such a philosophy would benefit and adapt into the social context.  
Despite Holmes’ methodological approach when assessing tradition, he did not disregard its antiquity. Holmes 
partially considered the antiquity of tradition to determine its validity and usage for modern society. 
Holmes argued that if we want to understand why a particular rule of law had taken its particular shape, we go 
to tradition.
857
 Holmes further contended that tradition illustrated that law was best justified when it had 
received acceptance and was accustomed to man.
858
  
Taking into consideration Holmes’ argument, tradition was used to help understand how and why objective tests 
were the way they were. Tradition illustrates that objective standards had been adopted in all legal societies to 
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adjudicate human behaviour. Further, tradition acknowledges that objective standards are justified in fulfilling 
its purpose in assessing the moral standing of the defendant’s conduct due to its universal acceptance and 
accustom to men in varying societies throughout history around the world.   
Thus far, we have seen at least three characteristics illustrated by Holmes that determine whether tradition was 
considered useful and, therefore, should be adopted. Firstly, whether this tradition had been accepted in society, 
secondly, if said tradition had been accustomed to men and thirdly, if reason determined its utility in modern 
society. Therefore, Holmes did not adopt a law solely based upon its value of antiquity, though it was an 
important factor; this tradition must have also undergone meticulous consideration to assess whether it was 
befitting to society.   
The tradition of using objective standards to evaluate human behaviour conforms to Holmes’ assessment of 
validity. The origin of objective standards is ancient, fulfilling the criterion of antiquity; it has been accustomed 
to men in varying jurisdictions, declaring its social acceptance. Objective standards have also been used in 
Jewish law, Athenian law, Roman law, canon law and English common law. It has undergone a scrupulous 
examination to assess whether it is beneficial for society. In conclusion, although objective standards may be 
‘traditional,’ this tradition was not blindly adopted but rather had undergone a process to ensure it was befitting 
for society.  
 In addition, Holmes emphasised: 
We are called on to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, and the cost. We learn 
that for everything we have to give up something else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the 
other advantage we lose, and to know what we are going to elect.859 
Holmes illustrated that before legislation was implemented, the legislation in question must undergo 
consideration. The costs involved, along with the pre-implementation procedures, were taken into account 
before enforcing this legislation. Legislators contemplated the advantages of enforcing this legislation. If the 
legislation was considered to be advantageous to society, it was enforced, if not, it was rejected. 
This procedure was also used when adopting a traditional legal framework. If the idea of using objective 
standards to judge human behaviour was passed down through tradition, it too would have undergone strenuous 
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consideration before being adopted into the legal system. The fact that this ideology was present in various 
jurisdictions, illustrates that it was advantageous toward social justice and, therefore, was universally used.  
The argument against this thesis argues against a misconstrued view of legal tradition. Traditionality is found in 
almost all legal systems, not as a peripheral, but as a fundamental characteristic of them.
860 
Tradition contains 
the following characteristics.  
II PASTNESS 
The first characteristic of tradition is based upon its antiquity. The most generally accepted characteristic of 
tradition is what T.S. Elliot coined as ‘pastness.’861 The substances of every tradition have, or have at least been 
believed by its members to have, originated some substantial time in the past.
862
 
III AUTHORITATIVE PRESENCE 
The second characteristic of tradition is contained within its authoritative status. In brief, tradition draws 
attention to the authoritative presence of the past.
863
 However, as Patrick Glenn, former Professor at the Faculty 
of Law at McGill University,
864 
noted, tradition is not a matter of passive acceptance. Rather, even when there is 
little or no resistance, there is a process of ‘massaging,’ involving selection, refinement and the filtering out of 
‘noise.’865  
A legal system adopts a tradition in the form of a prior legal philosophy or its precepts if such adoption is 
convinced that it helps society. That is, whether it simplifies or expedites. Whilst the authority of the system 
may persuade one to implement it, it is not the deciding factor for its implementation. Holmes claimed that we 
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are to ‘recognise their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage’ that attach to the rule.866 Before 
adopting a traditional element of law, it must only be adopted if it will be advantageous to society. 
If objective standards were used because they were passed down through tradition, it can be inferred that such 
adoption was based upon its ability to be advantageous toward society. Since the tradition of an objective test 
was present in all legal systems that have been assessed in this chapter, it can be inferred that objective 
standards are advantageous given their universal applicability.  
IV PERSUASION THROUGH REASON 
The third characteristic of tradition is its ability to persuade through reason. Traditions are adopted if they 
provide reasons for adherence.
867
 
Patrick Glenn provided an overall view of tradition that was captured well in the following passage:  
Traditions and hence communities, thus come to be defined by the totality of the flow of information in the world, 
including its quality and meaning. In the past, the flow of information from tradition to tradition was largely that of 
formal learning (translatio studii), since contact between traditions was less frequent. Evolutionary (autonomous) or 
multi-independent theories of social development thus enjoyed considerable support. Today, these theories have 
become increasingly hard to defend, at least in contemporary contexts, since it has become increasingly hard to 
identify any tradition which maintains itself through exclusively internal reflection and debate. All of the legal 
traditions discussed here, which cover the greater part (if not the totality) of the world’s population, are in constant 
contact with one or more of the other legal traditions. There is thus the possibility of transmission and exchange of 
all forms of tradition, and of all or most of their content. Formal learning is now accompanied by other forms of 
diffusion.868 
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V CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, legal tradition was not adopted unless it was advantageous to society. Tradition was used 
providing it simplified or expedited. Traditions survived if they benefited society. In this context, objective 
standards were only used if they were efficacious in adjudicating human conduct and were an integral part of 
forming a just legal system.   
Since objective standards were used in various jurisdictions throughout history, I conclude that this tradition is 
socially advantageous for judicial reasoning. Even if the only reason objective standards were adopted in a 
society was due to slavish adherence to tradition, they would only have survived for such an extensive period of 
time if they worked effectively, and they did.  
The following chapter of this thesis will explain why it is important we understand that all human judgement 
relies on objective elements like those evident in the reasonable man test of English common law. What are the 
present day implications of this research? What can we learn from the universal use of objective standards? 
Does or will society continue to reason using objective standards when assessing morally sensitive issues? What 
are the implications of not following this intuition?  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEVIATING FROM REASON  
I INTRODUCTION 
Thus far, this thesis has shown that objective standards were used in Jewish law, ancient Athenian law, Roman 
law, canon law and English common law. All these legal systems have rejected, either implicitly
869
 or 
explicitly,
870
 purely subjective tests to judge human behaviour. Each of these legal systems reasoned that 
objective standards were a necessary element in the qualitative assessment of the rightness or wrongness of 
human behaviour. Therefore, human reason, an ability that is universal to all mentally complete human beings, 
holds that objective standards play a significant role in any legal system that is to be perceived as just by its 
citizens.  
This chapter will explain why it is important we understand that all human judgement relies on objective 
elements like those evident in the reasonable person test of English common law. This chapter will also discuss 
the present-day implications of this research and what we can learn from this insight about objective standards.  
Rejecting objective standards to judge human conduct would place the court at the mercy of the subjective 
feelings of a party or parties.
871 
 
To demonstrate the present-day implications of this research, I will provide examples where some elements of 
the objective reasonable person test were not used.  
In the first example, I will assess the use of mandatory sentencing laws in Western Australian and the Northern 
Territory. This section will also assess the ‘one-punch’ laws enforced in New South Wales.  
In my second example, I assess the effectiveness and the public acceptability of an example of the use of strict 
liability laws in Australia, focusing on strict liability as it relates to directors of corporate trustees. 
In both examples, the legislation prevents the judge from assessing all the objective elements of an alleged 
crime and that restriction on otherwise unfettered judicial reasoning leads to the perception of injustice. This 
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chapter suggests there is a correlation between the abandonment of objective standards in law and the perception 
that the resulting laws, and the system as a whole, are unjust.   
II MANDATORY SENTENCING LAWS 
The Australian Law Reform Commission stated that: 
It is unusual for legislation to set minimum or mandatory penalties for criminal offences. Mandatory sentencing laws 
require that judicial officers deliver a minimum or fixed penalty (for the purposes of this paper, a term of 
imprisonment) upon conviction of an offender.872 
Mandatory sentencing laws have been the subject of criticism because they restrict judicial use of objective 
standards. The Law Council of Australia has voiced its disdain: 
In the Law Council’s view, mandatory sentencing laws are arbitrary and limit an individual’s right to a fair trial by 
preventing judges from imposing an appropriate penalty based on the unique circumstances of each offence and 
offender. Mandatory sentencing disproportionately impacts upon particular groups within society, including 
Indigenous peoples, juveniles, persons with a mental illness or cognitive impairment, or the impoverished. Such 
regimes are costly and there is a lack of evidence as to their effectiveness as a deterrent or their ability to reduce 
crime.873 
While mandatory sentencing laws are found in most Australian jurisdictions in various forms,
874
 I will not focus 
on a particular law but rather, the concept of mandatory sentencing generally. However, I will refer to various 
laws as used in Western Australia, the Northern Territory and New South Wales.   
A WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
In Western Australia, there is a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment—75 per cent of the maximum 
sentence— imposed upon conviction for causing grievous bodily harm when committed during an aggravated 
home robbery.
875
 The charge of grievous bodily harm carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, or 
14 years if committed in circumstances of aggravation. This means that the mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment for an offender of grievous bodily harm is seven and a half years, or 10 and a half years 
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imprisonment if committed in circumstances of aggravation.
876
 Declan Roche
877
 stated that - ‘It is argued that 
mandatory sentencing prevents crimes through incapacitation and deterrence, incapacitating repeat offenders 
and deterring those offenders as well as other potential offenders.’878 However, according to research undertaken 
in the United States, this is not the case.
879
 
Repeat burglary offenders also face a minimum term of imprisonment. Western Australian law mandates that an 
adult offender will be sentenced to two years imprisonment if that person has two prior convictions for 
burglary.
880
 
Mandatory minimum sentences are problematic because burglary covers a comprehensive range of conduct that 
varies in nature and gravity. The Australian Human Rights Commission, in an example of a young offender, has 
noted that:  
Although the legislation assumes that every offence of home burglary is equally serious, home burglary covers a 
wide range of circumstances. In one case, a 12-year-old Aboriginal boy from a regional area, with a history of 
welfare intervention, educational problems and substance abuse, was sentenced to 12 months detention for entering a 
house in company with others and taking a wallet containing $4.00. His previous burglaries consisted of entering a 
laundry room in a hotel where nothing was removed and a school canteen where a can of soft drink was taken.881 
The Australian Law Reform Commission has also noted that, in some instances, Aboriginal offenders have been 
charged with burglary after they had entered dwellings looking for food. These offenders have also been 
charged for wandering in and out of houses in a manner that was not regarded as inherently ‘criminal’ in the 
context of those communities.
882
  
Even though it may have been ‘reasonable’ for Aboriginal offenders and their companions to wander in and out 
of houses in their community, they were still charged with burglary. It could be argued that a reasonable person 
in an aboriginal community would have conducted himself in the same manner. Therefore, because such 
‘offenders’ likely acted reasonably according to the relevant community standards, the criminal charges against 
                                                          
876 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 873, 4.9. 
877 Lecturer in Law, Law Department, London School of Economics. 
878 Declan Roche, ‘Mandatory Sentencing’ (Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No 138, Australian Institute of Criminology, December 1999) 2. 
879 Based on the available research in the United Statesthat focused on the preventive effect of mandatory sentencing laws in New York, Florida, Pennsylvania 
Massachusetts and Michigan.). See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press, 1996) 140, cited by Declan Roche in ‘Mandatory Sentencing’ 
(Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No 138, Australian Institute of Criminology, December 1999).  
880 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 401(4)(b). For an example involving a young Aboriginal man, see Western Australia v Ryan (Unreported, 
District Court of Western Australia, 24 October 2016). See also; Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 873, 4.10. 
881 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001 (2002) 105. 
882 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 873, 4.12. 
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them are perceived by the relevant community to be unreasonable. However, because the defendant’s conduct 
was not assessed using all the applicable elements of objective reasonableness, they were charged with burglary 
and the judge before whom the defendant appeared was legislatively obliged to impose a mandatory sentence 
that was heavier than the community thought reasonable. This was because the judge’s ability to assess all the 
relevant objective elements of the alleged crime was foreclosed.  
In 2001, the Western Australia Department of Justice (‘Department’) reviewed the mandatory sentencing 
provisions that applied to home burglary offences and concluded that the amendments did not enhance justice. 
However, the Department did not make any recommendations regarding the abolition of these mandatory 
sentencing provisions.
883
 I believe that the Department should have recommended abolition of these rules.  
The Australian Law Reform Commission noted the following example of perceived injustice resulting from the 
use of the mandatory sentencing principle: 
More recently, amendments to the WA legislation tightened the regime by providing that an offender who commits 
their first, second and third burglary on a single night would now be captured by the ‘three strikes’ law, whereas 
prior to the changes multiple counts could be counted as a single ‘strike’ in such circumstances. Some stakeholders 
referred to these amendments as further affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders. The ALRC 
[Australian Law Reform Commission] has heard that an offender might enter a number of homes in a night while, 
for example, heavily intoxicated and looking for food. They might have no prior offending history, and there may be 
no harm or violence involved, but the judicial officer would be required to impose a sentence of two years 
imprisonment under the ‘three strikes’ regime.884 
The ALRC outlined the consequences of limiting the objective reasonable person test used to evaluate human 
conduct. Even if the accused did not have a criminal record and did not possess malicious intent, if that person 
had entered homes on more than three occasions in one night, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment. The 
judge was unable to assess the defendant’s conduct against the normal objective reasonable person standard. A 
standard that has been used to evaluate human behaviour for centuries.  
These examples show that the limitation of a judge’s ability to apply objective reasonable standards accepted by 
the community when mandatory sentencing is imposed results in a perception of injustice. This perception not 
only affects the relevant laws, but arguably taints the justice system as a whole. 
                                                          
883 Rowena Johns, ‘Sentencing Law: A Review of Developments 1998–2001’ (Briefing Paper No 2/202, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of NSW, 2002) 75, 
citing Department of Justice (WA), Review of Section 401 of the Criminal Code (2001). See also; Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 873, 4.13. 
884 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 873, 4.14. 
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B NORTHERN TERRITORY 
The Northern Territory mandatory minimum sentencing laws came into effect in 1997 and applied to a range of 
property offences. Like Western Australia’s mandatory minimum sentencing laws, Northern Territory’s laws 
also operated on a ‘three strikes’ basis and do not allow judges to take into consideration all the circumstances 
of a case. Under Northern Territory’s mandatory minimum sentencing scheme, offenders were imprisoned for 
14 days for a ‘first strike’ property offence, 90 days for a second offence and 12 months for a third offence.885 In 
2001, Northern Territory’s ‘three strikes’scheme was repealed because strong public opinion considered that the 
whole idea of mandatory sentencing was unjust. This backlash followed the suicide of an aboriginal boy who 
was mistakenly detained for his second minor property offence. The defendant was charged for stealing 
stationery worth $50 from a council building.
886
  
Research conducted in the Northern Territory has found that the mandatory sentencing laws have contributed to 
the disproportionate imprisonment of Aboriginal people which include young people and women. Between June 
1996 and March 1999, adult incarceration increased by 40% whilst the number of women in prison increased by 
485%.
887
 These laws have resulted in the perception that mandatory sentencing laws are discriminatory which 
again taints the whole justice system. That is, the prohibition on judicial consideration of some objective 
standards that would normally be applied in these cases, has led aboriginal people to feel that the whole justice 
system is discriminatory, which undermines its utility. When a judge is unable to take into account unique 
systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and fully assess what a 
reasonable person would do in the defendant’s circumstances, the laws that limit proper judicial consideration 
are perceived to be unjust.   
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD')888 noted that mandatory 
detention laws may be discriminatory in their impact on the indigenous community. Therefore, such laws breach 
                                                          
885 Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 78BA. See also; Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 50 and Declan Roche, ‘Mandatory Sentencing’ (Trends & Issues in 
Crime and Criminal Justice No 138, Australian Institute of Criminology, December 1999). 
886 Leonie Howe, ‘Mandatory Sentencing: A Death Sentence in the Northern Territory?’ (2001) 12(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 376. See also; 
Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 873, 4.18. 
887 John Sheldon & Kirsty Gowans, 'Dollars Without Sense: A Review of the NT’s Mandatory Sentencing Laws' (1999) North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid 
Service 1–40. 
888 This is an international body that oversees Australia’s human rights compliance because Australia has ratified a protocol to one of the UN instruments - the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The CERD oversees implementation of this Convention.  
 
 
169 
 
the obligations in Articles 2 and 5 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The 
Country-Rapporteur expressed her concern as follows:
889
 
 
My question is this, that first of all does the state party share the view that these mandatory sentencing regimes are 
inconsistent with its obligations under our Convention [referring to International Convention on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights] and perhaps under others? And I also wonder, I understand that there has been a legal 
committee of the government that has studied and concluded that quote, 'that the weight of the evidence of the 
committee was that the mandatory sentencing laws have a discriminatory impact on indigenous peoples and that is 
contrary to the provisions of CERD', and they named Articles 2 and 5 particularly. So I would want to know whether 
or not the state party fully agrees with that.890 
 
The CERD expressed its concern at mandatory sentencing in its Concluding Observations: 
 
The [CERD] Committee expresses its concern about the minimum mandatory sentencing schemes with regard to 
minor property offences enacted in Western Australia, and in particular in the Northern Territory. The mandatory 
sentencing schemes appear to target offences that are committed disproportionately by indigenous Australians, 
especially juveniles, leading to a racially discriminatory impact on their rate of incarceration. The [CERD] 
Committee seriously questions the compatibility of these laws with the State party's obligations under the 
[International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and recommends to the State party to review all 
laws and practices in this field.891 
 
The Australian Human Rights Commission (‘Commission’) stated that stated that where a pattern of sentencing 
reveals that certain groups, such as the indigenous people, are more likely to receive the harshest penalties, 
sentencing is discriminatory.
892
 Such discrimination is prohibited under several international conventions to 
which Australia is a party, including the guarantee of equality and non-discrimination under Articles 2 and 26 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
893
 
                                                          
889 Austrlian Human Rights Commission, International Review of Indigenous issues in 2000: Australia (7 October 2003) 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/international-review-indigenous-issues-2000-australia-4-national-laws-contributing#97>. 
890 Transcript of Australia’s Hearing Before the CERD Committee, 'Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination', 21-22 March 2000, 1393rd 
meeting, Part II 5. See also; Suhas Chakma,  Marianne Jensen and  International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Racism Against Indigenous Peoples 
(IWGIA, 2001) 62-63. 
891 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Decision (2)54 on Australia - Concluding Observations/Comments, UN Doc 
CERD/C/54/Misc40/Rev2 (18 March 1999) 15. See also; Austrlian Human Rights Commission, above n 890. 
892 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sentencing Juvenile Offenders, Human Rights Brief No 2 (1999) 5. 
893 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Non-discrimination, General Comment 18 (1989) 7. 
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The United Nations Human Rights Committee also voiced concern about the perceived injustice of mandatory 
sentencing laws: 
 
Legislation regarding mandatory imprisonment in Western Australia and the Northern Territory, which leads in 
many cases to imposition of punishments that are disproportionate to the seriousness of the crimes committed and 
would seem to be inconsistent with the strategies adopted by the State party to reduce the over-representation of 
indigenous persons in the criminal justice system, raises serious issues of compliance with various Articles in the 
[International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights]. The State party is urged to reassess the legislation regarding 
mandatory imprisonment so as to ensure that all Covenant rights are respected.894 
 
The injustice of minimum mandatory sentencing laws does not just apply to aboriginal offenders, but also non- 
aboriginal citizens. In 2015, the Northern Territories’ Department of the Attorney-General and Justice 
(‘Department’) reviewed the mandatory sentencing laws as they related to violent offences895 and concluded that 
the introduction of the provisions: 
Led to an increase in sentence length for repeat violent offenders [who were] sentenced in the Court of Summary 
Jurisdiction. [Although, this was not the case] for first-time violent offenders or offenders sentenced in the Supreme 
Court. [The use of such laws led to] an increase in the consistency of sentence outcome and sentence length for 
repeat violent offenders, but had relatively little impact on [the] consistency of outcomes for first-time offenders. 
[Minimum mandatory sentencing] resulted in an increase in the length of time and number of court appearances 
required to finalise defendants who plead guilty.896 
Repeat offenders experienced an increase in sentence length due to the introduction of the minimum mandatory 
sentencing provisions. Although these laws had a consistent effect on the length of the sentences given to repeat 
offenders, first-time offenders experienced inconsistency. Mandatory sentencing laws also reduced the justice 
system’s efficiency because it required offenders to attend court more often. One reason why these laws do not 
work properly is because they force judges to ignore objective matters that they would normally have weighed 
in their consideration of both guilt and penalty.. 
 
                                                          
894 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, above n 892, 17. See also; United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Australia, UN Doc HRC/A/55/40 (28 July 2000) 522. 
895 Department of the Attorney-General and Justice (NT), Review of the Northern Territory Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory Minimum Sentences) Act 2013 
(2015) 7. 
896 Ibid 2-3. 
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All these results of mandatory sentencing laws occur because judges are limited in what objective elements they 
can consider in making their decisions. When judges are allowed to exercise their judgment independent of 
legislative direction, they are seldom perceived as departing from community standards in their evaluation of 
human behaviour.  
 
From 1989 – 1991, a Royal Commission was appointed by the Australian Government to study and report on 
Aboriginal deaths in custody. Leonie Howe concluded that:  
 
In the ten years following the publication of the Commissioner's Report, research data prepared by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology has demonstrated that Aboriginal incarceration rates are on the increase as are the numbers 
of Aboriginal deaths in custody.897  
 
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner (‘Aboriginal Commissioner’) argued that 
socio-economic conditions are a highly relevant factor in explaining the disproportionate impact of those laws 
on Indigenous people. The Aboriginal Commissioner cited the following cases from Chris Sidoti’s898 
submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee in relation to the mandatory 
sentencing laws. These cases highlight the economic and social disadvantage of many young people affected by 
the Northern Territory mandatory sentencing laws.
899
 
Robert is a 15-year-old Aborigine. He was first referred to the Department of Family, Youth and Children's Services 
when he was 12 due to a lack of parental support. Since the age of 14 Robert has mostly looked after himself. This 
year he attempted suicide while in police custody, having been arrested for a mandatory detention offence. The 
offence was one of property damage. He broke a window after hearing about the suicide of a close friend. 
Andrew is a 17-year-old Aborigine. He lives in a town camp outside of Alice Springs. He is well known to youth 
services in Alice Springs, having accessed the court system and income and accommodation support since he was 
15. His literacy skills are low and English is his third language. As with many young people in Alice Springs, 
Andrew has been identified as high risk and survived a suicide attempt recently. He was charged with a mandatory 
detention offence when he was 16 years old 
                                                          
897 Howe, above n 887, 376, citing Anna Grant, Carlos Carcach and Rowena Conroy, Australian Corrections: The Imprisonment of Indigenous People, Trends 
and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1999) 6. 
898 Human Rights Commissioner (1999). 
899 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Report to the Attorney-General as required by section 46C(1)(a) of the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986, Report No 2 (2000) 5.25, citing Chris Sidoti, Submission No 1 to the Inquiry by the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee, Human Rights (Mandatory Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders) Bill 1999, November 1999, 6-7. 
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Tony is 17 years old and lives between Alice Springs and several bush communities. Tony has been accessing crisis 
accommodation with youth services since he was 14 years old. He has a history of multiple substance dependency. 
Tony has minimal education and his literacy skills are low. English is his third language. He has never had his own 
income and workers who know him believe the bureaucracy of the system and the excessive paperwork is what 
deters him from accessing this entitlement. Tony is considered to be an adult in the Northern Territory. He was 
charged with a mandatory detention offence (unlawful entry into a shop) and faced imprisonment in an adult jail.900 
The Northern Territory’s current Sentencing Act 2016 classifies individual offences into five categories. The 
legislation requires a court to impose either a term of ‘actual imprisonment’ or a ‘minimum sentence’, 
depending on the offence level and whether or not the offence is a second or subsequent offence by the 
offender.
901
 
The following example referred to on ABC’s Lateline shows how the law applies: 
‘Gloria’ [wa]s a young Aboriginal mother of four from a remote town on the northern tip of Arnhem Land. Gloria 
admitted to drunkenly hitting another woman who taunted her about the death of her mother. The harm caused to the 
victim was described by the prosecutor as being ‘a blood [sic] nose and soreness to her chest’. Gloria had appeared 
in court once previously for a minor offence. 
In court, the magistrate told defence counsel, ‘[t]he test is that unless you can establish some exceptional 
circumstances, then I must sentence this lady to three months imprisonment’. Defence counsel submitted, ‘It was a 
spur of the moment thing, it’s not something she needs deterrence from because she’s not a habitual offender. She’s 
not finding herself before the court time and time again’. 
With no exceptional circumstances offered, the Magistrate sentenced Gloria to three months imprisonment, as 
mandated. It was suggested that, prior to the introduction of mandatory sentencing laws, Gloria would have likely 
received a fine for the offence.902 
The magistrate was prevented from assessing Gloria’s conduct in light of normal objective reasonable person 
stanards. Instead, despite her circumstances, the magistrate was compelled to sentence her to three months 
imprisonment for conduct that was arguably reasonable under the circumstances. The Northern Territory’s 
mandatory sentencing laws have been criticised because of the perception that unjust outcomes follow when 
                                                          
900 Further case studies are provided in Sidoti, above n 900, chapter 5. 
901 Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) div 6A - Mandatory imprisonment for violent offences. 
902 ‘Mandatory Sentencing ‘Increases Prison Numbers’, Lateline, 28 May 2014 <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2014/s4014347.htm>.  
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mandatory sentences are imposed, because judges are not allowed to decide their cases independently applying 
accepted objective community standards.  
Mandatory minimum sentencing laws are also used in New South Wales (‘NSW’) in its ‘one-punch’ laws and 
with all this criticism of mandatory sentencing laws, it is surprising that NSW introduced its own version to deal 
with intoxicated people who punch others. This is because minimum mandatory sentencing laws are not 
effective as a deterrent and contribute to higher rates of re-offending. These laws fail to deter persons who have 
a mental impairment, or are dependant upon drugs or alcohol. The National Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Legal Services submitted that mandatory sentencing regimes could result in ‘serious miscarriages of 
justice’:903 
 
Mandatory sentencing regimes are not effective as a deterrent and instead contribute to higher rates of reoffending. 
In particular, [they] fail to deter persons with mental impairment, alcohol or drug dependency or persons who are 
economically or socially disadvantaged. They also have no rehabilitative value, disrupt employment and family 
connections … and diminish the prospects of people re-establishing social and employment links post release. 
Significantly, mandatory sentencing prevents the court from taking into account the individual circumstance of the 
person, leading to unjust outcomes. This is an arbitrary contravention of the principles of proportionality and 
necessity, and mandatory detention of this kind violate[s] a number of provisions of the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights.904 
 
Because ‘one-punch’ minimum mandatory sentencing laws only apply to defendants who are intoxicated by 
drugs or alcohol, these laws are ineffective as a deterrent and thus, are perceived to be unjust given that they 
contribute to a higher rate of re-offending for people who are dependent on these substances. For reasons 
discussed in relation to the Northern Territory’s mandatory sentencing laws, these laws also disproportionately 
apply to socially disadvantaged and indigenous people.  
In 2008 and 2014, while undertaking a review of Australia’s conformity with its treaty, the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture recommended that Australia remove mandatory sentencing due to its
905
 
‘disproportionate and discriminatory impact on the [I]ndigenous population.’906 
                                                          
903 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services, Submission No 109 to the Australian Law Reform Commission, Inquiry into the 
Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait IslanderPeoples, September 2017, 17. 
904 Ibid. 
905 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 873, 8.15. 
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Kingsford Legal Centre explained that:  
 
[a] number of the crimes in Australian jurisdictions to which a mandatory sentence is attached are ‘crimes of 
poverty’ relating to property offences and theft. As a result, mandatory sentences have a discriminatory impact on 
people of a low socio-economic status and particular racial groups, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people.907 
 
The injustice of mandatory sentencing laws is evident. They are ineffective as a deterrent and they unfairly 
apply to minority races. The unjust nature of minimum mandatory sentencing laws is also demonstrated as they 
apply in NSW in one-punch assault cases.  
C NEW SOUTH WALES AND ITS ‘ONE-PUNCH’ LAWS 
 
In 2014, the NSW Parliament passed the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) 
Bill 2014 (NSW) (‘Bill’). This Act amended the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), the Crimes 
Act 1900 (NSW), the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) and introduced 
mandatory sentencing laws for ‘one-punch’ assaults.908 This law has been the focus of much criticism.909  
 
Under the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW), an eight-year 
minimum mandatory sentence
910
 and 25-year maximum sentence will apply where alcohol or drugs intoxicated 
the offender.
911
 However, if the offender is not intoxicated, minimum mandatory sentencing laws do not 
apply.
912
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
906 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Australia, UN Doc CAT/C/AUS/CO/3 (2008) 23.  
907 Kingsford Legal Centre, Submission No 19 to the Australian Law Reform Commission, Inquiry into the Rates of Indigenous Incarceration, 31 August 
2017, 6. 
908 Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 52. 
909 Law Council of Australia, above n 874; Stephen Tomsen and Thomas Crofts, ‘Social and Cultural Meanings of Legal Responses to Homicide Among Men: 
Masculine Honour, Sexual Advances and Accidents’ (2012) 45(3) ANZ Journal of Criminology 430; Julia Quilter, 'The Thomas Kelly Case: Why A ‘One 
Punch’ Law is Not the Answer' (2014) 38 Criminal Law Journal 27. 
910 Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW) s 25B. 
911 Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW) s 25A(2). 
912 If the defendant was not intoxicated, a 20-year maximum sentence applies if he assaults another person who dies as a direct or indirect result of the assault, 
see Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW) s 25A(1). 
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‘One-punch’ assaults occur when a defendant intentionally hits a person causing death even though death may 
not have been intended. Under these laws, it is not necessary to prove that the death was reasonably 
foreseeable.
913
 Though prosecutors must prove there was an intention to punch,
914
 these laws do not allow any 
objective assessment of surrounding circumstances. This principle also applies if the defendant intentionally hit 
the victim causing death and the victim is killed as a result ‘of injuries received directly from the assault or from 
hitting the ground or an object as a consequence of the assault, if committed by an adult when intoxicated’.915  
 
Mandatory sentencing laws in general and the NSW one-punch laws in particular have been justified by 
deterrence arguments.
916
 The Institute of Public Affairs for example said that such laws deter ‘potential 
offenders from committing a criminal offence’.917 
 
The Law Council of Australia noted that there are a number of difficulties with the deterrence argument. First, 
there is indecisive evidence as to whether these laws achieve deterrent effects in Australia.
918
 For example, an 
analysis of the introduction of Northern Territory’s mandatory sentencing regime for property offences showed 
that property crime increased during mandatory sentencing, and decreased after its repeal.
919
 
 
The Northern Territory’s Office of Crime Prevention conducted a four-and-a-half year assessment that noted the 
relationship between the introduction of the Northern Territory’s mandatory sentencing regime in 1997 and 
crime prevention. The Office of Crime Prevention found three telling facts. Firstly, property offences increased 
the prison population by 15 per cent. Secondly, the length of the minimum sentence was not an effective 
                                                          
913 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 25A(4).  
914 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 428E removes the defence of intoxication.  
915 Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 52. 
916 Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1987) 164 CLR 465, 476 (per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ). See also; Nicholas Cowdery, 
'Mandatory Life Sentences in New South Wales' (1999) 22(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 290. 
917 Institute of Public Affairs, Missing the Message on Mandatory Sentencing (March 2000) Institute of Public Affairs 
<http://www.ipa.org.au/news/586/missing-the-message-on-mandatory-sentencing/pg/7>. 
918 Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 31. 
919 Northern Territory Office of Crime Prevention, Mandatory Sentencing for Adult Property Offenders–The Northern Territory Experience, Report (2003) 10. 
For further discussion of the deterrent impact of mandatory sentencing regimes see Law Institute of Victoria, Submission to Victorian Attorney General, 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 30 June 2011, 7, note 9. See Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 34. 
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deterrent and thirdly, the proportion of sentencing occasions resulting in imprisonment was 50 per cent higher 
during the period that the legislation was in force than in the period immediately after its repeal.
920
  
The Law Council of Australia also stated that mandatory sentencing ‘potentially results in unjust, harsh and 
disproportionate sentences where the punishment does not fit the crime... fails to produce convincing evidence 
which demonstrates that increases in penalties for offences deter crime’.921 
 
The Crimes Amendment (Murder of Police Officers) Act 2011 (NSW)
922
 also inserted s 19B into the Crimes Act 
and made life sentences mandatory for offenders convicted of murdering police officers. This provision does not 
apply if the defendant was under the age of 18 years at the time he committed the crime, or if the defendant 
suffered from a significant (but not self-induced) cognitive impairment.
923
  
 
New South Wales’ ‘one-punch’ law has concentrated on the ‘dangerousness’ of conduct that requires ‘an 
appreciable risk of serious injury’ (for instance, from the punch) and does not require that the death be 
reasonably foreseeable as a result of the punch.
924
 That is, even if a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
circumstances would not have foreseen that death was a likely result of his actions, the defendant was still 
culpable. It is submitted that the reason New South Wales’ ‘one-punch’ law is perceived to be unjust is because 
it prevents judges factoring objective community standards of reasonableness into their decisions about criminal 
guilt and sentencing.   
 
The objective reasonable person test is now removed from judicial consideration in ‘one-punch’ assault cases. 
This is highlighted in section 25A(4) of the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and 
Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW): 
 
                                                          
920 Northern Territory Office of Crime Prevention, above n 920, 13. This research is supported by Stephen Jackson and Fiona Hardy, ‘The Impact of 
Mandatory Sentencing on Indigenous Offenders’ (Paper presented at National Judicial Conference, Canberra, 6 & 7 February 2010) 1. See Law Council of 
Australia, above n 874, 35. 
921 Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 5. 
922 Crimes Amendment (Murder of Police Officers) Act 2011 (NSW) s 3. 
923 Crimes Amendment (Murder of Police Officers) Act 2011 (NSW) s 19B. See also; Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 52.  
924 Tomsen and Crofts, above n 910, 430. See also; Quilter, above n 910, 27. 
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(4) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) or (2),925 it is not necessary to prove that the death was 
reasonably foreseeable.926 
 
Former NSW director of public prosecutions Nicholas Cowdery QC said there was ‘no justification’ for 
mandatory minimum sentences. Cowdery stated that ‘there is plenty of evidence that [increasing penalties] ... 
does not deter offenders, complicates and adds to the expense of criminal proceedings and requires courts to act 
unjustly’.927  
Cowdery also argued that legislation that fixes penalties impacts judicial discretion and the principle of the 
separation of powers. He further states that minimum mandatory sentencing laws do not take into consideration 
the merits of each case individualistically but instead, imposes penalties fixed in advance.
928
  
Cowdery cited Chief Justice Brennan in Nicholas v The Queen
929
 to argue that penalties handed down according 
to minimum mandatory sentencing laws may be unconstitutional.
930
  
It is submitted that the primary reason why mandatory sentencing laws are perceived to be unjust, is because 
they forbid the presiding judicial officers from the independent assessment of criminal guilt and appropriate 
sentencing in accordance with accepted objective community standards. While legislatures may argue that 
mandatory sentencing laws express objective community standards, the resulting laws are not perceived to be 
just when the moral panic that generated their existence has passed and reasonableness returns to community 
consideration.  Again it is submitted that genuine objectivity is perceived as the heart of justice. Judges need to 
                                                          
925 (1) A person is guilty of an offence under this subsection if: (a) the person assaults another person by intentionally hitting the otherperson with any part of 
the person’s body or with an object held by theperson, and (b) the assault is not authorised or excused by law, and (c) the assault causes the death of the other 
person. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 20 years. (2) A person who is of or above the age of 18 years is guilty of an offence underthis subsection if the 
person commits an offence under subsection (1) when theperson is intoxicated. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. - Crimes and Other Legislation 
Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW) s 25A(1)–(2). 
926 Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW) s 25A(4). This is also present in s 281 of the 
Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA). 
927 Michaela Whitbourn, 'Lawyers Condemn 'Knee-jerk' Mandatory Jail Term Changes', The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 22 January 2014 
<https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/lawyers-condemn-kneejerk-mandatory-jail-term-changes-20140121-316xj.html>. 
928 Cowdary argued that minimum mandatory sentencing laws takes away ‘from the independence of the judiciary and the principle of the separation of 
powers’ that these laws deprive people of liberty ‘that is not in accordance with a public balancing process that is individually accountable, but arbitrarily in 
accordance with penalties fixed in advance without regard for the individual circumstances.’ See Nicholas Cowdery, 'Mandatory Sentencing' (Paper presented at 
Distinguished Speakers Program, Sydney Law School, 15 May 2014) 12. 
929 (1998) 193 CLR 173. 
930 Nicholas Cowdery, 'Mandatory Sentencing' (Paper presented at Distinguished Speakers Program, Sydney Law School, 15 May 2014) 12.  
Although the Commonwealth migration legislation has been held to be constitutional. See Magaming v The Queen [2013] HCA 40. 
In Nicholas, Chief Justice Brennan said: 
A law that purports to direct the manner in which the judicial power should be exercised is constitutionally invalid. However, a law which merely prescribes a 
Court’s practice or procedure does not direct the exercise of the judicial power in finding facts, applying law or exercising an available discretion. Cf. Nicholas 
v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188. 
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be able to take into account all the objective considerations that arise in every case before they assess guilt and 
determine penalty. As in the legal systems assessed, when mandatory sentencing laws prevent judicial 
assessment of what a reasonable person would do under the defendant’s circumstances, the laws concerned are 
perceived to be unjust and eventually fall into disuse.  
  
Chief Justice Barwick in Palling v Corfield [1970]
931
 stated that courts have a duty to impose punishment and 
has the discretion as to the extent of the punishment imposed. The court can also refrain from imposing 
punishment. Barwick argued that it is unusual and undesirable for judicial discretion to be removed because 
circumstances alter cases and it is an intrinsic part of justice that punishment fit the circumstances of the case. 
Because mandatory sentencing laws limit judicial discretion, they impede the court's ability to provide justice.932  
 
In a 1981 case, Chief Justice Harry Gibbs said that imposing fixed sentences lead to unreasonable and unjust 
results.933  
 
While discussing the injustice of mandatory minimum sentences, the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission stated that: 
 
The potential rigidity of such sentences interferes with the discretion of the sentencing judge, which must be 
preserved if justice is to be done in individual cases…Persons facing such sentences934 are likely to be less willing to 
plead guilty to the charges laid against them. This will place an increased burden on the courts, and prosecution and 
law enforcement agencies.935 
 
                                                          
931 123 CLR 52. 
932 Palling v Corfield [1970] 123 CLR 52, 58. Ordinarily the court with the duty of imposing punishment has a discretion as to the extent of the punishment to 
be imposed; and sometimes a discretion whether any punishment at all should be imposed. It is both unusual and in general, in my opinion, undesirable that the 
court should not have a discretion in the imposition of penalties and sentences, for circumstances alter cases and it is a traditional function of a court of justice to 
endeavour to make the punishment appropriate to the circumstances as well as to the nature of the crime.
 
933 Sillery v The Queen (1981) 180 CLR 353, 357.  Chief Justice Harry Gibbs fixed mandatory sentences ‘[w]ould lead to results that would be plainly 
unreasonable and unjust… there may exist wide differences in the degree of culpability of particular offenders so that in principle there is every reason for 
allowing a discretion to the judge of trial to impose an appropriate sentence not exceeding the statutory maximum.’ 
934 Although the Law Reform was discussion mandatory life sentences, the theme remains the same. 
935 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Discussion Paper No 33 (1996) 4.76, 114. 
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Supreme Court
936
 judge Judith Kelly in Nafi
937
 cited Mildren J who had said that ‘prescribed minimum 
mandatory sentencing provisions are the very antithesis of just sentences.’938 
Prominent figures and regulatory bodies highlight the injustice as a result of minimum mandatory sentencing 
laws. Law Society of NSW president Ros Everett said mandatory minimum sentences were ‘unlikely to be 
effective’ and studies in the United States had shown ‘deterrence arises from fear of being caught, not from the 
length of the sentence’.939 
Some media reports have suggested that the use of mandatory minimum sentencing laws will lead to an increase 
in the prison population.
940
 Another article noted that the laws might have a major impact on indigenous 
communities.
941
  
Cowdery concluded it was unrealistic and therefore unjust to prescribe a minimum penalty that must be imposed 
before the offence was committed and before all the facts and circumstances are known. Justice requires the 
consideration of all the circumstances of the case and because mandatory minimum sentencing laws do not take 
into consideration these circumstances, these laws are unjust.942  
The failure to appeal to objective reasonableness to evaluate human behaviour contradicts centuries of 
jurisprudential thought. For this reason, New South Wales’ ‘one-punch’ legislation has been criticized for being 
‘unjust’.943 The lack of objectivity and the limitation of judicial discretion are  factors that contribute to the 
perception that one-punch laws are unjust. Although minimum mandatory sentencing laws are currently used in 
                                                          
936 The impact of mandatory sentencing laws on judicial independence has also received comment from the highest courts in the NT where mandatory 
sentencing laws have had a longer history. 
937 Nafi v The Queen [2012] NTCCA 13. 
938 Trenerry v Bradley (1997) 6 NTLR 175, 187. Mildren J continued, ‘If a Court thinks that a proper just sentence is the prescribed minimum or more, the 
minimum prescribed penalty is unnecessary. It therefore follows that the sole purpose of a prescribed minimum mandatory sentencing regime is to require 
sentencers to impose heavier sentences than would be proper according to the justice of the case’. 
939 Whitbourn, above n 928. See also; Lenny Roth, 'Mandatory Sentencing Laws' (Brief No 1, NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2014) 6-7. 
940 M Coultan and D Box, Grog Violence Sentencing to Put 1000 More in Prison, The Australian, 22 January 2014. 
941 B Norrington and N Coultan, ‘City law likely to king hit the bush’, 28 January 2014. See also; Roth, above n 940, 7. 
942 Nicholas Cowdery, 'Mandatory Sentencing' (Paper presented at Distinguished Speakers Program, Sydney Law School, 15 May 2014) 6. 
 ‘It is unrealistic, therefore, and unjust, to prescribe a penalty or minimum penalty that must be imposed for any serious offence before it has been committed or 
is even in contemplation (or can even be foreseen by Parliament), before all the facts and circumstances are known and without knowing anything of the 
offender; and experience has shown that such measures do create injustice. Justice requires proper consideration of all the circumstances of the offence and the 
offender’. 
943 See Letter from Ian Brown to Research Director, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, 4 July 2014 in Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment 
Bill 2014 4; Roth, above n 940, 13; Law Council of Australia, Submission No 30 to Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Need For A 
Nationally-Consistent Approach to Alcohol-Fuelled Violence, 31 March 2016, 29; Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice—An Inquiry into 
the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Report No 133 (2017) 273–282. 
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various states around Australia, such laws will be repealed with time however; it takes time before these laws 
are abolished.  
The Law Council notes that evidence is also mounting that overseas jurisdictions which have substantial experience 
of mandatory sentencing are now moving away from such schemes because of doubt regarding the efficacy of 
mandatory penalties in reducing crime; increased incarceration costs; the potential for arbitrary, unduly harsh, and 
disproportionate sentences; and discriminatory impacts.944 
 
 This chapter shows that legislative and judicial tools are perceived to be unjust if objective reasonableness is 
abandoned as part of the judicial standard. While the use of objective standards results in the perception of 
justice, objective standards alone do not necessarily result in this perception. It is the objective 'measurement' of 
the conduct of the individual accused that creates a sense of justice. Each of the laws assessed in this chapter 
operates perfunctorily. It is as if there is no judicial assessment at all. These laws fail the public perception of 
justice test because they remove significant elements of objective judicial reasoning from the process. The only 
way amendments will convince the public that these laws have been made just, is if reasoning using objective 
standards by the judges is put back into the judicial process. 
 
The following section will discuss another area of law that has removed objective elements when evaluating 
human behaviour – strict liability laws. I have chosen a corporate law to show that the limitation of judicial 
objectivity results in a perception of injustice wherever it occurs in judicial practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
944 Law Council of Australia, above n 874, 6. 
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III STRICT LIABILITY LAWS 
The Australian Law Reform Commission stated that strict liability leads to liability regardless of fault. If strict 
liability was the cause of action, then the defendant is liable even though he was not at fault, in other words, 
even if his actions were not negligent, reckless or intentional.
945
 Division 6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
outlines the nature of strict liability and states - ‘there are no fault elements’.946 The plaintiff need not prove the 
element of mens rea in cases concerning strict liability.
947
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) stated that strict liability laws are too onerous and broad, 
and ‘[are] inconsistent with modern trends in tort law to fault-based liability’.948  
An example of the unnecessarily onerous laws referred to be the ALRC are Australia’s strict liability laws as 
applied in commercial law, particularly strict liability for directors of trustee companies.  
On the topic of strict liability and its relationship to directors of trustee companies, the ALRC stated that 
removing the need to prove fault in cases of strict liability would risk unfairness to directors who are subject to 
deemed liability provisions.
949
 The ALRC considered - ‘the potential for unfairness of deeming provisions 
necessitates the inclusion of the protection of a fault element in provisions that deem an individual liable for a 
civil penalty’.950 The ALRC recommended that: 
[i]n the absence of any clear, express statutory statement to the contrary, any legislation that deems an individual to 
be personally liable for the contravening conduct of a corporation should include a fault element that the individual 
knew that, or was reckless or negligent as to whether, the contravening conduct would occur.951 
The ALRC was not arguing that directors should not be immune to liability instead, if they were liable for the 
acts or omissions of a corporation, the element of fault needed to be adjudicated before liability was assessed. 
                                                          
945 Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Report No 123 (2014) 7.72. ‘There are a range of Commonwealth 
laws that could be said to impose strict or absolute liability. This chapter examines laws that arise in the following areas: corporate and prudential regulation; 
environmental protection; work health and safety laws; customs and border protection legislation; national security legislation; and copyright legislation.’ Cf. 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms—Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws, Report No 129 (2016) 10.34. 
946 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) div 6. 
947 Lanham, Wood, Bartal and Evans, above n 36, 380. See also; Barry Wright and  Wing-Cheong Chan, Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code: 
The Legacies and Modern Challenges of Criminal Law Reform (Routledge, 2016) 117. 
948 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 496, 7.73.  
949 Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms–Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws, ALRC Report 127 (2015) 14.25. The 
judicial independence point was also highlighted by the High Court in a case about a commercial deeming provision–Actors and Announcers Equity Association 
v Fontana Films Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 23. 
950 Australian Law Reform Commission, Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australia, ALRC Report 95 (2003) 329. 
951 Ibid Rec 8–1. 
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The addition of a fault element would remove the perception of injustice of strict liability laws because it would 
put objective reasoning back into the judicial process. It would allow directors to be held accountable for the 
wrongdoings of a corporation and the judicial process would be perceived to be just because it used objective 
standards to assess fault. This is because Australian common law uses the reasonable person test to assess 
culpability in cases of negligence
952
 and recklessness.
953
 
The ALRC argued that directors subject to strict liability laws could be at risk of unfair outcomes because there 
are no fault elements involved in evaluating their behaviour. This meant that directors would be found liable to 
punishment even if a reasonable person in his position would have acted in the same manner. It is submitted that 
the limitation of judicial assessment of the circumstances of the case is the reason why strict liability laws, and 
mandatory sentencing laws, create a sense of injustice. Only when judges are allowed to objectively assess all 
the elements of any case,  will  the result be perceived to be just.  
These perceptions of injustice arise in the case of both blue-collar and white-collar crime. Laws that limit 
objectivity in judicial reasoning are also perceived to be unjust in the long term wherever they occur. NSW laws 
passed to criminalise unintentional wrongdoing by the directors of corporate trustee companies provide another 
example. Michael Quinlan
954
 explained that sense of injustice in his article titled, ‘Jailbreak – The Latest 
Disturbing Developments in Insolvent Trading’. Mr Quinlan cited two cases concerning strict liability laws 
which related to directors of trustee companies to show the perceived injustice in strict liability laws – Hanel v 
O'Neill [2003]
955
 and Edwards & Ors v Attorney-General and Anor [2004].
956
 
These cases demonstrate the injustice of strict liability laws that applied to directors of corporate trustees 
because these laws do not allow the application of objective reasonable person standards.
957
 The Law Council of 
Australia and the Australian Institute of Company Directors (‘AICD’) stated that strict liability laws ‘may foster 
                                                          
952 Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie and Simon Bronitt, Regulating Deviance: The Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008) 291. See also; Katy Barnett and Sirko Harder, Remedies in Australian Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 201 and 
Arthur Best,  David W Barnes and  Nicholas Kahn-Fogel, Basic Tort Law: Cases, Statutes, and Problems (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2018) 127. 
953 Kathryn H Christopher and Russell Christopher, Criminal Law: Model Problems and Outstanding Answers (Oxford University Press, 2011) 77. See also; 
Hemming, above n 826, 69-112. 
954 Partner at the commcerical law firm, Allens Arthur Robinson (1998–2013).  
955 SASC 409.  
956 NSWCA 272. 
957 Michael Quinlan, Jailbreak–The Latest Disturbing Developments in Insolvent Trading (23 February 2012) Allens 
<https://www.allens.com.au/pubs/pdf/insol/pap10mar05.pdf>.  
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a risk averse approach to business and stifle economic growth and innovation’.958 When objective standards are 
not used in assessing the culpability of directors charged under strict liability laws, business processes may 
adopt a minimal risk approach, hindering corporate growth. Consequently, this negatively impacts economic 
growth and innovation. These consequences bring about a sense of injustice in part because of the absence of 
objective elements and judicial discretion in evaluating human behaviour.    
The Law Council of Australia and AICD focused on ss 588G
959
 and 197 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
(‘CA’) to illustrate the injustice of strict liability laws.    
The Law Council of Australia explained the mechanics of s 197 as it applies to directors of corporate trustees 
under the strict liability scheme: 
Under s 197 of the Corporations Act, where a corporation incurs a liability while acting (or purporting to act) as a 
trustee, and subsequently cannot discharge all or part of that liability or is not entitled to be fully indemnified against 
the liability out of trust assets for particular reasons, s 197 imposes a strict liability on a director of the corporation to 
discharge the liability… s 197 may cause a director to be liable for all debts incurred by the corporate trustee, and is 
not limited to those liabilities incurred after insolvency.960 
The Law Council of Australia argued that ss 558G and 197 should be amended because of the perceived 
injustice: 
To the extent to which the ALRC intends to address s 588G in its current inquiry, the Committee [referring to the 
Law Council of Australia] urges the ALRC also to consider[s the amendment of] other provisions, such as s 197, 
which also impose strict or absolute liability on directors, officers or other employees of a body corporate.961 
The AICD stated that when determining whether a company is likely to be insolvent, a director ‘is required to 
make complex commercial decisions without full information, and with limited time’.962 These circumstances 
make it unjust for a director to be found liable without independent judicial assessment of her conduct. As with 
                                                          
958 Letter from John Keeves to Sabina Wynn, 21 September 2015, 3 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/359._financial_service_council_fsc_submission_to_alrc_-_elder_abuse.pdf>, citing Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, Submission No 42 to the Australian Law Reform Commission, Inquiry into Traditional Rights and Freedoms–Encroachments by Commonwealth 
Laws, 27 February 2015, 1.  
959 Director's duty to prevent insolvent trading by company. 
960 Letter from John Keeves to Sabina Wynn, 21 September 2015, 3.  
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/359._financial_service_council_fsc_submission_to_alrc_-_elder_abuse.pdf>. 
961 Ibid. 
962 Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms–Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws, 21 September 2015, 1, 5. See also; Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms–Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws, ALRC Report 127 (2015) 10.42. 
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minimum mandatory sentencing laws, corporate strict liability laws that do not take into account mitigating 
factors are perceived to be unjust because objective judicial assessment is foreclosed. Even if a reasonable 
person in the director’s position would have acted in the same way, the director is still culpable under strict 
liability laws.  
Following the comments made by the Law Council of Australia and AICD, there have been no amendments 
made to these sections. 
Hanel was decided on 11 December 2003 in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The Court 
was called upon to assess whether a director of a corporate trust was personally liable for obligations incurred 
by the corporate trustee when there are insufficient or no trust assets to indemnify the trustee and to interpret s 
197 of the CA.
963
  
The Court held that a director of a corporate trustee of a trading trust was personally liable for the trust's debts 
under s 197 because the trust had no assets.
964
 This decision held notwithstanding that the provisions of the 
relevant trust deed specified that the corporate trustee was 'entitled to be fully indemnified against the liability 
out of trust assets'. Irrespective of whether a reasonable person in a director’s circumstances would have 
conducted himself in the same way, directors are still held personally liable for the trust's debts.  
Section 197(1) of the CA makes a director of a corporation accountable to discharge the liability of a company 
that incurs liabilities while acting as trustee if: 
(i) the corporation has not discharged, and cannot discharge, the liability or that part of it; and  
(ii) the corporation is not entitled to be fully indemnified against the liability out of trust assets.965 
Section 197(1) of the CA states that ‘this is so even if the trust does not have enough assets to indemnify the 
trustee.’ 
O’Neill, a property owner, brought an action against Hanel to enforce a judgement obtained against a shopping 
centre tenant, Daroko Pty Ltd (‘Daroko’). Hanel was Daroko’s sole director. Daroko was the trustee of the 
Daroko Unit Trust. In so far as Daroko was a trustee, a clause in the trust deed gave Daroko indemnity against 
liabilities incurred.  
                                                          
963 Quinlan, above n 958. 
964 Geoffrey Gibson, Law for Directors (Federation Press, 2003) 77. 
965 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 197(1).  
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Hanel stated that neither Daroko nor the trust had sufficient assets to pay the judgement because the assets of the 
trust were transferred to another trust. Hanel argued that he was not liable under s 197(1) because the condition 
of s 197(1)(b) was not fulfilled because the trust deed’s indemnity clause entitled Daroko to be fully indemnified 
out of the trust assets.
966
  
The Court decided that the phrase ‘this is so even if the trust does not have enough assets to indemnify the 
trustee’ in s 197 extended the liability of directors of a corporate trustee to situations where there are insufficient 
assets in the trust to discharge the liability. In other words, directors are personally liable if the trust is unable to 
indemnify the trustee due to insufficient funds because the trustee is not ‘entitled to be fully indemnified’.  
Michael Quinlan highlighted the injustice that strict liability laws place upon directors of corporate trustees: 
Hanel v O'Neill imposes significant new obligations on directors of corporate trustees. Directors may no longer be 
protected from personal liability by the provision of an indemnity in favour of the trustee in the trust deed.967 
McDougall J in Intagro Projects Pty Ltd v. Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2004]
968
 also 
expressed the injustice of strict liability laws. McDougall J concluded that he was ‘tempted’ to rule that ‘the 
majority view [in Hanel] was plainly wrong’ but because this case served as a precedent, he ‘should follow the 
majority view in Hanel, notwithstanding the reservations’.969 His Honour stated that the approach taken by the 
majority could lead to undesirable consequences. To explain, McDougall J stated ‘that their approach would 
impose on directors of trustee companies a personal liability as great as that imposed on directors under s 588G, 
but without the defences granted by s 588H’.970  
As Lang Thai
971
 stated: 
When the company is unable to discharge the debts, directors are required to discharge personally those debts 
without exception; this requirement appears to be automatic under s 197 and there are no available defences that 
could be raised by innocent directors. In other words, directors of trustee companies have a higher chance of being 
sued than directors of ordinary companies acting in their own capacity. This is because when a trustee company is 
unable to discharge the debts, the creditors are more likely to invoke s 197(1) and not s 588G. The important 
                                                          
966 Quinlan, above n 958. 
967 Ibid. 
968 50 ACSR 224. 
969 Intagro Projects Pty Ltd v. Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2004] 50 ACSR 224, 237 and 228. 
970 Lang Thai, 'Directors' Personal Liability- Is the Proposed Amendment to Section 197 Acceptable When Compared with Hanel v O'Neill?' (2005) 10(2) 
Deakin Law Review 732, citing Intagro Projects Pty Ltd v. Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2004] 50 ACSR 224, 234.  
971 Lecturer, Deakin Law School. 
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difference between the two provisions is that the defences in s 588H that are otherwise available to directors being 
sued under s 588G are not available to directors being sued under s 197(1). When proceedings are brought against 
directors under s 197(1), they do not have defences equivalent to s 588H nor can they rely on the s 588H defences.
972
 
Directors charged under s 197 do not have access to the defences outlined in s 588H, and that inaccessibility 
breaches the objective legal responsibility principle.  
Another case that demonstrates the injustice of strict liability laws is the case of Edwards & Ors v Attorney-
General and Anor [2004].
973
  
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales decided this case on 6 August 2004. The case 
concerned an application by the directors of the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (‘MRCF’) for 
court orders relieving them of personal liability under s 1318(2), in relation to actual and prospective asbestos 
claims that may be brought against the company.
974
 Section 1318 applies to civil proceedings against a person 
for breach of trust, default, negligence or breach of duty. This section also applies in circumstances where 
proceedings have not yet commenced but are anticipated.
975
  
The CA always included a relief from personal liability section. This shows an acknowledgment that the strict 
liability piece of the law went too far. By including objective standards directly avoids the need to amend the 
strict liability laws back and make them reasonable.  
Even if a reasonable person in the director’s position would have conducted himself in the same manner, the 
director is still accountable under the strict liability regime. An objective reasonable person standard is absent in 
strict liability cases. Removing judicial discretion that allows a judge to evaluate human behaviour by using 
objective elements contradicts centuries of jurisprudential thought. Objective elements were, and are, used in 
judicial reasoning because they work. When judicial reasoning limits the use of objective standards to assess 
human behaviour, the outcomes are perceived to be unjust. This is demonstrated by the perceived injustice of 
the strict liability laws. 
The MRCF was established in 2001 and was the holding company of Amaca and Amaba, former subsidiaries of 
James Hardie Industries Limited. These subsidiaries were subject to numerous claims for injuries and death 
                                                          
972 Thai, above n 971, 732. 
973 NSWCA 272. 
974 Thai, above n 971, 732. 
975 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1318(2); see also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Dick [2007] NSWCA 190; (2007) 64 ACSR 61, [91]-[94] (Santow 
JA). 
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caused by asbestos. MRCF was also the trustee of a trust that continued to pay the debts including claims for 
asbestos related deaths and injuries and contributed to medical research on behalf of Amaca and Amaba. 
The directors of the MRCF were aware that the quantum of claims outweighed the funds available in Amaca 
and Amaba. The directors were concerned that they could be held personally liable if Amaca and Amaba 
continued to pay, in full, the current claims against them. The director’s counsel advised that the directors were 
unable to obtain insurance against the risk of personal claims being made against them. The director’s counsel 
argued his clients could be personally liable for breaches of duty even though they acted pursuant to the 
operations of the trust.
976
 The directors sought relief under s 1318 of the CA.  
This section empowers a Court to relieve (amongst others) a director from liability for contravening the 
apprehended liability in default, negligence, breach of trust and breach of duty if that person has acted honestly 
and, taking into consideration the circumstances, should be excused. However, only partial relief can be 
granted.977 Even though a director acted reasonably under the circumstances, he could still be personally liable 
for breaches of duty.  
This thesis has shown that in each legal system assessed, if the defendant acted reasonably under the 
circumstances, culpability was removed or, in cases of involuntary homicide in canon law, diminished. This is 
because he acted in accordance with objective standards expected of a reasonable person. Therefore, because 
directors likely acted reasonably according to the relevant community standards, the charges against them are 
perceived by the relevant community to be unreasonable. However, this principle is ignored in cases of strict 
liability. Even if a reasonable person would have acted in the same the manner as the defendant in the same 
circumstances, the defendant could still be personally liable. Objective reasoning allows the judge to take into 
consideration what a reasonable person would do in the defendant’s circumstances. However, strict liability 
laws remove the element of objective reasoning and for this reason, the outcomes of these cases and the laws 
that dictated them are perceived to be unjust.     
                                                          
976 Company Directors, Forgive Perhaps Forget Unlikely Law Reporter (01 September 2004) Australian Institute of Directors 
<http://www.companydirectors.com.au/director-resource-centre/publications/company-director-magazine/2000-to-2009-back-editions/2004/september/forgive-
perhaps-forget-unlikely-law-reporter>. 
977 Quinlan, above n 958. 
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The application of relief under s 1318 raised a key issue, could relief be given in respect of possible future 
breaches? Michael Quinlan stated that, ‘the Court held that future acts could not be prospectively sanctioned’.978 
Therefore, the relief available to the directors was limited.  
The directors of the MRCF received a relief in respect of payment of the companies’ debts (including debts 
relating to asbestos-related) on or after 24 June 2004 up to the date of the order. 
The Court in Edwards and Hanel did not use objective standards to determine the culpability of the 
defendant(s). Instead, strict liability laws were enforced.  
Cases involving strict liability remove the aspect of objective reasonableness Mitigating factors are not taken 
into consideration. Even if a reasonable person would have conducted himself in the same manner as the 
defendant, the defendant is still culpable.  
Using an objective standard of reasonableness to evaluate human behaviour was the standard principle in Jewish 
law, ancient Athenian law, Roman law, canon law and English common law. However, this principle is not used 
in cases involving the doctrine of strict liability. For this reason, this doctrine has received much criticism. Some 
have argued that this doctrine is ‘unjust’979 because the lack of objectivity causes the sense of injustice. 
However, whilst it may be argued that objectivity is present in adjudicating conduct in the case of strict liability 
laws, the presence of some objective elements does not necessarily provide the perception of justice. Under 
strict liability laws, judges are not able to assess the situation and ask, “what would a reasonable person do 
under these circumstances?” For this reason, even if a reasonable person would act in the same manner as the 
defendant, he is still held accountable. The lack of judicial discretion is the primary reason why strict liability 
laws, as well as mandatory sentencing laws, are viewed as unjust.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
978 Ibid. 
979 See R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007) 235 and Douglas N Husak, 'Varieties 
of Strict Liability' 8 (1995) Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 189 and Husak, above n 61, 171. In a comprehensive survey, one commentator 
concluded that ‘the dominant view appears to be that in the Anglo-American culture, the use of strict liability crimes is arbitrary and unreasonable.’ See Laurie 
Levenson, ‘Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes’ (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review 401 note 7, 403.  
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IV CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown that objective standards were used in Jewish law, ancient Athenian law, Roman law, 
canon law and English common law because they result in the perception that the laws and the legal system as a 
whole is just. These legal systems rejected using subjective standards to assess wrongdoing and fault. Rather, 
these legal systems all preferred objective elements and empowered their adjudicators to assess them using 
reasonable standards of human behaviour as their guide.  
The two examples used in this chapter show that this wisdom did not just appear in history. This wisdom is the 
result of centuries of jurisprudential reflection. Human behaviour can be judged by standards that are not 
objective in nature, but when subjective standards are used, or when independent judicial assessment is removed 
from the judicial process, we do not feel that the results are just. Such experiments that contain these two 
characteristics are not abandoned overnight, but because they result in a perception of injustice, there is 
eventually a return to objective standards in judicial reasoning because they are perceived to be more just.  
The reason for that sense of injustice is the lack of objectivity in judicial reasoning. This thesis confirms that 
legal systems must use objective standards in their laws is those laws are to be perceived as just. If we make a 
law without genuine objectivity, that law will eventually be abandoned. That is because laws that do not contain 
objectivity contravene the jurisprudential thought of some of history’s most successful legal systems. The idea 
that subjective standards can be used to judge human conduct is foreign to the legal systems assessed in this 
thesis and it continues to apply in the present.  
Laws were considered to be unjust if they did not use objective reasonableness to judge human behaviour. This 
was presented in the two examples I provided – mandatory sentencing laws and strict liability laws. 
In the first example, mandatory sentencing laws were legally enforced in cases of certain crimes committed, 
such as NSW’s one-punch laws. These laws have been criticised by the Law Council of Australia because they 
are arbitrary and do not provide individuals with the right to a fair trial. These laws prevent judges assessing a 
penalty appropriate for the crime. Mandatory sentencing laws do not allow judges to take into consideration 
mitigating factors. The Law Council of Australia noted the injustice of these laws because they have a 
disproportionate impact upon minority groups within society. The author submits that the primary reason for 
this perception of injustice is the lack of objectivity in the such laws.  
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In Western Australia, mandatory sentencing laws are imposed upon conviction for causing grievous bodily harm 
when committed during the course of an aggravated home robbery. The Western Australia Department of 
Justice has criticized the mandatory sentencing laws and concluded that these laws did not enhance justice as a 
consequence of abandoning objective reasonableness. The Australian Law Reform Commission came to the 
same conclusion.  
The Australian Law Reform Commission noted that these laws can be problematic because they treat all 
accounts of robbery with equal severity. The nature of the crime and any mitigating factors affecting the reason 
why these crimes were committed are not taken into consideration. The reasonableness of the defendant’s 
conduct is not measured as a part of the adjudication process.  
Mandatory sentencing laws are also used in the Northern Territory and apply to a range of property offences. 
They operate on a ‘three strike’ approach. If convicted, offenders are imprisoned for a minimum period of time 
that applied incrementally for each offence committed.  
The defendant’s conduct is not assessed by an objective reasonable person standard. The mandatory minimum 
sentence of 14 days applies for a first offence irrespective of whether the defendant stole $50 or $500.  
In 2015, the Northern Territory’s Department of the Attorney-General and Justice explained the injustice of 
mandatory sentencing laws that applied to violent offences. It concluded that these laws increased the sentence 
length for repeat offenders, first-time offenders experienced an inconsistent sentence length and an increase in 
the number of court appearances in cases that sought to finalise defendants who plead guilty. Mandatory 
sentencing laws also have a negative impact on time efficiency in these cases. These laws were not repealed for 
political reasons.
980
  
The Australian government has recieved submissions from the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination
981
 (‘CERD’) and the United Nations Human Rights Committee982 outlining the injustice 
of the minimum mandatory sentencing laws. The Australian government responded to these issues and 
concluded that mandatory sentencing laws are not racially discriminatory. In responding to CERD, the 
Australian government argued that it would be more difficult to get a conviction under mandatory sentencing 
                                                          
980 For a detailed discussion see Law Council of Australia, above n 874. 
981 Transcript of Australia’s Hearing Before the CERD Committee, above n 891, Part II. 
982 Transcript of Australia's appearance before the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 'Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination', 20 July 
2000.  
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because of the standard of proof required and 'mandatory sentencing is likely to produce an outcome where 
indigenous people would be less represented in the statistics'.
983
 The Australian Human Rights Commission was 
not satisfied with the response given by the Australian government to CERD and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee.
984
  
In 2014, the NSW Parliament introduced mandatory sentencing laws for ‘one-punch’ assaults. These new laws 
have also been criticised. Defendants are convicted under these laws even though the offender did not intend the 
injury and even though the punch was not directly associated with the damage(s) sustained by the victim. An 
eight-year minimum mandatory sentence applies if the victim’s death is a direct or indirect result of the assault 
committed by an offender who is intoxicated by drugs or alcohol. No minimum mandatory sentence applies to 
offenders who are not affected by these substances. This inconsistency compounds the sense of injustice that 
flows because of the lack of objective reasoning in the one-punch law cases.  
Under the ‘one-punch’ laws, the victim’s death need not be reasonably foreseeable. This evaluation omits the 
use of an objective standard like English common law’s reasonable person test to evaluate the defendant’s 
behaviour. 
For the second example, I referred to strict liability laws. Strict liability laws state that a person is guilty of an 
act even if he did not possess mens rea. The Australian Law Reform Commission, opposed these law and 
argued against them. They stated that strict liability leads to liability regardless of fault. The defendant is still 
liable even if his conduct is not negligent or reckless. The defendant is still culpable even if a reasonable person 
would have conducted himself in the same manner under the same circumstances.  
One example of strict liability laws was applied to directors of corporate trustees. In the event that a corporation 
incurs a liability while acting, or purporting to act, as a trustee, s 197 of the CA imposes strict liability on the 
company’s director(s). Directors are personally liable if the company cannot discharge all or a portion of that 
liability or if the trust assets are insufficient to fully indemnify the company. While strict liability laws also 
apply to directors under s 588G, directors charged under this provision have defences available under s 588H.
985
 
Directors charged under s 197 do not have access to these defences and that inaccessibility breaches the 
objective legal responsibility principle and results in the perception that such directors are unjustly dealt with.  
                                                          
983 Transcript of Australia’s Hearing Before the CERD Committee, 'Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination', 21-22 March 2000, 1394th 
meeting, Part III, 6-7. 
984 See Austrlian Human Rights Commission, above n 890. 
985 Thai, above n 971, 732, citing Intagro Projects Pty Ltd v. Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2004] 50 ACSR 224, 234.  
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This section may cause a director to be liable for all debts incurred by the corporate trustee, and is not limited to 
those liabilities incurred after insolvency. 
The Law Council of Australia argued that imposing strict liability on directors personally creates a ‘risk averse 
approach to business and stifle economic growth and innovation’.  
I referred to two cases to illustrate this principle - Hanel v O'Neill [2003] and Edwards & Ors v Attorney-
General and Anor [2004]. In both cases, the reasonable person test was not used to evaluate the defendant’s 
conduct. 
Because all of the legal systems that were considered in this thesis used objective standards and allowed judges 
to independently assess defendant liability in adjudication, we can infer that through reason, human beings view 
objective standards as an important judicial or legislative tool. In the absence of objective elements in judicial 
reasoning, laws adjudicating guilt seem unjust and will eventually become discredited. No other approach to the 
adjudication of human conduct has been as satisfying to human consumers of justice as the use of objective 
standards. Objective standards were used in various legal systems at different moments in time. If they did not 
work, they would not have been used in Jewish law, ancient Athenian law, Roman law, canon law and English 
common law. If they were not advantageous, they would not be universally used in judicial reasoning.  
This thesis has shown some of the contemporary consequences of not using objective standards as a judicial or 
legislative tool. Law makers should not use subjective standards because in doing so they will offend the 
principle of objectivity that has been used throughout all legal systems assessed in this thesis. It is also 
submitted that laws that limit independent judicial consideration of all the objective factors that apply in a case, 
should be revoked.  The only way the public can be convinced that laws are just, is if they insist on the 
application of reasonable objective standards by independent judges. 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown that objective standards have been used in Jewish law, ancient Athenian law, Roman law, 
canon law and English common law because they resonate with the human assessment of what is fair and just. 
These standards were used to evaluate human behaviour. Although the standards used in these legal systems 
may not have been purely objective, the laws that endured always included objective elements.  
 
Christopher Cherniak identified the universality of a reasonable person is in need of further research: 
The fact that a reasonable person concept turns up in such disparate social structures further suggests its universality. 
A cross-cultural hypothesis worth some systematic exploration, therefore, is that the reasonable person concept is as 
universal as the very idea of a legal code.986 
This thesis has filled this ‘research gap’ in legal philosophy. 
 
This thesis has shown that the existence of objective standards in all the areas demonstrates that all legal 
systems examined depended upon objective standards to assess culpability. It is submitted tha this consequence 
provides an insight into the way human reason operates.  
 
The legal systems in this thesis rejected the use of subjective standards as a legislative tool either implicitly or 
explicitly. Because they lacked objectivity. However, in the event that objective standards were not used as a 
judicial or legislative tool, the standard in question was perceived to be unjust and aberrant laws which omitted 
objective elements were eventually abandoned.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of human cognition in relation to assessing right 
from wrong by identifying the universal use of objective standards in the legal systems evaluated. The universal 
application of an objective test like common law’s reasonable person test suggests that laws which attempt to 
adjudicate human conduct without such standards will not satisfy their citizen consumers because they will not 
be perceived to be just.  
 
                                                          
986 Cherniak, above n 51, 145. 
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This thesis has shown how the human cognitive faculty works when assessing the justice of human law. It 
concludes that modern day legal systems have deviated from reason as expressed in the previous chapter.  
  
The presence of objective tests, in the examples considered, establishes that human reason dictates that objective 
standards are indispensable to purport a moral judgement.   
By demonstrating the pervasive use of objective standards in all the legal systems considered, this thesis also 
suggests that lawmakers and judges should be taught that objective elements are an essential part of any law that 
is to be perceived just in the long term.  
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